Annual Report 2021

Forging and Fostering Peace
ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation

Forging and Fostering Peace
ASEAN Institute for
Peace and Reconciliation

ANNUAL REPORT

2021

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Messages

H.E. Yeap Samnang

Ambassador/Permanent Representative of Cambodia to ASEAN

Chair of the ASEAN-IPR Governing Council

Over two years, the Southeast Asian region is still adapting to the challenges that the global COVID-19 pandemic pose. However, I am delighted to see many new initiatives and achievements that the ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (ASEAN-IPR) has taken up, continuing to stay relevant in the conversations developing in the region. Against the backdrop of the pandemic, the Institute has continued coming up with innovative ways to spread narratives of peace and putting forward the importance of working together with various stakeholders to address challenges in the region.

Under the ASEAN Comprehensive Recovery Framework, one of the identified strategies is on 'strengthening human security', whereby ASEAN commits to develop a recovery framework that puts the welfare of people at the core, by strengthening the protection and empowerment of all people and all communities in COVID-19 recovery and beyond – including prioritising mainstreaming of gender equality throughout the response and the recovery process. The ASEAN-IPR is contributing to the efforts of integrating Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda through its initiative on the Module Development of a WPS Training Programme aimed at building the capacity of ASEAN government officials.

Under Cambodia's Chairmanship of ASEAN with the theme "ASEAN A.C.T.: Addressing Challenges Together", the WPS Agenda continue to be one of the priorities, with the focus on completing the Regional Plan of Action on WPS in ASEAN by 2022. The WPS Agenda is another cross-cutting issue that requires the support and involvement of all the pillars of the ASEAN Community in order to make it effective and meaningful. Moreover, it is Cambodia's endeavour under our chairpersonship, namely in the political and security pillar, that ASEAN remains resilient and strong against non-traditional security issues in the region, to ensure our way forward in peace, security and prosperity.

Entering its tenth year of existence, I strongly believe the ASEAN-IPR stays creative and adaptive in implementing its mandate and function – and for this I commend the continued dedication of the Executive Director and his team in the ASEAN-IPR Secretariat.

Lastly, I would like to thank ASEAN Member States, whether through the Governing Council, Advisory Board as well as ASEAN Women for Peace Registry, and the partners of Institute that have provided their support which enabled the actualisation of all the projects in 2021.

Ms. Nhek Soparama

Chair of the Advisory Board of the ASEAN-IPR

It is very encouraging that the ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (ASEAN-IPR) has exercised its mandate effectively since its official launch in Phnom Penh in November 2012. Even more so, the Institute with much flexibility and creativity has managed to put forward various research and capacity-building activities with relevant ASEAN Bodies and External Partners in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic. I must commend His Excellency Ambassador I Gusti Agung Wesaka Puja, Executive Director of ASEAN-IPR, and the ASEAN-IPR Secretariat team for their outstanding work.

Remarkably, ASEAN-IPR has initiated numerous capacity-building activities on peace and conflict resolution in the form of training programs and discussion forums. In particular, the ASEAN-IPR Discussion Series ever since its first launch in 2020 has become a signature activity of the Institute. These activities have helped to strengthen the public understanding of peace and security matters through the sharing of best practices and lessons learned.

The Institute has played a key part in the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda and Youth, Peace, Security (YPS) Agenda in ASEAN. ASEAN-IPR focuses on empowering women and youths as proactive agents of peace rather than passive beneficiaries, which is a key aspect of the sustainability, inclusiveness, and success of peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts. Encouraging youth's participation and involvement in peace processes and intergenerational collaboration, including through the use of digital technology, is also central to the Institute's recent work.

ASEAN-IPR has also contributed to ASEAN's efforts in promoting gender mainstreaming across all pillars and ASEAN-led mechanisms, including through the Institute's continued support for the ASEAN Women for Peace Registry (AWPR). This is very well in line with one of Cambodia's priorities for ASEAN Chairmanship 2022.

In the true spirit of "Let's ACT Together", ASEAN-IPR has substantiated partnerships with like-minded institutions/organisations/partners to promote the culture of peace within our region. In this regard, I highly appreciate the generous support from various partners to the ASEAN-IPR's projects/activities/initiatives.

Taking this opportunity, as the Chair of the Advisory Board of ASEAN-IPR 2022, I would like to congratulate the Institute on its 10th anniversary. I wish ASEAN-IPR continued success in its future endeavours in contributing to the building of a peaceful, harmonious, and prosperous Community, in line with ASEAN Community Vision 2025 and beyond. I also wish to extend my well wishes to Indonesia for Chairing the Governing Council and Advisory Board of the ASEAN-IPR in 2023.

I Gusti Agung Wesaka Puja

Chief Executive Director
of the ASEAN-IPR

As the pandemic continue on from the previous year, the world continued to adjust to situations in 2021. This is indeed the case for ASEAN and the ASEAN Institute for Peace & Reconciliation (ASEAN-IPR), as we embark on our 9th year of existence, and in the wake of reaching the first decade. We look at challenges not as half full or half empty glass of water, but windows of opportunity to address the elephant in the room, while harmonising and strengthening trust.

As reflected in the ASEAN Anthem, "we dare to dream, we care to share", creativity, bravery and flexibility have been the mantra that gave way to the Institute continuing its work in spite of challenges. Therefore, I am humbled to share to our stakeholders that 2021 recorded an all-time record thus far for the ASEAN-IPR in carrying out activities. Such activities came in the form of focused group discussion (FGD), webinar, workshop, training, call for papers/articles, research, and even through the creation of original poetry.

In 2021, we also took a chance to touch upon new topics/issues that require the region's attention. This includes – among others – the role of information and communication technology (ICT) in mitigating conflict and fostering peace, conflict management and pandemic response, education in crisis situations, utilising digital platforms for peace, role of interreligious and intercultural dialogue for peacebuilding, as well as the role of local wisdom in peacebuilding.

None of the work in 2021 could be done half as well, without the trust and collaboration forged and cultivated with our growing roster of partners in 2021. The year saw our first collaboration with ASEAN Foundation, ASEAN Studies Centre of Gadjah Mada University, Institute for Peace and Democracy (IPD), and many like-minded institutions/think tanks within the region. It is also encouraging to inaugurate collaboration with many institutions outside of the region – of which you will learn more in the Report.

It is certainly noteworthy to highlight ASEAN-IPR's growing engagement with the general public in 2021. These are the activities that showed that everyone could play a part in fostering culture of peace. The year started on a high note with our Peace Message Video Competition – of which the top 3 selected original videos are available on our YouTube channel and on our Instagram. The ASEAN-IPR Discussion Series' number of audiences have been growing, and the activity has easily become one of the Institute's signature activities, with the benefit of the strong support from the Embassies of Finland and Ireland in Jakarta. Nevertheless, out of our outreach activities last year, none has attracted more public participation than the Publication of ASEAN Peace Poems, with close to 200 entries of original poems received.

While many new activities surface, the Institute does not forget its main mandate as a research and capacity building institution. Thus, 2021 saw the start of our 2nd research project – this time looking at the peace processes in Aceh. The year also saw the Institute's call for papers to scholars in the region for the first time – through our "Working Paper Series on Peace & Conflict Resolution", as well as our publication/book project with a Chinese University. Also, we've developed two training modules tailor-made for the region: one on youth and technology for peace, another on advancing women, peace & security (WPS) in the region.

As always, I wish to take this opportunity to express my appreciation to the ASEAN-IPR's Governing Council and Advisory Board for their continued guidance and support. I would also like to acknowledge the cooperation and support from our ASEAN Women for Peace Registry (AWPR) Members, of which we have turned to numerous times in realising the various projects done in 2021.

It is also my privilege to specially recognise Brunei Darussalam as the 2021 Chair of ASEAN and ASEAN-IPR, under the theme "We Care, We Prepare, We Prosper". Your stewardship in the past year has truly strengthened and prepared ASEAN to be more responsive and ready in facing current and future challenges. We also look forward to the leadership of Cambodia, the same Chair who saw the Institute's inception in 2012, as Chair of the Institute in 2022.

To all of our friends, partners, stakeholders, we present to you our Annual Report for 2021, in hopes that you enjoy, know, learn and grow with us in forging and fostering peace for ASEAN.

About ASEAN-IPR

1 Establishment

The ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (ASEAN-IPR) is an Institute **mandated** to be ASEAN's institution dedicated for research activities, and supporting ASEAN bodies, on peace, reconciliation, conflict management and conflict resolution.

The Institute was established in fulfilment of an action line under Provision B.2.2.i of the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) Blueprint (2010-2015), which aims to *"strengthen research activities on peace, conflict management and conflict resolution".*

On 8 May 2011, at the 18th ASEAN Summit, ASEAN Leaders adopted a "*Joint Statement on the Establishment of an ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation*". The following year, at the 45th ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting (AMM) in July 2012, the Institute's terms of reference (TOR) was adopted, making way for the Institute's official launch during the 21st ASEAN Summit on **18 November 2012** in Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

The Institute's legal personality is established under a Host Country Agreement with the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, granting the ASEAN-IPR's privileges and immunities, which was signed on 1 February 2018.

The Institute is also called to promote activities agreed in the APSC Blueprint, and additional activities as agreed by ASEAN Member States. Specifically, the Institute has been assigned to be one of the implementers of **10 Action Lines under the APSC Blueprint 2025**.

Thus, the ASEAN-IPR is envisioned to be ASEAN's knowledge hub and centre of excellence in building capacity on conflict resolution and reconciliation and further strengthening peace-oriented values towards harmony, peace, security and stability in the region and beyond.

2 Mandate & Functions

Pursuant to its mandate, the Institute is to undertake activities as prescribed in its **Terms of Reference**, available in **Annex 1**, which include:

Research

Undertake **research** and compile ASEAN's experiences and best practices on peace processes, with the view of providing appropriate recommendations to ASEAN bodies, and enhance regional mechanisms.

Capacity Building

Build capacity and knowledge on peace processes for all stakeholders.

Pool of Experts

Develop a **pool of experts** to assist ASEAN (governments and/or Bodies) in conflict management, provide policy recommendations, as well as facilitation for peace negotiations.

Networking

Establishing **linkages/ network** with relevant institutions and organisations in ASEAN Member States, as well as other region, and at the international level with similar objectives aimed at promoting a culture of peace.

Dissemination of Information

Disseminate information of best practices, lessons learned and relevant information to ASEAN Member States, other relevant stakeholders, as well as the general public.

3 ASEAN-IPR Logo & Motto

Since April 2018, the ASEAN-IPR logo has been established as part of the Institute's identity, to represent its mandate, functions, vision & mission.

The ASEAN-IPR's logo shows a blue dove, of which the wings are also shaped as a hand that safely holds the ASEAN Emblem – as a gentle guard of ASEAN's peace and stability. The dove also holds an olive branch, with ten leaves of the olive branch representing ten ASEAN Member States. Both the dove and olive branch are universal symbols of peace. Lastly, the dominant blue colour represents a peaceful and stable ASEAN.

In January 2021, the ASEAN-IPR adopted its motto, namely "**Forging and Fostering Peace**". The motto was subsequently incorporated into the Institute's logo. The motto has a colour gradient, from a lighter blue to a more solid blue, represents the purpose and aspiration of ASEAN-IPR's work: to solidify and nurture peace in the region.

Forging and Fostering Peace
ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation

4 Structure of the ASEAN-IPR

The ASEAN-IPR consists of:

Governing Council (GC)

The Governing Council (GC) is the highest decision-making body of the Institute, with the responsibility to formulate guidelines and procedures for the Institute's activities, as well as approving the Institute's annual operating budget. The GC consists of one representative from each ASEAN Member State, with the Secretary-General of ASEAN and the Executive Director (ED) of ASEAN-IPR (serving as Ex-Officio Members of the Council). In 2021, under the Chairmanship of Brunei Darussalam, the GC held three (3) meetings, namely: (i) 22nd Meeting (4 February 2021); (ii) 23rd Meeting (10 May 2021); and, (iii) 24th Meeting (4 November 2021).

Advisory Board (AB)

The Advisory Board (AB) is responsible for generating research priorities of the Institute, for consideration by the Governing Council. The Board consists of eminent persons in related fields, with one representative from each ASEAN Member State, and the ED of ASEAN-IPR serving as an Ex-Officio Member. In 2021, under the Chairmanship of Brunei Darussalam, the AB held their 10th Meeting on 4 November 2021. Pursuant to their Rules of Procedures, the AB also convened an Interface Meeting with the GC on 4 November 2021, which updated their latest list of Priority Research Areas.

Executive Director (ED)

The Executive Director (ED) represents the ASEAN-IPR in all administrative and operational matters and manages activities of the Institute. The ED also heads the ASEAN-IPR Secretariat, based in Jakarta. The Institute's current Executive Director is Mr. I Gusti Agung Wesaka Puja, who was appointed by the Governing Council on 26 October 2020, for a three-year term, succeeding Mr. Rezlan Ishar Jenie. Pursuant to the Terms of Reference (TOR) of the ASEAN-IPR, the ED shall make regular reports on the work of the Institute through the relevant senior officials to the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) Council.

ASEAN Women for Peace Registry

The ASEAN Women for Peace Registry (AWPR) is a means to take stock of women experts in the field of peace and reconciliation. The Registry's establishment on 13 December 2018 in Cebu City, Philippines, was pursuant to the ASEAN-IPR's function to pool expertise in support for ASEAN's peace and security efforts. Moreover, the AWPR also aims to contribute to the implementation of the ASEAN Leaders' "Joint Statement on Promoting Women, Peace and Security in ASEAN", adopted on 13 November 2017 during the 31st ASEAN Summit, which encouraged the integration of gender perspectives in all conflict prevention initiatives and strategies.

Currently, there are 27 Members of the AWPR from all 10 ASEAN Member States, of which the list of Members could be seen on **ANNEX 2.**

Progress & Achievements of the Institute

1 Annual Operational Budget & Facilities

The Institute's annual operational budget for 2021 continued to be provided through the generous support and contribution of the Government of Indonesia, amounting to **USD 272,580.00** – as it has been since 2018. In addition, the Institute also has funds in the amount of **USD 16,321.20** from the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand, which was accorded as a one-off contribution during its chairmanship in 2019.

annual operational budget for 2020

$ 272,580

total operational expenses

75%

The total operational expenses (utilisation rate) of the 2021 budget had been approximately 86%. Similar to 2020, situations surrounding the Covid-19 pandemic continued to necessitate various creative adjustments in the Institute's operations, which affects under-utilisation of budget lines such as travel, hosting meetings (face-to-face), etc. However, the ASEAN-IPR Secretariat took the initiative to adjust and optimise the work of the Institute – in which funds were re-appropriated to support newly proposed initiatives

The Government of Indonesia also continued its support for the ASEAN-IPR Secretariat's office, based in the Training Centre of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia premises – inclusive of in-kind contribution such as office equipment and basic maintenance. Discussions are also on-going on the relocation of the ASEAN-IPR Secretariat office premises to the ASEAN Secretariat's Heritage Building.

2 External Audit and Outcome of Audit

The ASEAN-IPR continued to engage with Independent Auditor BDO Indonesia *(Tanubrata Sutanto Fahmi Bambang & Partner)* between February-July 2021, to audit the Institute's annual operational budget and project funds for the period of 1 January to 31 December 2020. During the audit process, the ASEAN-IPR Secretariat exercised transparent communication and provided complete information and all data needed to the External Auditor.

Following the External Audit of the Institute's finances for FY 2020, the External Auditor was of the opinion that the financial statement of the ASEAN-IPR Secretariat ended on 31 December 2020 has been presented in accordance with International Public Sector Accounting Standards.

External Audit for the Institute's finances for FY 2021 will be conducted in 2022.

3 ASEAN-IPR Activities in 2021

With the conclusion of the very first Three-Year Work Plan (TYWP) of ASEAN-IPR, covering 2017-2020, on 1 December 2020, the ASEAN-IPR Governing Council endorsed the new TYWP of the Institute for 2021-2023. The TYWP had been formulated to guide the Institute in implementing its mandates and functions, and aimed to define targets and achievements on the TOR and the ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint 2025; as well as to chart out strategic direction and outcomes for the ASEAN-IPR. Thus, the Institute's activities in 2021 have been pursuant to the latest TYWP.

With the on-going Covid-19 pandemic, the ASEAN-IPR continues to creatively adjust with its activities as necessary. Nevertheless, despite the challenges posed by the Covid-19 pandemic, 2021 recorded an all-time record for the Institute on the number of activities carried out – with almost 20 activities conducted throughout the year, whether in the form of Focused Group Discussion (FGD), Seminar/Webinar, Workshop, Training, Call for Papers/Articles, Research, even a Publication of Poems. Many activities are still conducted either through virtual (online) means, or at best through hybrid (combination of online-offline) format.

Activities which engaged the public further pushes the Institute's visibility and online presence – as well as increasing public participation in peace building, in line with the Institute's mandate and functions.

The following are highlights of the Institute's activities throughout 2021:

i Call for Papers & Publication of "ASEAN-IPR Working paper Series on Peace & Conflict Resolution"

Working Papers are scientific papers addressing preliminary results of research and discuss what the next steps should be or how-to follow-up from the preliminary results. **The ASEAN-IPR Working Paper Series on Peace & Conflict Resolution** was initiated and approved by the Governing Council in November 2020.

While adapting to the many challenges posed by the Covid-19 pandemic and still wanting to continue its work, the ASEAN-IPR initiated this project to engage with scholars and academes in the region through think tanks and like-minded institutions based in ASEAN Member States. Amongst the objectives of this project were to: (i) support the implementation of the Priority Research Areas that has been drawn by the Institute's Advisory Board; (ii) serve as reference for possible research projects; and, (iii) promote collaboration and networking with like-minded institutions. The Call for Papers was circulated in December 2020.

Ultimately, five (5) Authors from different institutions based in various ASEAN Member States produced five (5) Working Papers – all of which were written and published in 2021 and early 2022. The Papers touched upon topics ranging from gender mainstreaming in peacebuilding, to the role of local communities and local wisdom in peace processes. All papers were also reviewed by an Editorial Team, coming from the Institute's Advisory Board and the ASEAN Women for Peace Registry.

All of the Working Papers are available electronically on the ASEAN-IPR Website and are appended at the tail end of this Annual Report **(ANNEX 6-ANNEX 10).**

ii ASEAN-IPR Focused Group Discussion (FGD), Session 1: "The Role of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) in Mitigating Conflict and Fostering Peace"

(25 January 2021, Yogyakarta, Indonesia/Hybrid with online participants)

This was one of only two activities in 2021 which has limited face-to-face participation, in respect to the Covid-19 protocol. In collaboration with the ASEAN Studies Centre of Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta, the ASEAN-IPR convened its very first Focused Group Discussion (FGD) – with a hybrid online/offline format (co-hosts organising the event from Yogyakarta, Indonesia). Around 25 participants – from the Governing Council, Advisory Board, AWPR, scholars/academes, as well as mainstream and social media influencer representatives – actively contributed to the discussions. The FGD aimed to seek further knowledge and understanding on how ICT could support efforts in mitigating and managing causes and consequences of conflict, as well as build and maintain peace.

The FGD dove into – among others – (i) how ICT, in particular governance of cyberspace, can assist in addressing fake news, falsehood and misinformation in the contexts of domestic or regional conflicts; (ii) the role of social media influencers in mitigating conflict and forging peace, and how states could and should engage them; (iii) how to manage the use of ICTs and social media platforms for information crowdsourcing, especially in conflict hotspots; and, (iv) state support for peacekeeping initiatives on ICT platforms.

Discussions noted the importance of ICT in conflict resolution today. On one hand, there is the eminent risk of ICT to be subject of manipulation, while there is urgency to dig into the potential use of ICT to promote peace on the one hand. To tackle the former, the discussion emphasized the importance of education and youth digital literacy to prevent the spread of fake news and disinformation. Equally important, there is urgency to create and update policy guidelines on ICT governance, especially surrounding the issue of internet security, digital peace meditation, and threat assessment for early warning systems

iii ASEAN-IPR Outreach Programme: Peace Message Video Competition

(January 2021)

Another initiative born from continuing work in the midst of the challenges posed by the Covid-19 pandemic was the ASEAN-IPR Outreach Programme. The Programme aimed to broaden the reach of the Institute by promoting its work through engagement with the public and raising their awareness. Thus, a series of activities which invites public participation were initiated, namely – (i) Peace Message Video Competition; (ii) Online Lecture Video; and, (iii) Online Discussion Forum.



The Peace Message Video Competition was the first sub-activity under the Outreach Programme to be implemented. The Video Message Competition specifically targets youth in the region – inviting them to create short videos promoting and/or narrating peace, tolerance and diversity/pluralism. Up to 28 entries were received in a span of one-month. The selected top 3 videos were posted on the ASEAN-IPR's Instagram and YouTube pages. The competition significantly increased followers/subscribers, engagement and traffic into the Institute's social media platforms.

iv Call for Papers & Publication in Collaboration with China Foreign Affairs University (CFAU): 'Sustaining Peace in ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific: Preventive Diplomacy Measures'

The ASEAN-IPR was invited to collaborate with China Foreign Affairs University to produce a publication entitled Sustaining Peace in ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific: Preventive Diplomacy Measures. The publication compiled eight (8) papers/articles – four (4) by ASEAN authors and four (4) by Chinese authors writing on topics ranging from "conflict prevention, preventive diplomacy and international development cooperation", "The Global South and innovative practices in conflict prevention, conflict management and preventive diplomacy", "conflict prevention, conflict management, preventive diplomacy and pandemic response" and "new challenges".



The project aimed to compile and disseminate the experiences and best practices from the perspectives of ASEAN and Chinese scholars on sustaining peace. Moreover, in line with the Institute's function, as well as pursuant to the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) Blueprint 2025, the project endeavoured to build network, enhance dialogue and cooperation/collaboration with relevant institutions on the promotion of peace.



The following are titles and authors of the articles compiled for the publication:

1) "Implementing Development Approach to Conflict Prevention in an On-going Conflict Context: Experience, Challenges and Lessons-learned from Thailand" *(by Suphatmet Yunyasit, Thailand, Member of AWPR)*
2) "Examining the Space for Adaptation and Innovation in Conflict Management in the Global South" *(by Joel Ng, Singapore, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University Singapore)*
3) "More of the Same: ASEAN Conflict Management in the Covid-19 Era" *(by Fitriani, Indonesia, Centre for Strategic & International Studies Indonesia)*
4) "ASEAN and the Challenge of Democracy" *(by Amina Rasul, Philippines, Member of AWPR)*
5) "Developmental Peace: The Chinese Approach to UN Peacekeeping and Peacebuildiing" *(by He Yin)*
6) "Relational Security and Practices in ASEAN" *(by Ji Ling)*
7) "Southeast Asia's Response to Public Health Security Crisis from the Perspective of Regionalism and International Cooperation" *(by Hu Xin)*
8) "Ways to Construct a New Asia-Pacific Security Architecture: A Chinese Integrative Outlook" *(Su Hao and Xiong Yuetian)*

The publication is expected for completion and subsequently launched in the middle of 2022.

v ASEAN-IPR Discussion Series 2021, Session 1: "Post-Conflict Peace Building and Relief Efforts" (14 July 2021)

Since it was first launched in 2020, the ASEAN-IPR Discussion Series have become a signature activity of the Institute – drawing interest and/or attention from like-minded institutions and the general public alike. Thus, this initiative continues in 2021 with seven sessions spread throughout the second half of the year. The 2021 Discussion Series were supported by the Embassy of Finland and Embassy of Ireland in Jakarta.

The inaugural session of the Discussion Series 2021 took the theme "Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and Relief Efforts", which aimed to discuss the synergy between humanitarian assistance and relief with peacebuilding efforts. The session brought more than one hundred (100) participants, who joined through the

webinar's platform or through live-streaming on the Institute's YouTube Channel. The session was moderated by H.E. Kok Li Peng (Representative of Singapore to the ASEAN-IPR Governing Council), and brought two speakers – namely Ms. Adelina Kamal (Executive Director of ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre)) and Mr. Tomi Jarvinen (Deputy Executive Director of Finn Church Aid).

During the Session, the speakers emphasised the crucial role of local communities, authorities, women as well as youths to have a common shared understanding on how to respond to disasters or conflicts. Moreover, the discussion also underscored the importance of transparency and information sharing between the parties of conflict to build trust, and allow for collaboration and ensure security, especially in post-conflict situations. This session is available on the ASEAN-IPR YouTube channel through the following link: **http://bit.ly/DiscussionSeries2021Session1**

vi Module Development for the ASEAN-IPR Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Training Programme

Pursuant to ASEAN-IPR's capacity building function; and to fulfil one of its tasks to undertake studies to promote gender mainstreaming in peace processes; as well as in support of the 2017 Leaders' Joint Statement on Promoting Women, Peace and Security (WPS) in ASEAN – the ASEAN-IPR is formulating and designing a Training Programme on Women, Peace & Security. The project aims to mainstream WPS pillars into ASEAN Member States' policymaking and community building efforts. Furthermore, it also aimed to develop enhanced skills and knowledge on peacebuilding and conflict resolution through a comprehensive understanding of WPS Agenda in the region.

As a start (Phase 1), the ASEAN-IPR is developing a Module on WPS Training Programme – tailor-made specifically for government officials in relevant line ministries and agencies that could strategically produce policies and programmes supporting women's participation, protection and rehabilitation in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. This First Phase is supported by the Canada Fund for Local Initiatives (CFLI), channelled through the Mission of Canada to ASEAN, as well as by the United Kingdom Mission to ASEAN.

For the Module Development, the ASEAN-IPR engaged with Prof. Miriam Coronel-Ferrer – who chaired the government panel that negotiated and signed the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines; and served as a Member of the United Nations' Standby Team of Senior Mediators – as Lead Expert. She was joined by other experts and practitioners on peacebuilding, conflict analysis and conflict resolution from across the region – namely Dr. Emma Leslie (Cambodia), Dr. Fitriani (Indonesia), Prof. Jasmin

Nario-Galace (Philippines), Dr. Tamara Nair (Singapore), Dr. Amporn Marddent (Thailand), Dr. Hoang Oanh (Viet Nam). Three Modules (representing the junior, mid and senior levels) were developed through Four Expert Meetings. Additionally, the Module Development went through a regional consultation with stakeholders such as the ASEAN-IPR GC, AB, Members of the AWPR, ASEAN Committee on Women (ACW), ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC), UN Women, as well as other stakeholders/ partners/like-minded institutions – seeking their comments and/or inputs.

Following the development of the Module, Phase 2 of the project (set to be implemented in 2022 or early 2023) will be the Pilot Trainings – implementing the three different Modules. Phase 2 is expected to be supported by CFLI as well as the United Kingdom (UK) Mission to ASEAN.

vii Interface between the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the ASEAN-IPR on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda

(22 July 2021)

Upon initiative and invitation from the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (ICRC) Regional Delegation to Indonesia and Timor-Leste, Members/ Representatives of the ASEAN-IPR Governing Council (GC), Advisory Board (AB) and ASEAN Women for Peace Registry (AWPR) had a virtual Interface with ICRC Representatives (coming from their headquarters in Geneva, Bangkok Office & Jakarta Office). More than 50 participants from the two institutions interacted during the Interface.

The main objective of the Interface was to present ICRC's role and mandate within the context of the women, peace and security (WPS) agenda and enhance the mutual understanding of each institution's position and approach to WPS. Furthermore, the Interface endeavoured to explore areas of mutual interest, namely where ICRC could complement endeavours undertaken by the ASEAN-IPR and AWPR.

Executive Director of ASEAN-IPR highlighted the Symposium on International Humanitarian Law entitled "Strengthening Convergences for Humanitarian Action in ASEAN" back in 2017 in Manila, as the inaugural collaboration between ASEAN-IPR and ICRC. Thus, it has been the Institute's hope to expand the two institutions' collaboration on areas of common interest.

The ICRC focused its presentation on addressing sexual violence in the Asia-Pacific Region, as well as how it aligns with the WPS agenda. Furthermore, they also underlined how the international humanitarian law (IHL) – as the main bulk of ICRC's work – synergises with the WPS agenda.



viii ASEAN Foundation/ASEAN-IPR/ICRC Joint Webinar: "The Value of Education as an Essential Public Service: Ensuring the continuity and resumption of education in crisis situations" (28 July 2021)

ASEAN-IPR continued its collaboration with ICRC, as well as its very first collaboration with the ASEAN Foundation, through this Joint Webinar. More than 130 participants – coming from ASEAN & ASEAN Member States' institutions, think tanks, universities, youth as well as humanitarian organisations – took part in the Webinar.

The Webinar aimed to exchange best practices and lessons learned on how authorities, education institutions and humanitarian organisations could work collaboratively with stakeholders to provide assistance and improve access to education in crisis situations and how to prepare for potential shocks in the future (i.e., armed conflicts, human induced and/or natural disasters, etc.). Moreover, it sought to discuss and explore the nexus between access to education and peacebuilding and/or reconciliation processes.

Dr. Helen Durham, Director of International Law and Policy of ICRC, delivered keynote remarks;

highlighting that access to education and to safe schools is critically important, before, after and even during crisis – as it create a protective and stabilising effect on the lives of children and their families. Furthermore, she underscored that enduring the continuity of education and a safe learning environment, including during crisis, is key to avoid creating a generation-wise education gap with long-term consequences for people and countries.

Other speakers are Ms. Josephine Lascano (Executive Director, Balay Rehabilitation Centre, Philippines) and Ms. Ayu Kartika Dewi (AWPR Member, Indonesia). The panel discussion and exchanges highlighted the need to reinforce and prioritised education as an essential public service, enhance preparedness and resiliency, develop robust infrastructure, and advocate for a stronger partnership among all stakeholders including government community, schools and the private sector.

The Webinar was also live streamed on the ASEAN-IPR's YouTube channel and is available for replay through the following link: **https://youtu.be/dwWOEIP7sew**

ix ASEAN-IPR Discussion Series 2021, Session 2: "Youth as Agents of Peace – Utilising Digital Platforms for Narratives of Peace" (11 August 2021)

As a lead up to its upcoming project on youth and technology, the second session of the ASEAN-IPR Discussion Series took the theme "Youth as Agents of Peace: Utilising Digital Platforms for Narratives of Peace". The Webinar brought together up to ninety (90) participants, with the objective to explore the role and impact of youth in maintaining and spreading narratives of peace through digital platforms within the region.

The discussion was moderated by H.E. Ambassador Artauli Tobing, Representative of Indonesia to the ASEAN-IPR Governing Council. Three speakers shared their experience and expertise on the topic: Mr. Somkiao Kingsada (Director-General of International Relations, Cooperation Department, Lao People's Revolutionary Youth Union), Mr. Mahmudi Yusbi (Head of Programmes, ASEAN Foundation) and Mr. Ahmad Afriyan (Project Development Manager, ASEAN Youth Organisation).

The Speakers exchanged views on the best practices of youth involvement related to peace on the digital platform, barriers to youth involvement in peace processes and intergenerational collaboration. To allow for meaningful youth participation in generating peaceful narratives, there needs to be an openness from the older generation to provide participatory channels for youth to be involved in peace processes. The Speakers also emphasised the timeliness of the shift in views from the youth as passive beneficiaries of help to the youth as proactive agents and leaders of peace. Additionally, they also highlighted the much-needed trust building between generations for collaboration to happen, especially in bridging the gap in the context of information communication and technology (ICT).

The Second Session of the ASEAN-IPR Discussion Series 2021 is available on the Institute's YouTube channel through the following link: **http://bit.ly/DiscussionSeries2021Session2**

x Youth-Tech: Utilising Technology as an Instrument of Peace – 1st Expert Meeting (19-20 August 2021, Jakarta, Indonesia/Hybrid)

"Youth and Technology (Youth-Tech): Utilising Technology as an Instrument of Peace" is one of the activities under the ASEAN-IPR Training & Capacity Building Programme, funded by ASEAN-Republic of Korea Cooperation Fund (AKCF). The project aims to produce a module on "Youth and Digital Technology for Peace" as an output, with a Training Workshop convened to implement the module.

The 1st Expert Meeting of the Youth-Tech Project was convened to discuss, deliberate and provide comments and/or inputs to the draft Module, prepared by the project's Regional Consultant + Team. Experts from Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines and Singapore; as well as observers from Brunei Darussalam, Lao PDR and Viet Nam; participated and provided recommendations to the draft Module – namely on content and technical aspects on the Module's development.



xi ASEAN-IPR Discussion Series 2021, Session 3: "20 Years of Aceh Peace Process – 15 Years after Helsinki, A Reflection" (25 August 2021)

The third session of the Discussion Series in 2021 took the theme "20 Years of Aceh Peace Process, 15 Years after Helsinki: A Reflection". The session aimed to reflect on the mediation for peace process in Aceh and discuss the implementation of the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) as the peace agreement between the conflicting parties, more than fifteen years after it was signed. The session brought more than ninety (90) participants.

The discussion was moderated by Prof. Miriam Coronel-Ferrer, Professor for the Department of Political Science at the University of the Philippines Diliman. Speakers in the session included Dr. Rizal Sukma (Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Indonesia), Ms. Minna Kukkonen-Karlander (Senior Manager in Asia Programme, CMI Martti Ahtisaari Peace Foundation) and Ms. Shienny Angelita (Indonesia Country Representative, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue).

The speakers exchanged views on the achievement and challenges of the Aceh Peace Agreement, including the shortcomings of the implementation of the Helsinki MOU. The peace initiative in Aceh was successful due to the political willingness and commitment from both the Indonesian Government and the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or GAM), assisted with a credible third-party mediator that resulted in a comprehensive agreement (i.e., Helsinki MOU). However, in order to ensure sustainable peace in Aceh and a successful implementation process, there needs to be a continuous discussion on the best practices to exercise the various aspects of the agreement. To do so, the active involvement from regional and international organisations, as well as local and national governments, and civil society is essential. Additionally, the Speakers also highlighted the importance of gender mainstreaming and women's representation in peace processes, as well as politics, to ensure an inclusive result that addresses the needs of all stakeholders.

xii ASEAN-IPR Research Project: "Aceh Case: Peace Building and Post-Tsunami Recovery" – Inception Meeting (30 August 2021)

In 2020, the Governing Council approved ad-referendum a Concept Note for ASEAN-IPR's 2nd Research Project, this time focusing on the peace process in Aceh, Indonesia; and to study the strategy and impact of post-tsunami humanitarian assistance in peace building process. Specifically, the research aimed to assess and link the factors of humanitarian assistance in natural disasters tsunami that could contribute to the peacebuilding process; as well as to identify and document the best practices and lessons learned that could be used as the references for other conflict and/or disaster areas. The Research Project was spearheaded by the Representative of Indonesia to the Governing Council and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia. In April 2021, the Project was approved for funding support by Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund (JAIF).

Following the conferment of support from JAIF, ASEAN-IPR Research Project – "Aceh Case: Peacebuilding and Post-Tsunami Recovery kick started with an Inception Meeting on 30 August 2021. The Meeting was attended by the Research Team, ASEAN-IPR Indonesia Team, ASEAN-IPR Secretariat, and representatives from JAIF as well as the Mission of Japan to ASEAN. The Research Team introduced the research activities and work plan – including research questions, research design, analytical framework, as well as health and safety protocols while carrying out the research in the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic. Following, the Meeting also gave room to seek comments and/or inputs from all relevant stakeholders on the research process.



xiii ASEAN-IPR Discussion Series 2021, Session 4: "Covid-19 and Peace in the Region" (22 September 2021)

The Fourth Session of the ASEAN-IPR Discussion Series 2021 aimed to discuss how the Covid-19 pandemic has caused disruptions to humanitarian assistance, efforts of conflict resolution and peacebuilding. More than 50 participants joined – both through the webinar platform as well as on the ASEAN-IPR's YouTube channel.

The Discussion was moderated by Dr. Darmp Sukontasap, Representative of Thailand to the Governing Council. Speakers in Session were: (i) Ms. S. Nanthini, MIR (Senior Analyst, S. Rajaratnam School for International Studies (RSIS)); (ii) Mr. Alexandre Faite (Head of Regional Delegation for Indonesia and Timor Leste, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)); (iii) Dr. Paul Quinn (Head of From Violence to Peace (Global Lead), Christian Aid Ireland).

The speakers exchanged views on how the region adapts to the shift in priorities from conventional humanitarian assistance to healthcare support and vaccine distribution, while looking at the region's success and shortfalls in pursuit of these efforts. Covid-19 has added further complexity to the risk landscape of ASEAN and the way humanitarian relief is conducted as the region have had to deal with natural hazards while at the same time facing the pandemic. The region has responded in a commendable way through ad-hoc meetings such as the ASEAN Special Summit on Covid-19 and regional mechanisms such as the AHA Centre, ASEAN Emergency Operations Network, ASEAN Bio-Diaspora Virtual Centre, Regional Public Health Laboratories Network, ASEAN Risk Assessment and Risk Communications Centre as well as the ASEAN Comprehensive Recovery Framework.

Nevertheless, as the pandemic could not be addressed in isolation, a horizontal, localised and cross-sectoral coordination is needed, as well as vertical approach in the form of a neutral and impartial international humanitarian aid in conflict situations. A complementarity approach that combines the two, as well as a stronger trust and relationship between the local communities and government/defence/police is needed to ensure a sustainable, inclusive and context-sensitive response to the health crisis and complex emergencies.

The Fourth Session of the Discussion Series 2021 is available on the ASEAN-IPR YouTube channel through the following link: **http://bit.ly/DiscussionSeries2021Session4**

xiv ASEAN-IPR Discussion Series 2021, Session 5: "Cross-sectoral Initiatives to Advance the WPS Agenda in ASEAN" (21 October 2021)

The Fifth Session of the ASEAN-IPR Discussion Series 2021 was convened on 21 October 2021. The Session aimed to explore initiatives undertaken by different sectors within ASEAN to ensure the participation and involvement of women in peace processes, and to reflect on the implementation of the women, peace and security (WPS) agenda within the region thus far. More than sixty (60) participants joined this Session.

Three Speakers were invited to share their expertise, namely: (i) H.E. Mrs. Kheng Samvada (Permanent Secretary of State, Cambodia Ministry of Women's Affairs/ASEAN Committee on Women (ACW) Focal Point Cambodia); (ii) Dr. Gloria Jumamil Mercado (AWPR Member, Philippines); and (iii) Ms. Lilianne Fan (Member of Southeast Asian Network of Peace Negotiators and Mediators (SEAWPNM). The Session was moderated by H.E. Yuyun Wahyuningrum, Representative of Indonesia to the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR).

The Speakers exchanged views on the various undertakings of ACW, AWPR and SEANWPNM in advancing the WPS agenda in the region, especially with reference to the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on WPS and its four pillars – participation, protection, prevention, and relief & recovery.

Although ASEAN has formulated the 2017 Joint Statement on Promoting WPS in ASEAN as well as completed the ASEAN Regional Study on WPS the ASEAN Region Plan of Action on WPS remains essential to promote ASEAN Member States' to adopt the WPS agenda to their national policies and programmes. Aside from developing the RPA, ACW, AWPR and



SEAWPNM have also been actively conducting capacity building initiatives, such as in the form of training and discussion. These activities allowed various actors in peace and to share the best practices and lessons learned on the implementation of WPS, as well as identify the existing challenges that may hamper the process.

As we are entering the third decade since the establishment of UNSCR 1325 on WPS, ASEAN along with its bodies and partners shall continue to create more opportunities for the regional community to exchange knowledge and experiences on WPS. Moreover, researches on the best practices and challenges among Southeast Asian local communities, especially amidst the pandemic, that may affect the implementation process should be thoroughly addressed. Through these researchers, recommendations to enhance regional and national mechanisms on WPS implementation can be made.

This Session of the Discussion Series 2021 is also available on ASEAN-IPR's YouTube Channel: **http://bit.ly/DiscussionSeries2021Session5**

xv KAICIID International Dialogue Centre – ASEAN-IPR Training Sessions on Interreligious Dialogue for ASEAN Officials (2-23 November 2021, Videoconference)

The King Abdullah bin Abduaziz Centre for Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue (KAICIID) is an international organisation whose work is to bring together religious leaders, policymakers and experts to the dialogue table so that they can find common solutions to shared problems. The organisation regularly conducts trainings on interreligious dialogue for relevant stakeholders – namely religious leaders, government officials, journalists and youth groups.

KAICIID initiated collaboration with the ASEAN-IPR by convening an Online Training Session on Interreligious Dialogue for ASEAN Officials between 2-23 November 2021. The Sessions aimed to: (i) support ASEAN policy and practices in areas of interreligious dialogue (IRD) and intercultural dialogue (ICD), in line with the mandate and/or objective of both institutions, and pursuant to the 2017 ASEAN Declaration on Culture of Prevention for a Peaceful, Inclusive, Resilient, Healthy and Harmonious Society; (ii) to stimulate potential development of broader IRD related engagements with ASEAN-IPR, especially in the areas of countering hate speech and engaging women and youth; and. (iii) to engage mid-level ASEAN officials/professionals involved in policy-making and technical support to utilise IRD and ICD techniques and approaches in conflict management and resolution.

The Training brought more than 20 officials from ASEAN – coming from government institutions of ASEAN Member States, ASEAN Secretariat & ASEAN-IPR. Particularly, the Sessions aimed to engage officials already working in international relations so they are able to incorporated IRD in diplomacy for the contribution to building social cohesion in the region. The dialogical sessions

covered topics such as the fight against stereotypes, and the integration of IRD and ICD in conflict transformation and peacebuilding processes. Participants learnt techniques and approaches they would be able to utilise for conflict management and conflict resolution, as well as in policy strategy and planning in order to promote policy-making processes which are sensitive to cultural and religious differences.

The ASEAN-IPR is exploring possibility to continue the Sessions with KAICIID, as possible regularised collaboration with the organisation. It is envisioned that an IRD & ICD Training Module that's tailor-made for the region would be the continued possible collaboration. Subsequent Sessions are also aimed to be convened in an offline (face-to-face) format.

xvi ASEAN-IPR Discussion Series 2021, Session 6: "Peace Processes beyond the Region: Sharing of Best Practices & Lessons Learned" (18 November 2021)

The Sixth Session of the ASEAN-IPR Discussion Series was specially convened in conjunction with the celebration of ASEAN-IPR's 9th anniversary, namely on 18 November 2021. Almost 200 participants tuned in for the Webinar. The Session's theme was in the spirit of strengthening engagement and partnership with like-minded institutions, pursuant to ASEAN-IPR's function as a knowledge hub through the establishment of network and collaboration. Therefore, the topic raised was peace processes beyond ASEAN – sharing best practices and lessons learned.

This Session brought together representatives from regional organisations – including African Union (AU) Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and Organization of American States (OAS) – with the objective to share their roles and/or experiences in peace processes within their respective regions. To round up the Session and provide a global perspective, a representative from the United Nations (UN), namely Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) was also present to share the UN's approach and role in peace processes from a multilateral perspective, including its engagement with ASEAN institutions.

Prior to the discussions, the first Executive Director of ASEAN-IPR, Ambassador Rezlan Ishar Jenie, and then Chair of the Governing Council, Ambassador Pengiran Hairani Pengiran Tajuddin, conveyed their felicitations and reassurance of what the ASEAN-IPR has achieved in the past nine years. Such included an array of symposia and workshops, research projects, training and capacity building projects, partnership with friends and like-minded institutions, manifestation of its first pool of experts through the ASEAN Women for Peace Registry (AWPR), as well as the first-ever ASEAN Women Interfaith Dialogue (as the first of its kind in the region).

Discussions were moderated by Dr. I Ketut Putra Erawan (Executive Director, Institute for Peace and Democracy (IPD)). Dr. Christina Horwatch-Stenner (OSCE), Ms. Mukondeleli Mpeiwa (AU) and Ms. Marian Vidaurri (OAS), all shared the mechanisms and/or architecture of their respective organisations on conflict resolution and peacebuilding. They highlighted the various lessons learned on their respective organisation's role in facilitating peacebuilding and the resolution of conflicts within their respective region/jurisdiction. Amongst the best practices underscored by all speakers was inclusivity of all stakeholders in the process of conflict resolution. Another dimension highlighted by the speakers include contemporary challenges such as the weaponization of ICT and social media, exacerbating the process of facilitating conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Additionally, all speakers also highlighted the impact of Covid-19 to the complexity of the aforementioned processes.

Ms. Theresa Whitfield, Director of Policy and Mediation Division of UN-DPPA highlighted the UN's work under the Secretary-General's (UNSG) good offices mechanism – including mediation, facilitation and specialised expertise. She also acknowledged the significant role of regionalism in peace processes, which became the basis of UN's engagement with its regional partners all over the world, including ASEAN.

The Sixth Session of the ASEAN-IPR Discussion Series is available on the ASEAN-IPR's YouTube's channel through the following link: **http://bit.ly/DiscussionSeries2021Session6**

xvii ASEAN-IPR Focused Group Discussion (FGD), Session 2: "Lessons Learned on Engaging Constituents for Peace Building in the Region" (7-8 December 2021, Bali, Indonesia)

The ASEAN-IPR's Focused Group Discussion (FGD) is an activity of the Institute, which was approved by the Governing Council to be a regularised event. The FGD is envisioned to be a basis for ASEAN-IPR to engage and collaborate with think tanks in the region, to share best practices and lessons learned on issues relevant to the work of the Institute and other like-minded institutions. The ASEAN-IPR FGD is conducted under Chatham House rules.

Ahead of the 14th Bali Democracy Forum (BDF), on 7-8 December 2021 in Bali the ASEAN-IPR collaborated with the Institute for Peace & Democracy (IPD) – as one of the institutions in charge of organising BDF – to convene its second Focused Group Discussion (FGD). The 2nd Session of the FGD was conducted with the theme "Lessons Learned on Engaging Constituents for Peace Building in the Region".

The topic was chosen with consideration on how the IPD has been engaging with various stakeholders on capacity building activities in the region and beyond, including training programme. As Key Resource Persons who laid out the foundation for the discussions, the FGD brought two of IPD's Patrons, namely H.E. Dr. N. Hassan Wirajuda (Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia 2001-2009) and H.E. Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Agus Widjojo (Chief of the National Resilience Institute of Indonesia).

Around 20 participants – representing the Institute's Governing Council, ASEAN Women for Peace Registry (AWPR), ASEAN Secretariat, think tank in Southeast Asia (i.e., CSIS Indonesia), as well as relevant stakeholders, actively contributed to the discussions. The 2nd session of the FGD was the first full offline activity since the start of the pandemic in 2020.

The FGD highlighted – among others – political dynamics in the region, and explored peace processes in Southeast Asia, namely the various lessons learned on engaging constituents for peacebuilding conducted under regional initiatives – which puts emphasis on dialogue, prior to the process of negotiation, mediation, adjudication – underlining the importance to listen and understand the dynamic process of each party, including the role of military in peacebuilding. Such lessons tie in with one of the ASEAN-IPR's priority areas for research, namely the "role of local communities, local wisdom & knowledge in peacebuilding, peace process and conflict resolution".

Based on previous experiences, it is noted that for many years, ASEAN Member States have been helping each other to resolve issues – whether inter-state or intra-state – without

overstepping boundaries of a state's internal affairs. ASEAN Member States have been comfortable to let each other in, and help each other's issues, due to common history, familiarity and empathy. In this regard, some viewed that a third-party facilitator on addressing issues should come from within the region (from ASEAN, for ASEAN). Thus, the ED of ASEAN-IPR underlined that ASEAN-IPR shall always stand ready to support such endeavour.

The FGD generated possible pathways for ASEAN and ASEAN-IPR in moving forward to engage constituents for peace and playing its role to support peace processes in the region. Among others, ASEAN and the ASEAN-IPR may take example from the Jakarta Informal Meeting – which facilitated the peace process in Cambodia and resulting in the Paris Peace Agreement; as well as other successful peace processes in the region, including Mindanao (Philippines), Aceh (Indonesia), etc. Discussion in such dialogue or informal meeting may include issues of common concern; such as addressing the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on peacebuilding.

No less important is the involvement of stakeholders – women and youth – in peace process which have always been in ASEAN and ASEAN-IPR's work agenda. However, it is equally essential to iterate which aspect of peacebuilding would be most effective youth groups be involved in – for example, embedding and cultivating culture of peace among the youth in the region.

xviii ASEAN-IPR Publication of ASEAN Peace Poems & ASEAN Peace Poetry Night (17 December 2021)

One of the ways to express thoughts about peace is through poetry. The art of poetry has been used to convey various messages – including that of peace – through different cultures. On 21 September 2021, in conjunction with the International Day of Peace, the ASEAN-IPR announced the call for creation of poems – inviting all ASEAN citizens to submit an original poem with topics related to peace (including – among others – peacebuilding, peacekeeping, peace education, conflict resolution, reconciliation, culture of peace, moderation, climate security, gender equality, youth participation and empowerment, humanitarian relief, natural resources, environment/mother earth).

A total of 196 original poems were received – whether done in English or in an ASEAN Member State language. The ASEAN-IPR engaged with three literary experts to select 25 poems that would subsequently be published in the **ASEAN-IPR Publication of ASEAN Peace Poems.** The experts were Mr. Hariz Fadhilah (Brunei Darussalam), Ms. Okky Madasari (Indonesia) and Ms. Melizarani T. Selva (Malaysia). The shortlisted poems underwent rigorous selection process, including coding process to ensure anonymity and impartiality. During the process, the Experts consistently underlined and praised the diversity in the poems submitted, showcasing the various interpretations of peace, and accordingly, the promising prospects of the arts sector in ASEAN.



On 17 December 2021, prior to the Seventh Session of the ASEAN-IPR Discussion Series, the ASEAN-IPR held an ASEAN Poetry Night to celebrate the art of poetry as a tool for peacebuilding by bringing a selection of authors out of the 25 selected poems to read out their poems. During the event, the three panel of experts also gave a live-reading of their own respective poems on peace.

The ASEAN-IPR Publication of ASEAN Peace Poems was published in early 2022 – both in electronic form and hardcopy. The electronic version of the publication is downloadable on the ASEAN-IPR Website on the following link: **https://asean-aipr.org/resources/asean-peace-poems/**

xix ASEAN-IPR Discussion Series 2021, Session 7: "The Role of Folklore (Local Wisdom) in Peacebuilding" (17 December 2021)

The Seventh and last Session of the ASEAN-IPR Discussion Series 2021 was done in the spirit of the ASEAN-IPR's function as a knowledge hub and to engage with civil society and relevant stakeholders to promote peacebuilding. The theme was **the role of folklore (local wisdom) in peacebuilding.** For the Session, the ASEAN-IPR invited representatives from government and non-governmental organisations and grassroots institution from the region to share their experience in transforming conflict through community-led peace initiatives. More than seventy (70) participants joined the Session.

This Session was moderated by Madame Amina Rasul-Bernardo (AWPR Member, Philippines; President, Philippine Center for Islam and Democracy). Speakers included Mr. Makara Nom (Officer, National Library, Ministry of Culture and Fine Arts of Cambodia), Ms. Visna Vulovik (Development and Gender Specialist, Wahid Institute) and Ms. Ei Pwint Rhi Zan (Managing Director, Third Story Project Myanmar) – who shared their works in relation to local wisdom, storytelling and peacebuilding, along with its successes and challenges.

A common point throughout the discussion was that local wisdom plays great importance in building culture of peace, whether through incorporating it into school curriculums, establishing a peace village, or promoting the positive message of peace by storytelling. Storytelling has been a tool that's used not only to entertain children, but also to inherit moral or social values for newer generations. Using folklore as one of its instances, we can learn from our ancestors on how we should address certain problems/issues. Therefore, we can influence the younger generations to generate culture of peace. However, it was acknowledged that the Covid-19 pandemic and conflict situations have hampered the efforts to build culture of peace through folklore.

On the other hand, the education sector may support the promotion of folklore in the spreading of positive messages of peace. For instance, the Commission on Higher Education and Heavenly Culture of the Philippines has been tasked to inculcate culture of peace within the schools, among the students and the professors. Incorporating peace education, including folklore within the curricula, is crucial to involve the participation of youths in eliminating violence in the society. Furthermore, it could also help countries with a low literacy rate. Peace education through community-building can help in promoting peace or those who do not have access to education. In addition, technology development could also be utilised to spread folklore through audiobooks and radios in order to reach a larger audience.

The Seventh Session of the Discussion Series 2021, along with the ASEAN Peace Poetry Night are available on ASEAN-IPR's YouTube's channel through the following **link: http://bit.ly/DiscussionSeries2021Session7**

An updated list of the Institute's activities from 2013 to 2021 is available in **ANNEX 5.**

4 ASEAN-IPR's Outreach, Communications & Publication

In March 2021, the Governing Council approved the Institute's Communication Work Plan for 2021 – which continued to promote awareness on the Institute's work among the general public, outreach and engage with stakeholders in promotion of ASEAN-IPR's work.

The Institute's numerous activities has naturally expanded and amplified the ASEAN-IPR's network and outreach. Moreover, starting in 2021, the ASEAN-IPR launched an Internship Programme, targeting fresh graduates, as well as students in their final years of university seeking work experience. The Internship Programme has increased attention – namely from youth groups – eager to learn and contribute to the work of ASEAN-IPR. On average, there are 3-5 Interns recruited in each quarter – focusing on Programme Management, Communications, as well as Secretariat Operations (Finance/Admin) work.

This year marked a high surge in the Website's hit – from 7,736 to 41,037 accumulated hits from its launch in 2018. This increase of hits is more than ten times from last year's number increase on the Website's hits. According to performance report prepared by the Website's developer, contributing factors to the surge of hits in 2021 may be due to: (i) an increase of interest to the Institute generated from the Internship Programme; (ii) an increase in resource-based contents such as e-publications, e-pamphlets and working papers; and, (iii) ASEAN-IPR activities which specifically aims to engage the general public – this include the Outreach Programme (i.e. Video Competition) as well as the Publication of ASEAN Peace Poems – where announcements made from social media would eventually lead interested parties to the Website to find further details and/or information on how to participate. It is encouraging to note that some Members of the Advisory Board (AB) and ASEAN Women for Peace Registry (AWPR) are also starting to use the Website as a platform to share their work (i.e., papers/articles/publications). One of the latest features to be introduced on the ASEAN-IPR Website is **the accessibility feature** – as an effort to make the Website more accessible and inclusive to all stakeholders. The accessibility feature gives visitors options as desired and more comfortable – such as larger or smaller text, high contrast and negative contrast, as well as grayscale.

Lastly, a new feature is in development for the Website – namely the Online Discussion Forum, under the ASEAN-IPR Outreach Programme. The Forum, which will be a new page under the Website is a platform provided for Members of the AB and AWPR to share contents – such as articles, working papers, write-ups, as well as events related to the work of ASEAN-IPR – inspired by knowledge-sharing online forums such as Quora or Reddit. Additionally, AB & AWPR Members could also bring up discussion on various issues in peace processes that would enable them to interact with Website Visitors. This new feature shall be launched in January 2022.

Support from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) for the ASEAN-IPR Website was due to end in May 2021. However, due to a significant amount of funds still available, the Website's Grant from the Norwegian MFA has been extended to May 2022 at no additional cost.

The performance of the social media platforms has been significantly increasing – especially due to increase in contents created in 2021. The Institute have been learning more on how to create contents as per each social media platform's target audience – which shall continuously be refined and improved. In 2021, platforms with most increases in followers/subscribers are Instagram, LinkedIn and YouTube – of which the number of increases has been greater than that of last year's increase.

Two new contents have been introduced to the ASEAN-IPR's YouTube Channel. The first is called "Series of Insights" – where Members of the Governing Council and Advisory Board, namely those about to conclude their term, gave insights on the work of the Institute, based on their personal experience. It is hoped that such content could give the general public a better idea of the ASEAN-IPR's work. The second content, currently in production, is another part of the Outreach Programme, namely the Online Lecture Video. The Lecture Videos will feature Members of the AWPR introducing various aspects and/or dimensions of peace processes (e.g., women, youth, climate/environment, radicalism/extremism). The Lecture Videos are also due to be launched in early 2022.

The ASEAN-IPR Publication of ASEAN Peace Poems have also proven to be one of the projects with the highest public engagement in 2021. This was apparent from the almost 200 entries of poems received from the public.

In 2021, it is noted that up to eight (8) new publications of the Institute were produced and/or published – as listed in ANNEX 5.

The following are the latest figures on followers/hits for the ASEAN-IPR Website and Social Media Platforms (as of December 2021):

ASEAN-IPR Website and Social Media Platforms

(as of December 2021)

8 August 2018	8 May 2018	3 January 2018	1 July 2018	1 February 2018	7 August 2019	Launched
41,037 HITS	1,932 FOLLOWERS	2,697 FOLLOWERS	689 FOLLOWERS	935 FOLLOWERS	369 SUBSCRIBERS	Hits/ Followers
33,301 HITS	613 FOLLOWERS	1,097 FOLLOWERS	93 FOLLOWERS	471 FOLLOWERS	199 SUBSCRIBERS	Increase from 2019

The Institute continues to make available its publications, most of which were generated from its activities. At the end of 2020, the ASEAN-IPR has also produced a pamphlet containing the Institute's basic information – both in electronic and hardcopy forms. The following are the latest ASEAN-IPR publications from 2021

ASEAN-IPR Pamphlet/ Infographic

ASEAN-IPR Annual Report 2020



ASEAN-IPR Working Paper Series on Peace & Conflict Resolution, Issue 2021, No. 1: "The Impact of Myanmar's Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement on the Peacebuilding Environment" (by Peggy BRETT)



ASEAN-IPR Working Paper Series on Peace & Conflict Resolution, Issue 2021, No. 4: "Local Women and Peacebuilding in Thailand's Deep South: Perspectives from the Peace Survey" (by Fareeda PANJOR and Nurainee JANGOE)



ASEAN-IPR Working Paper Series on Peace & Conflict Resolution, Issue 2021, No. 2: "Lessons Learned from the Peace Villages in Indonesia: The Role of Village Women in Policy-Making through Human Security Approach" (by Visna VULOVIK)



ASEAN-IPR Working Paper Series on Peace & Conflict Resolution, Issue 2021, No. 5: "The Responsibility to Provide: Cultivating an Ethos of Responsible Sovereignty in Southeast Asia" (by TAN See Seng)



ASEAN-IPR Working Paper Series on Peace & Conflict Resolution, Issue 2021, No. 3: "Cohesion in the Time of Conflict: An Analysis of Social Cohesion in the Context of Ethnic Armed Conflict in Myanmar's Rakhine State" (by Dominique Samantha DULAY)

ASEAN-IPR Publication of ASEAN Peace Poems

A complete list of ASEAN-IPR Publications is available in **ANNEX 6.**

5 ASEAN-IPR and Its Stakeholders/Partners

In 2018, the ASEAN-IPR Advisory Board developed a list of like-minded institutions within the region which the ASEAN-IPR could link and/or partner with – a list internally referred to "Catalogue of Think Tanks". In 2021, the Catalogue was finally utilised as the starting point for the ASEAN-IPR's first call for papers in implementing the 'Working Paper Series on Peace & Conflict Resolution'. Thus, the year 2021 marks ASEAN-IPR's first collaboration with multiple think tanks from within the region on its project.

The ASEAN-IPR cultivated new partnerships, as well as developed further existing engagement with various like-minded institutions. This included institutions like the ASEAN Foundation, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz International Centre for Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue (KAICIID), ASEAN Studies Centre of Gadjah Mada University (ASC-UGM) (Yogyakarta, Indonesia) and the Institute for Peace and Democracy (IPD). Through the Discussion Series, ASEAN-IPR engaged with other regional groupings such as the African Union, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and Organization of American States (OAS).

In 2021, the Institute actively engaged and/ or contributed to youth-led activities. Through the Youth-Tech Project, the Institute partnered with the ASEAN Youth Organisation (AYO). The Institute also contributed to AYO's Workshop on Cybersecurity in August 2021. Other notable youth-led activities where the Institute participated and/or contributed included – among others – "2021 Global Minority Rights Summer School: Ethnocultural Diversity, Conflict and the Human Rights Minorities" (organised by Tom Lantos Institute, Budapest); "ASEAN Youth Interfaith Camp" (October 2021); "ASEAN Youth Initiative Empowerment Programme (AYIEP)" (organised by ASC-UGM, August 2021); as well as the "Open Session of the Eleventh ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Youth" (September 2021).

Women, Peace & Security (WPS) remained high on the agenda of the ASEAN-IPR, as well as the priority of partners. The Institute and the ASEAN Women for Peace Registry (AWPR) contributed to the "Regional Study on Women, Peace & Security" – initiated by the ASEAN Secretariat with ASEAN Committee on Women (ACW) and the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC), with support from UN Women and ASEAN-USAID PROSPECT. Moreover, the Institute also participated in the "2nd ASEAN-Australia WPS Dialogue" in November 2021.

Through initiatives in 2021, the Institute have also started engagement with grassroots organisations – such as the panel of experts in the Peace Poems Publication, as well as Third Story Project Myanmar for the last session of the Discussion Series.

One of the most encouraging takeaways from 2021 has been the generous support from various partners to the ASEAN-IPR's projects/activities/initiatives – including (among others) ASEAN-ROK Cooperation Fund (AKCF), Canada Fund for Local Initiatives (CFLI), the Embassies of Ireland and Finland in Jakarta, Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund (JAIF), UK Mission to ASEAN. The ED also continue to engage with various Dialogue/Sectoral/Development Partners, many of whom have expressed and/or pledged support for future activities of the Institute.

6 ASEAN-IPR in the Joint Communique of the 54th ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting (AMM)

The ASEAN-IPR has been extremely encouraged by the acknowledgement and support of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting (AMM) through the Joint Communique of the 54th AMM (2 August 2021), namely paragraph 42 as follow:

"We noted ASEAN-IPR's activities with relevant ASEAN Bodies' and ASEAN External Partners to Promote the culture of peace and moderation in ASEAN. We encouraged the ASEAN-IPR to find innovative solutions to ensure its sustainability and activities. We also noted ASEAN-IPR's continued support for ASEAN Women for Peace Registry (AWPR) to implement the ASEAN Leaders' Joint Statement on Promoting Women, Peace and Security."

The full text of the Joint Communique of the 54th AMM is available on ANNEX 11.

Credit: asean.org

Annexes

Terms of Reference of the
ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation

The ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (hereinafter referred to as 'the Institute') shall be established under Provision B.2.2.i of the ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint. As a follow-up to the ASEAN Leaders' Joint Statement on the Establishment of an ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation adopted on 8 May 2011, the Institute shall be an entity associated with ASEAN under Article 16 of the ASEAN Charter.

The Institute shall operate in accordance with the following Terms of Reference (ToR):

1 Headquarters

The headquarters of the Institute shall be in the Republic of Indonesia, hereinafter referred to as "the Host Country", and shall be based in Jakarta.

2 Legal Personality

The legal personality of the Institute shall be established under a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Host Country and the Institute.

3 Personalities

The Institute would operate in accordance with the ASEAN Charter and be guided by the principles of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, ***inter alia***:

respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all ASEAN Member States;
shared commitment and collective responsibility in enhancing regional peace, security and prosperity; and
non-interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN Member States.

4 Mandate and Functions

4.1 Mandate

The Institute shall be the ASEAN institution for research activities on peace, conflict management and conflict resolution, as requested by ASEAN Member States.

The Institute's work will include, ***inter alia***, promotion of those activities agreed in the ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint and additional activities as agreed by ASEAN Member States.

4.2 Functions

The Institute may undertake, among others, the following activities:

- **Research**

  Undertake research and compile ASEAN's experiences and best practices on peace, conflict management and conflict resolution as well as post-conflict peace-building, with the view to providing appropriate recommendations, upon request by ASEAN Member States, to ASEAN bodies
  Undertake studies to promote gender mainstreaming in peace building, peace process and conflict resolution
  Study and analyse existing dispute settlement mechanisms in ASEAN with a view to enhancing regional mechanisms for the pacific settlement of disputes

- **Capacity Building**

  Hold workshops on peace, conflict management, conflict resolution
  Hold seminars/workshops/training in promoting the voice of moderation to contribute to the Global Movement of the Moderates, as well as to advance work in the area of interfaith dialogue
  Knowledge building among relevant government officials, scholars or think-tanks on conflict management and resolution

- **Pool of Expertise and Support for ASEAN Bodies**

  Develop a pool of experts from ASEAN Member States as resource persons to assist in conflict management and conflict resolution activities
  Where appropriate and at the request of ASEAN governments, provide policy recommendations to ASEAN governments on promotion of peace and reconciliation based on their own studies, as well as facilitation for peace negotiation
  Assist ASEAN bodies, upon request of ASEAN Member States, on activities and initiatives related to peace, reconciliation, conflict management and conflict resolution

- **Networking**

  Function as a knowledge hub by establishing linkages/network with relevant institutions and organisations in ASEAN Member States, as well as other regions and at the international level, which have similar objectives aimed at promoting a culture of peace
  Collaborate with relevant UN agencies, regional organisations and international think tanks to exchange expertise and experiences on peace, conflict management, conflict resolution

- **Dissemination of information**

  Disseminate best practices, lessons learned and relevant information to ASEAN Member States
  Outreach and engagement with the civil society and other relevant stakeholders to promote peace, reconciliation, conflict management, conflict resolution and peace-building
  Promote awareness of the work of the Institute among the general public

5 Budget and Funding

ASEAN Member States shall make a contribution to support the operations of the Institute for each budget year.
ASEAN Member States may consider making additional contributions to support the operations of the Institute within the same budget year.
The Institute may seek additional project-based voluntary funding from ASEAN
Member States on an ad hoc basis, which should be requested in a timely manner
The Institute shall mobilise additional resources from ASEAN Dialogue Partners, interested countries, international and regional organizations, financial and any other institutions, corporations, foundations or individuals to fund project-based activities.
The resources mobilised to fund the project-based activities will also be allocated as deemed appropriate to support the operations of the Institute.

6 Structure

The Institute shall be composed of the Governing Council, the Executive Director and an Advisory Board

Governing Council

- The Governing Council, here in after referred to as "the Council", shall consist of :

  a Representative of each ASEAN Member State to be appointed by and accountable to the respective appointing Governments;
  the Secretary-General of ASEAN as ex-officio member; and
  the Executive Director as ex-officio member.

- Each Member of the Council, except for the ex-officio members, shall work for a term of three (3) years and shall be eligible for one re-appointment.
- The Chair of the Council shall be the Representative of the ASEAN Member State holding the Chairmanship of ASEAN.
- The Members of the Council, except for the ex-officio members, shall elect two (2) Vice-Chairmen from among themselves each for a term of one year.
- The Council shall :

  formulate the guidelines and procedures for the activities of the Institute;
  have the overall responsibility for the funds of the Institute and shall be responsible for the formulation of policy for the procurement and the utilization of the funds;
  approve the annual operating budget for the Institute;
  perform such other functions as may be necessary to carry out the objectives of the Institute; and
  meet at least twice a year.

Executive Director

- The Executive Director of the Institute shall be a national of an ASEAN Member State and shall be appointed by the Governing Council through open recruitment for a non-renewable term of three years.

- The Executive Director in discharging his/her functions to serve ASEAN Member States, shall represent the Institute, not his/her country or any other institution.
- The Executive Director shall:

  represent the Institute in all administrative and operational matters, manage the activities of the Institute and perform such other functions as may be assigned by the Council from time to time;
  have authority to appoint such professional, secretarial and administrative staff as are necessary to achieve the Institute's objectives; and
  undertake activities to raise funds for the Institute's activities, in accordance with guidelines and procedures as established by the Council.

- The Executive Director shall be responsible to the Council.

Advisory Board

- An Advisory Board, hereinafter referred to as "the Board", shall consist of:

  a representative appointed by the government of each ASEAN Member State, here in after collectively referred to as "Representative";
  the Executive Director as ex-officio member.

- Representatives shall work for a term of three years and shall be eligible for one re-appointment.
- Representatives shall be eminent persons in the field of peace and reconciliation, including, but not limited to, academics, parliamentarians, senior or retired civil servants and civil society representatives.
- Representatives on the Board, with the exception of the Executive Director, shall not serve concurrently on the Council.
- The Board shall advise the Council on the research priorities for the Institute.

7 Decision-Making

Decision-making in the Institute shall be based on consultation and consensus in accordance with Article 20 of the ASEAN Charter.

8 Reporting Mechanism

The Executive Director shall make regular reports on the work of the Institute through the relevant senior officials to the ASEAN Political-Security Community Council (APSC Council).

9 Review Mechanism

This TOR shall be initially reviewed five years after the official launching of the Institute. This review and subsequent reviews shall be undertaken by the APSC Council supported by the relevant senior officials.

ASEAN Women for **Peace Registry**

Cambodia

H.E. Shopally Long

Under-Secretary of State *Ministry of Women Affairs*

Her Excellency Long Sophally has served as Under Secretary of State for the Ministry of Womens Affairs (MoWA), the Royal Government of Cambodia since 2013. She is in charge of MoWAs Information, International Cooperation and Legal Protection Departments. From 2012?2013, she was the Director of the International Cooperation Department in MoWA. In these roles, she has advocated with international organizations and development partners to mainstream gender into their strategic policy frameworks.? She passionately promotes the meaningful participation of women in social development and decision-making to enable women to gain equal

Malinda Kosal

Deputy Director-General
National Center for Peacekeeping Force

Expertise:

Mediation; Education and Research; Capacity Building; Program Monitoring and Evaluation; Resource / Fund Mobilization; Networking and Liaison

Youk Sokha

Deputy National *Police Commissioner, National Police Commissioner, Ministry of Interior*

Brunei Darussalam

Let. Col. Norsuriati binti Hj. Sharbini

Staff Officer 1 Legal Unit-Judge Advocate General's Office (JAG)
Directorate of Personnel, Ministry of Defense of Brunei Darussalam

Expertise:

Mediation, Education and Research, Policy-Making, Capacity Building, Disarmament, Demobilization of Combatants, Reintegration of Combatants, Program Monitoring and Evaluation, Networking and Liaison

Indonesia

Dr. Arifah Rahmawati

ASEAN Women for Peace Registry (AWPR)
Member, Indonesia

Arifah Rahmawati holds PhD on Policy Studies, post-graduate school of Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM) Yogyakarta Indonesia. In 2019 she was rewarded cum laude for her thesis on Reintegration Policy of the Acehnese Female Combatants (the Inong Balee) ? A Gender Contestation. Arifah was Indonesias national coordinator and researcher of the Gender and Conflict project, a 6 years research project (2014-2020) investigates gendered conflict dynamics and peacebuilding initiatives at post and currents conflict situation of three types conflicts in Indonesia: ethno-religious conflict of Ambon; anti-government movements of Aceh; and resource-driven vigilantism in East

Shadia Marhaban

Mediator
Mediators Beyond Borders International

Expertise:

Mediation; Education and Research; Policy Making; Capacity Building; Disarmament, Demobilization of combatants; Reintegration of combatants; Healing and Reconciliation; Community Social cohesion; Program Monitoring and Evaluation; Resource / Fund Mobilization; Networking and Liaison

Ayu Kartika Dewi

Managing Director *Indika Foundation*

Initiator and Co-Founder *SabangMerauke and Milenial Islami*

Expertise:

Education and Research; Policy Making; Capacity Building; Healing and Reconciliation; Community Social cohesion; Program Monitoring and Evaluation; Crossculture student exchange programs, Peaceful Islam, Peace education curriculum development, critical thinking education

Lao PDR

Ms. Vathida Phonekeo

ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Division

Soukphaphone Phanit

Deputy Director-General *Lao Women's Union*

Expertise:

Mediation; Capacity Building; Community Social cohesion; Program Monitoring and Evaluation; Resource/Fund Mobilization (coordinating with UN agencies, International NGOs, CSOs); Networking and Liaison

Ms. Nuanvilay Rattanakone

Director of Cooperation and Compilation Division

Malaysia

Dr. Ayesah Uy Abubakar

Research Fellow, Borneo Institute for Indigenous Studies & Senior Lecturer, International Relations Programme, Faculty of Social Science & Humanities (FSSH), Universiti Malaysia Sabah (UMS)

Dr. Ayesah Uy Abubakar is the Head of the Research Cluster on Ethnography & Development at the Borneo Institute for Indigenous Studies – Universiti Malaysia Sabah (BoRIIS-UMS). She is a senior lecturer at the International Relations Programme of the Faculty of Social Science and Humanities at the same university. Dr. Ayesah teaches human rights, international humanitarian law, and peace and development among many others.? In 2019, she published a book on?Peacebuilding and Sustainable Human Development: The Pursuit of the Bangsamoro Right to Self Determination

Fadlilawati BT Masran

Coordinator for Community
Mediation Programme Department of Unity and National Integration

Deborah Henry

Co-founder and Director
Payong Organization

Myanmar

Dr. Wah Wah Maung

Director-General *Central Statistical Organization, Ministry of Planning and Finance*

Expertise:

Education and Research; Policy Making; Capacity Building; Healing and Reconciliation; Community Social cohesion; Program Monitoring and Evaluation; Resource / Fund Mobilization; Networking and Liaison

Dr. Mi Yin Chan

Vice President (2) – *Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee ? State (Mon)*

Expertise:

Ceasefire monitoring, Mediation

Dr. San San Aye

Director-General *of the Department of Social Welfare*

Expertise:

Policy Making; Capacity Building; Healing and Reconciliation; Community Social cohesion; Program Monitoring and Evaluation; Resource / Fund Mobilization; Networking and Liaison

Philippines

Teresita Quintos-Deles

Former Presidential Adviser *on the Peace Process*

Expertise:

Mediation; Policy Making; Capacity Building; Community Social cohesion; Program Monitoring and Evaluation; Resource / Fund Mobilization; Networking and Liaison

Dr. Gloria Jumamil-Mercado, MNSA

Executive Director *Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process*

Vice-Chair *Philippine Government Peace Implementing Panel, Government of the Philippines (GPH) and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Peace Accords, OPAPP*

Expertise:

Mediation; Policy Making; Capacity Building; Community Social cohesion; Program Monitoring and Evaluation; Resource / Fund Mobilization; Networking and Liaison

Amina Rasul-Bernardo

President *Philippine Center for Islam and Democracy*

Member of the Board *Magbassa Kita Foundation, Inc*

Amina Rasul-Bernardo is the President of the Philippine Center for Islam and Democracy. She is a member of the Board of Regents of Mindanao State University. One of the leading Muslim leaders in the Philippines working to strengthen peace and development as well as promote human rights, justice and democratic practices in Muslim Mindanao, she has spearheaded the organizing and capacity-building of Muslim women, particularly those who teach in the madrasah, for peace-building and prevention of violent extremism. Her efforts led to the establishment of the Noorus Salam (Light of Peace), an organization of Muslim women active in Mindanao and Muslim communities in Metro Manila. She has developed an Islamic peace education program in cooperation with Muslim religious leaders.

She has been a Trustee and Vice-Chair of the Ramon Magsaysay Awards Foundation.

She has written & edited several books on the Mindanao conflict, Islam, and democracy such as Broken Peace? Assessing the 1996 GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement and The Radicalization of Muslim Communities in Southeast Asia.

She was a member of the Philippine cabinet under former president Fidel V. Ramos, serving as Presidential Advisor on Youth Affairs and appointed concurrently as the first chair of the National Youth Commission (NYC), which she organized. In addition, she has served as Commissioner of the National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women, representing Muslims; as a board member of the Philippine National Oil Corporation (PNOC) and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP); and as founding director of the Local Government Guarantee Corporation (LGGC). She was a member of the Board of the Mindanao Development Authority.

She was a UN PEACE awardee for 2019. In 2007, she received the Muslim Democrat of the Year Award from the Washington, DC-based Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy (CSID) and is recognized as one of the 500 Most Influential Muslims by the Royal Aal al-Bayt Foundation of Jordan.

She holds a bachelors degree in economics from the University of the Philippines, an MBA from the Asian Institute of Management, and a masters in public administration from Harvards Kennedy School of Government.

Singapore

Moe Thuzar

Lead Researcher (Socio-Cultural) *ASEAN Studies Center, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute*

Expertise:

Education and Research; Policy Making (Research outputs helped to inform or influence policy, but did not have a direct or immediate input to policy making per se); Capacity Building; Program Monitoring and Evaluation; Resource/Fund Mobilization (Not directly relevant but research outputs can become advisory inputs to potential or interested donors); Networking and Liaison; Human security norms discussion/ identification

Dr. Tamara Nair

Research Fellow *Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore*

Expertise:

Education and Research; Policy Making (Research outputs helped to inform or influence policy, but did not have a direct or immediate input to policy making per se); Capacity Building; Program Monitoring and Evaluation; Resource/Fund Mobilization (Not directly relevant but research outputs can become advisory inputs to potential or interested donors); Networking and Liaison

Thailand

H.E. Nongnuth Petcharatana

Former Ambassador *of Thailand to Austria and Germany*

Former Permanent Representative *of Thailand to IAEA, UNODC, CTBT, UNIDO and OSCE in Vienna.*

Expertise:

Diplomacy and business, International issues

Dr. Amporn Marddent

Lecturer *School of Languages and General Education, Walailak University, Thailand*

Expertise:

Education and Research (Ethnography); Capacity Building; Networking and Liaison

Dr. Suphatmet Yunyasit

Lecturer *Institute of Human Rights and Peace Studies, Mahidol University, Thailand*

Expertise:

Education and Research; Capacity Building; Networking and Liaison; Program monitoring and evaluation; Cross-community peacebuilding

Viet Nam

H.E. Nguyen Nguyet Nga

Ambassador / Senior Advisor *Diplomatic Academy of Viet Nam*

Expertise:

Policy Making

H.E. Nguyen Thai Yen Huong

Ambassador / Professor *Diplomatic Academy of Viet Nam*

Expertise:

Education and Research; Policy Making; Community Social cohesion

Lt. Col. Nguyen Thi Minh Phuong

Staff Officer *Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Ministry of National Defense of Viet Nam*

Expertise:

Peace-keeping operations, Military Observer

Three-Year Work Plan (TYWP) of the **ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (ASEAN-IPR)**

Introduction

The overall objective of the TYWP is to fulfil the mandates and functions of the Institute – as stipulated in in its Terms of Reference (TOR), with a view to work towards provisions in the "ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) Blueprint 2025" on conflict resolution and pacific settlement of disputes, as well as post-conflict peace-building – which aimed at the creation of cohesive, peaceful and resilient region with shared responsibility for a comprehensive security. Therefore, the TYWP of ASEAN-IPR is formulated with reference to the TOR, the APSC Blueprint 2025, and other ASEAN documents relevant to the work of the Institute, guided by the ASEAN Charter, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia 1976 (TAC) and decisions of the GC.

The Three-Year Work Plan of ASEAN-IPR for 2021-2023 aims to chart out the initiatives of the Institute in the coming three years, including to continue work that has been implemented from the previous TYWP 2018-2020.

Overall, this TYWP 2021-2023 is aimed at carrying out activities for the Institute to cultivate and spread culture of peace, which involves the participation of wider stakeholders (e.g. youth groups, women and civil society groups), in accordance with its mandate and functions.

The TYWP 2021-2023 was endorsed by the Governing Council at their 21st Meeting (1 December 2020), with the understanding that the TYWP would be a living document where it could be updated accordingly as more Tools/Key Activities and/or Projects are carried out by the Institute.

Component[1]		Strategic Outcome[2]	Tools/Key Activities[3]
TOR of ASEAN-IPR	APSC Blueprint 2025		
Research & Studies	A.3.2 B.4.4	Lessons learned of experiences and best practices on peace, conflict management and conflict resolutions as well as post-conflict peace-building in the region	Series of research on ASEAN Member States lessons learned on related issues
	A.3		
Research & Studies		Studies on gender mainstreaming in peace building, peace process and conflict resolution	*Series of activities to promote gender mainstreaming in peace building, peace processes and conflict resolution*
		Analysis on existing dispute settlement mechanisms in ASEAN	*Comparative studies on dispute settlement mechanisms in ASEAN*
			Series of Lessons Learned/Case Studies on mechanisms in relations with the pacific settlement of disputes in the region
Capacity Building	B.4.4.ii	Increased capacity on peace, conflict management & conflict resolution	*Training series, conferences, exchange studies*
	A.3.1.ii A.3.2.iii B.4.6.iii	Increased activities and stakeholder's involvement and participation in the promotion of moderation and inter-faith dialogue	*Training series, conferences, exchange studies*
	A.3.2 B.4.4	Shared knowledge among relevant government officials, scholars or think-tanks on conflict management and resolution	*Training series, conferences, exchange studies*
	A.3		
Pool of Expertise and Support for ASEAN Bodies	A.3.2.v B.4.4.i	Having a register of experts from AMS to assist in conflict management and conflict resolution	*Establishing network of experts on range of issues related to conflict management and conflict resolution*
		Provide Policy Recommendations on promotion of peace and reconciliation for ASEAN governments, where appropriate	*ASEAN-IPR evidence-based analysis*
		Facilitation for peace negotiation at the request of ASEAN governments, where appropriate	
		Assistance to ASEAN bodies on activities and initiatives related to peace, reconciliation, conflict management and conflict resolution	
Networking		ASEAN-IPR as knowledge hub on peace, conflict management, conflict resolution, post-conflict peace building & reconciliation	*Website & Social Media Platforms for ASEAN-IPR*
			Series of Seminars/Webinars on peace processes
		Collaboration with regional organisations, international think tanks, UN agencies to exchange expertise and experiences	*Call for publications on peace and peace processes*
			Training series, conferences, exchange studies
			Catalogue of think tanks

Dissemination of Information		Disseminate best practices, lessons learned and relevant information to ASEAN Member States	*ASEAN-IPR Website*
		Outreach and engagement with the civil society and other relevant stakeholders to promote peace, reconciliation, conflict management, conflict resolution and peace-building	*Training series, conferences, exchange studies*
			Call for publications on peace and peace processes
		Increased ASEAN public's awareness and support to the ASEAN-IPR work and activities	*ASEAN-IPR University Tour, led by the ASEAN-IPR Advisory Board*
			ASEAN-IPR Communication Strategy & Work Plan
			Website & Social Media Platforms for ASEAN-IPR
			Engaging the youth in the ASEAN-IPR's work to spread culture of peace

1 **Components:**

Based on the Function and Mandates of the ASEAN-IPR, as stipulated in the TOR;
Based on the 10 Action Lines of the APSC Blueprint 2025 where the ASEAN-IPR is to be an implementing entity.

2 **Strategic Outcome:** the wording is drafted based on the TOR of the ASEAN-IPR.

3 **Tools/Key Activities:** Tools to achieve the Strategic Outcome

List of Meetings and Activities of the ASEAN-IPR

Meetings of the Governing Council (GC)

Meeting	Date	Venue	Host	Chair
1st Meeting	10 December 2013	ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, Indonesia	ASEAN Secretariat	Brunei Darussalam
2nd Meeting	21 April 2014	Bali, Indonesia	Indonesia	Myanmar
3rd Meeting	4 December 2014	Jakarta, Indonesia	[Indonesia – TBC]	Myanmar
4th Meeting	17 March 2015	Cebu, Philippines	Philippines	Malaysia
5th Meeting	26 November 2015	Yogyakarta, Indonesia	Indonesia	Malaysia
6th Meeting	13 June 2016	Jakarta, Indonesia	Indonesia	Lao PDR
7th Meeting	5 November 2016	Yangon, Myanmar	Myanmar	Lao PDR
8th Meeting	19 June 2017	Yangon, Myanmar	Myanmar	Philippines
9th Meeting	1 October 2017	Manila, Philippines	Philippines	Philippines
10th Meeting	17 October 2017	ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, Indonesia	ASEAN Secretariat	Philippines
11th Meeting	26 February 2018	ASEAN-IPR Secretariat, Jakarta, Indonesia	ASEAN-IPR Secretariat	Singapore
12th Meeting	19 April 2018	ASEAN-IPR Secretariat, Jakarta, Indonesia	ASEAN-IPR Secretariat	Singapore
13th Meeting	18 October 2018	Jakarta, Indonesia	Indonesia	Singapore
14th Meeting	31 January 2019	ASEAN-IPR Secretariat, Jakarta, Indonesia	ASEAN-IPR Secretariat	Thailand
15th Meeting	9 May 2019	Bangkok, Thailand	Thailand	Thailand
16th Meeting	19 August 2019	ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, Indonesia	ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN-IPR Secretariat	Thailand
17th Meeting	21 November 2019	ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, Indonesia	ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN-IPR Secretariat	Thailand
18th Meeting	21 January 2020	ASEAN-IPR Secretariat, Jakarta, Indonesia	ASEAN-IPR Secretariat, Jakarta, Indonesia	Viet Nam
19th Meeting	12 May 2020	Videoconference	ASEAN-IPR Secretariat	Viet Nam

GC Meeting to Shortlist Candidates for ED 2021-2023	15 June 2020	Videoconference	ASEAN-IPR Secretariat, Jakarta, Indonesia	Viet Nam
GC Meeting to Interview Shortlisted Candidates for ED 2021-2023	22 July 2020	Videoconference	ASEAN-IPR Secretariat	Viet Nam
20th Meeting	30 September 2020	Videoconference	ASEAN-IPR Secretariat	Viet Nam
21st Meeting	1 December 2021	Videoconference	ASEAN-IPR Secretariat	Viet Nam
22nd Meeting	4 February 2021	Videoconference	ASEAN-IPR Secretariat	Brunei Darussalam
23rd Meeting	10 May 2021	Videoconference	ASEAN-IPR Secretariat	Brunei Darussalam
24th Meeting	4 November 2021	Videoconference	ASEAN-IPR Secretariat	Brunei Darussalam
25th Meeting	22 February 2022	Videoconference	ASEAN-IPR Secretariat	Cambodia
26th Meeting	21 April 2022	Videoconference	ASEAN-IPR Secretariat	Cambodia
27th Meeting	30 September 2022	Phnom Penh, Cambodia	Cambodia	Cambodia

Meetings of the Advisory Board (AB)

Meeting	Date	Venue	Host	Chair
1st Meeting	21 April 2014	Bali, Indonesia	Indonesia	Myanmar
2nd Meeting	17 November 2014	Bali, Indonesia	Indonesia	Myanmar
3rd Meeting	26 November 2015	Yogyakarta, Indonesia	Indonesia	Malaysia
4th Meeting	5 November 2016	Yangon, Myanmar	Myanmar	Lao PDR
5th Meeting	19 June 2017	Yangon, Myanmar	Myanmar	Singapore (Vice-Chair of the AB)
6th Meeting	1 October 2017	Manila, Philippines	Philippines	Philippines
7th Meeting	18 October 2018	Jakarta, Indonesia	Indonesia	Singapore
8th Meeting	9 May 2019	Bangkok, Thailand	Thailand	Thailand
9th Meeting	30 September 2020	Videoconference	ASEAN-IPR Secretariat	Viet Nam
10th Meeting	4 November 2021	Videoconference	ASEAN-IPR Secretariat	Brunei Darussalam
11th Meeting	15 September 2021	Videoconference	ASEAN-IPR Secretariat	Cambodia

Interface Meeting of the GC and AB of the ASEAN-IPR

Meeting	Date	Venue	Host	Chair
1st Interface	21 April 2014	Bali, Indonesia	Indonesia	Myanmar
2nd Interface	5 November 2016	Yangon, Myanmar	Myanmar	Lao PDR
3rd Interface	19 June 2017	Yangon, Myanmar	Myanmar	Philippines (GC) & Singapore (AB – Vice-Chair)
4th Interface	1 October 2017	Manila, Philippines	Philippines	Philippines
5th Interface	18 October 2018	Jakarta, Indonesia	Indonesia	Singapore
6th Interface	9 May 2019	Bangkok, Thailand	Thailand	Thailand
7th Interface	30 September 2020	Videoconference	ASEAN-IPR Secretariat	Viet Nam
8th Interface	4 November 2021	Videoconference	ASEAN-IPR Secretariat	Brunei Darussalam
9th Interface	30 September 2022	Phnom Penh, Cambodia + Videoconference (Hybrid)	Cambodia	Cambodia

Meetings of the ASEAN Women for Peace Registry (AWPR)

Meeting	Date	Venue	Host	Chair
1st Meeting	22 August 2019	Phnom Penh, Cambodia	Cambodia	Facilitated by ED of ASEAN-IPR
Video conference Meeting	5 June 2020	Videoconference	ASEAN-IPR Secretariat	Facilitated by ED of ASEAN-IPR
Introductory Meeting with ED 2021-2023	20 January 2021	Videoconference	ASEAN-IPR Secretariat	Facilitated by ED of ASEAN-IPR
Meeting on Proposed AWPR Work Plan and Working Arrangements	31 March 2021	Videoconference	ASEAN-IPR Secretariat	Facilitated by the ASEAN-IPR Secretariat
AWPR Thematic Group Meeting – Gender Mainstreaming and WPS	2 June 2021	Videoconference	ASEAN-IPR Secretariat	Facilitated by the ASEAN-IPR Secretariat
AWPR Thematic Group Meeting – Conflict Management, Conflict Transformation and Conflict Resolution	24 June 2021	Videoconference	ASEAN-IPR Secretariat	Facilitated by the ASEAN-IPR Secretariat

AWPR Brainstorming Meeting with The Asia Foundation (TAF)	25-26 July 2022	Bangkok, Thailand	The Asia Foundation	Facilitated by the ASEAN-IPR Secretariat
AWPR Strategic Planning Workshop	29 September 2022	Phnom Penh, Cambodia	UN Women	Co-Facilitated by ASEAN-IPR Secretariat + UN Women
GC-AWPR Informal Meeting	30 September 2022	Phnom Penh, Cambodia	Cambodia	N/A

Activities of the ASEAN-IPR

Activity	Date	Venue	Host
2014			
ASEAN-IPR Symposium on Peace and Reconciliation: Processes and Initiative	7-8 April 2014	Manila, Philippines	Philippines
ASEAN-IPR – Institute for Peace and Democracy (IPD) Symposium on Peace and Reconciliation: Principles and Best Practices	22-23 April 2014	Bali, Indonesia	Indonesia
The Advisory Board of ASEAN-IPR Seminar on Conflict Types and Management	17 November 2014	Bali, Indonesia	Indonesia
2015			
ASEAN – UN Workshop: Regional Dialogue II on Political-Security Cooperation: ASEAN – UN Collaboration in Support of the ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (ASEAN-IPR)	25-26 February 2015	Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar	Myanmar
ASEAN Workshop on Strengthening Women's Participation in Peace Processes	18-19 March 2015	Cebu City, Philippines	Philippines
ASEAN-IPR Symposium on the Repercussion of Violent Extremism towards Moderates	27-28 November 2015	Yogyakarta, Indonesia	Indonesia
ASEAN-IPR Symposium on the Plight of Women and Children in Conflict Situation	7-9 December 2015	Tagaytay City, Philippines	Philippines
2016			
ASEAN-IPR Symposium on Principles, Mechanisms and Practices of Peace and Reconciliation Processes	4-5 November 2016	Yangon, Myanmar	Myanmar

2017			
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Seminar on Preventive Diplomacy, Mediation and Early Warning Systems	19-21 June 2017	Yangon, Myanmar	Myanmar
ASEAN-IPR Symposium on Strengthening Convergences for Humanitarian Action in ASEAN	2-3 October 2017	Manila, Philippines	Philippines
2018			
Signing of the Host Country Agreement between the ASEAN-IPR and the Government of Indonesia	1 February 2018	Jakarta, Indonesia	Indonesia
Launch of the ASEAN-IPR Website	8 August 2018	ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta	N/A
ASEAN-IPR Regional Youth Conference on Peace & Tolerance	19-20 October 2018	Jakarta, Indonesia	Philippines
ASEAN-IPR – UN Workshop: "ASEAN Perspectives in Conflict Management & Conflict Resolution in the Region	5-7 December 2018	Jakarta, Indonesia	ASEAN-IPR Secretariat & UN-DPA
Symposium on the Establishment of the ASEAN Women for Peace Registry	13-14 December 2018	Cebu City, Philippines	Philippines
2019			
Preliminary Seminar on the ASEAN-IPR Research Project on Lessons Learned from a Process of Conflict Resolution between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), as Mediated by Indonesia (1993-1996)	7 February 2019	Jakarta, Indonesia	Indonesia
Mainstreaming Peace & Reconciliation in Southeast Asia – an ASEAN-IPR Training Series: Approaches in Peace Process and Peacebuilding in Southeast Asia and the Role of Mediators	21-22 February 2019	Manila, Philippines	Philippines
Study Visit on 'Peace Facilitation & Reconciliation'	12-14 June 2019	Bern & Geneva, Switzerland	Switzerland
Seminar on the Outcome of the ASEAN-IPR Research Project on Lessons Learned from a Process of Conflict Resolution between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), as Mediated by Indonesia (1993-1996)	23 September 2019	ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta	Indonesia
ASEAN Women Interfaith Dialogue: Promoting Understanding and Inclusivity	12 – 14 November 2019	Sheraton Gandaria City, Jakarta, Indonesia	ASEAN-IPR

2020			
ASEAN-IPR Discussion Series: "Women, Peace & Security and Covid-19 in ASEAN"	6 August 2020	Videoconference	ASEAN-IPR
ASEAN-IPR Discussion Series: Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding in Southeast Asia	28 August 2020	Videoconference	ASEAN-IPR, in partnership with Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies (CPCS Cambodia)
ASEAN-IPR Discussion Series: The Contemporary Challenges in Countering Radicalisation and Violent Extremism	11 September 2020	Videoconference	ASEAN-IPR, in partnership with Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies (CPCS Cambodia)
ASEAN-IPR Discussion Series: Climate Change and Peace	9 October 2020	Videoconference	ASEAN-IPR
Appointment of Mr. I Gusti Agung Wesaka Puja as Executive Director of the ASEAN-IPR	26 October 2020	ASEAN-IPR Secretariat, Jakarta	ASEAN-IPR
ASEAN-IPR Discussion Series: Empowering Women and Youth in Building Sustainable Peace	30 October 2020	Videoconference	ASEAN-IPR
ASEAN Workshop on Enhancing the Roles of ASEAN Women in Sustainable Peace and Security	24 November 2020	Hanoi, Viet Nam	Viet Nam Ministry of Foreign Affairs & ASEAN
Call for Papers + Publication of "ASEAN-IPR Working Paper Series on Peace & Conflict Resolution"	7 December 2020-13 January 2022		ASEAN-IPR
2021			
ASEAN-IPR Focused Group Discussion (FGD): "The Role of ICT in Mitigating Conflict and Fostering Peace"	25 January 2021	Yogyakarta, Indonesia (Hybrid of videoconference/face-to-face)	ASEAN-IPR
ASEAN-IPR Outreach Programme: Peace Message Video Competition	January 2021	Virtual (ASEAN-IPR Instagram & YouTube channel)	ASEAN-IPR
Call for Papers: 'Sustaining Peace in ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific: Preventive Diplomacy Measures'	4 March 2021 (ED call for nominations of Authors and Reviewers)	N/A	ASEAN-IPR, China Foreign Affairs University (CFAU
ASEAN-IPR Discussion Series 2021, Session 1: "Post-Conflict Peace Building and Relief Effort"	14 July 2021	Videoconference (zoom & ASEAN-IPR YouTube Channel)	ASEAN-IPR
Module Development for the ASEAN-IPR Women, Peace & Security Training Programme	21 July 2021	Videoconference	ASEAN-IPR
Interface between the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) & the ASEAN-IPR on Women, Peace & Security (WPS) Agenda	22 July 2021	Videoconference	ICRC & ASEAN-IPR Secretariat

ASEAN Foundation/ASEAN-IPR/ICRC Joint Webinar: "The Value of Education as an Essential Public Service: Ensuring the continuity and resumption of education in crisis situations"	28 July 2021	Videoconference (zoom & ASEAN-IPR YouTube Channel)	Hosted on the ASEAN Foundation's zoom Webinar, and streamed on the ASEAN-IPR's YouTube Channel
ASEAN-IPR Discussion Series 2021, Session 2: "Youth as Agents of Peace – Utilising Digital Platforms for Narratives of Peace"	11 August 2021	Videoconference (zoom & ASEAN-IPR YouTube Channel)	ASEAN-IPR
Youth-Tech: Utilising Technology as an Instrument of Peace – 1st Expert Meeting	19-20 August 2021	Jakarta, Indonesia (Hybrid of videoconference/ face-to-face)	Indonesia
ASEAN-IPR Discussion Series 2021, Session 3: "20 Years of Aceh Peace Process – 15 Years after Helsinki, A Reflection"	25 August 2021	Videoconference (zoom & ASEAN-IPR YouTube Channel)	ASEAN-IPR
ASEAN-IPR Research Project: "Aceh Case – Peace Building and Post-Tsunami Recovery" – Inception Meeting	30 August 2021	Virtual (zoom)	Indonesia
ASEAN-IPR Discussion Series 2021, Session 4: "COVID-19 & Peace in the Region"	22 September 2021	Videoconference (zoom & ASEAN-IPR YouTube Channel)	ASEAN-IPR
ASEAN-IPR Discussion Series 2021, Session 5: "Cross-Sectoral Initiatives to Advance WPS Agenda in ASEAN"	21 October 2021	Videoconference (zoom & ASEAN-IPR YouTube Channel)	ASEAN-IPR
KAICIID-ASEAN-IPR Training Sessions on Interreligious Dialogue for ASEAN Officials	2-23 November 2021	Videoconference (zoom)	KAICIID
ASEAN-IPR Discussion Series 2021, Session 6: "Peace Processes beyond the region: sharing of best practices & lessons learned"	18 November 2021	Videoconference (zoom & ASEAN-IPR YouTube Channel)	ASEAN-IPR
ASEAN-IPR Publication of ASEAN Peace Poems			ASEAN-IPR
ASEAN-IPR Focused Group Discussion (FGD), Session 2: "Lessons Learned on Engaging Constituents for Peace Building in the Region	7-8 December 2021	Bali, Indonesia	ASEAN-IPR
ASEAN-IPR Peace Poetry Night + ASEAN-IPR Discussion Series 2021, Session 7: "The Role of Folklore (Local Wisdom) in Peace-building	17 December 2021	Videoconference (zoom, ASEAN-IPR Instagram Live & ASEAN-IPR YouTube Channel)	ASEAN-IPR

2022			
Youth-Tech: Utilising Technology as an Instrument of Peace – 2nd Expert Meeting	20 January 2022	Jakarta, Indonesia (Hybrid of videoconference/ face-to-face)	Indonesia
ASEAN Workshop on Mainstreaming the Women, Peace & Security (WPS) Agenda in ASEAN Community Pillars	11 February 2022	Hanoi, Viet Nam (hybrid of videoconference/face-to-face)	Viet Nam
ASEAN-IPR + United Nations Online Dialogue: Introduction to Climate-Related Security Risks	7 April 2022	Videoconference	ASEAN-IPR, UN-DPPA DPO
ASEAN-IPR Discussion Series 2022, Session 1: "Early Warning Capabilities: Effective Conflict Prevention"	27 April 2022	Videoconference	ASEAN-IPR
Outcome Seminar of ASEAN-IPR Research Project: "Aceh Case: Peace Building and Post-Tsunami Recovery"	9 May 2022	Jakarta, Indonesia (hybrid of videoconference/face-to-face)	Indonesia
Virtual Learning Exchange of ASEAN-IPR and Philippine Higher Education Institutions (HEIs)	6 June 2022	Videoconference	Philippines' Office of Presidential Adviser on Peace, Reconciliation and Unity (OPAPRU)
ASEAN-IPR Discussion Series 2022, Session 2: "Gender-Sensitive Analytical Approaches: Women's Inolvement in Violent Extremism"	24 June 2022	Videoconference	ASEAN-IPR
Book Launch: ASEAN-IPR Research Project: Aceh Case – Peacebuilding and Post-Tsunami Recovery	27 June 2022	ASEAN-IPR Secretariat + Videoconference (hybrid)	Indonesia
Addressing Disinformation to Promote Peace Online Workshop	12 July 2022	Videoconference	ASEAN-IPR + HD Centre
ASEAN-IPR Discussion Series 2022, Session 3: "Protection and Promotion of Human Rights for Sustainable Peace"	23 August 2022	Videoconference	ASEAN-IPR
Dialogue on Peace and Multilateralism: The Youth as the Agents of Future Change	21 September 2022	Erasmus Huis, Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Jakarta	Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Jakarta

List of Publications of the ASEAN-IPR (2010-2022)

	Title of Publication	Author	Year	Related ASEAN-IPR Activity	Link
	**ASEAN-IPR Symposium on Peace and Reconciliation Processes and Initiatives**		2014	ASEAN-IPR Symposium on Peace and Reconciliation: Processes and Initiative, 7-8 April 2014 in Manila, Philippines	https://bit.ly/SymposiumOnPeaceAndReconciliation
	**ASEAN-IPR Workshop on Strengthening Women's Participation in Peace Processes and Conflict Resolution**		2015	ASEAN-IPR Workshop on Strengthening Women's Participation in Peace Processes, 18-19 March 2015 in Cebu City. Philippines	https://bit.ly/WorkshopOnStrengthening-WomensParticipation-InPeaceProcess
	**ASEAN-IPR Symposium on the Plight of Women and Children in Conflict Situations**		2015	ASEAN-IPR Symposium on the Plight of Women and Children in Conflict Situation, 7-9 December 2015 in Tagaytay City, Philippines	https://bit.ly/SymposiumOnThePlightOf-Women
	**ASEAN-IPR Symposium on Strengthening Convergences for Humanitarian Action in ASEAN**		2017	ASEAN-IPR Symposium on Strengthening Convergences for Humanitarian Action in ASEAN, 2-3 October 2017 in Manila, Philippines	https://bit.ly/SymposiumOnStrengthening-Convergences
	**ASEAN-IPR Annual Report 2018**	**ASEAN-IPR Secretariat**	2017	N/A	https://bit.ly/ASEAN-IPR_AnnualReport2018
	**Lessons Learned from a Process of Conflict Resolution between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) as Mediated by Indonesia (1993-1996)**		2019	Seminar on the Outcome of the ASEAN-IPR Research Project on Lessons Learned from a Process of Conflict Resolution between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), as Mediated by Indonesia (1993-1996), 23 September in Jakarta, Indonesia	https://bit.ly/LessonsLearnedMindanao

	**ASEAN-IPR Regional Youth Conference on Peace and Tolerance 2018**		2019	ASEAN-IPR Regional Youth Conference on Peace & Tolerance, 19-20 October 2018 in Jakarta, Indonesia	https://bit.ly/RegionalYouthConferenceOnPeaceTolerance
	**ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation – United Nations Workshop: ASEAN Perspectives in Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution in the Region**		2020	ASEAN-IPR – UN Workshop: "ASEAN Perspectives in Conflict Management & Conflict Resolution in the Region, 5-7 December 2018 in Jakarta, Indonesia	https://bit.ly/ASEAN-IPR_UN_Workshop
	**ASEAN-IPR Annual Report 2019**	**ASEAN-IPR Secretariat**	2020	N/A	https://bit.ly/ASEAN-IPR_AnnualReport2020
	**ASEAN-IPR Women Interfaith Dialogue**		2020	ASEAN-IPR Women Interfaith Dialogue: "Promoting Understanding for an Inclusive and Peaceful Society", 12-13 November 2019 in Jakarta, Indonesia	https://bit.ly/ASEAN-IPR_WomenInterfaithDialogue
	**ASEAN-IPR Pamphlet/ Infographic**	**ASEAN-IPR Secretariat**	2020	N/A	https://bit.ly/ASEAN-IPR_E-Pamphlet
	**ASEAN-IPR Working Paper Series on Peace and Conflict Resolution Issue 2021 No. 1 – The Impact of Myanmar's Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement on the Peace-Building Environment**	**Peggy BRETT**	2021	Launch of the ASEAN-IPR Working Paper Series on Peace and Conflict Resolution Issue 2021 No. 1, on 1 September 2021	https://bit.ly/WorkingPaperSeries1
	**ASEAN-IPR Working Paper Series on Peace and Conflict Resolution Issue 2021 No. 2 – Lesson Learned from the Peace Villages in Indonesia: The Role of Village Women in Policy-Making through Human Security Approach**	**Visna VULOVIK**	2021	Launch of the ASEAN-IPR Working Paper Series on Peace and Conflict Resolution Issue 2021 No. 2, on 13 September 2021	https://bit.ly/WorkingPaperSeries2

	**ASEAN-IPR Working Paper Series on Peace and Conflict Resolution Issue 2021 No. 3 – Cohesion in the Time of Conflict: An Analysis of Social Cohesion in the Context of Ethnic Armed Conflict in Myanmar's Rakhine State**	**Dominique Samantha DULAY**	2021	Launch of the ASEAN-IPR Working Paper Series on Peace and Conflict Resolution Issue 2021 No. 3, on 07 October 2021	https://bit.ly/WorkingPaperSeries3
	**ASEAN-IPR Annual Report 2020**	**ASEAN-IPR Secretariat**	2021	N/A	https://bit.ly/ASEAN-IPR_AnnualReport2020
	**ASEAN-IPR Working Paper Series on Peace and Conflict Resolution Issue 2021 No. 4 – Local Women and Peacebuilding in Thailand's Deep South: Perspectives from the Peace Survey**	**Fareeda PANJOR & Nurainee JANGOE**	2021	Launch of the ASEAN-IPR Working Paper Series on Peace and Conflict Resolution Issue 2021 No. 4, on 11 November 2021	https://bit.ly/WorkingPaperSeries4
	**ASEAN-IPR Working Paper Series on Peace and Conflict Resolution Issue 2021 No. 5 – The Responsiility to Provide: Cultivating an Ethos of Responsible Sovereignty in Southeast Asia**	**TAN See Seng**	2022	Launch of the ASEAN-IPR Working Paper Series on Peace and Conflict Resolution Issue 2021 No. 5, on 13 January 2022	
	**ASEAN-IPR Publication of ASEAN Peace Poems**	**Various**	2022	ASEAN-IPR Publication of ASEAN Peace Poems	
	**Sustaining Peace in ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific: Preventive Diplomacy Measures**	**Various**	2022	Call for Papers & Publication in Collaboration with China Foreign Affairs University (CFAU): 'Sustaining Peace in ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific: Preventive Diplomacy Measures'	

Forging and Fostering Peace
ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation

WORKING PAPER SERIES ON PEACE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

The Impact of Myanmar's Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement on the Peace-Building Environment

Peggy BRETT

ISSUE: 2021 - NO. 01

The Impact of Myanmar's Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement on the Peace-Building Environment

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ISSUE 2021 - NO. 1

ABSTRACT

The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) signed in October 2015 did not bring peace to Myanmar but has instead contributed to reconfiguring the peace-building environment of the country. The division of ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) into signatories and non-signatories has become entrenched. There are tensions within and between the members of various EAO alliances, some arising from pre-existing differences, others new issues relating to the NCA-based peace process. Such tensions have been one factor leading some EAOs to explore bilateral negotiations, despite a public commitment to collective negotiation. These changes contribute to an increasingly complex peace-building environment. They highlight the extent to which the EAOs cannot be considered a single constituency and the need for a peace process to engage seriously with their different priorities and interests. The nature of these changes mean that they are likely to remain relevant, despite the further changes to the peace-building environment caused by political disruption beginning 1 February 2021. The long-term impacts of the turmoil are hard to predict. In the short-term, it has resulted in an unsettled and unpredictable situation with many of the actors reconsidering their relationships and repositioning themselves in light of the ascendant events.

THE IMPACT OF MYANMAR'S NATIONWIDE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT ON THE PEACE-BUILDING ENVIRONMENT

1. Background

On 15 October 2015, the government of Myanmar and eight ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). The NCA differs from previous ceasefires in two significant ways. Firstly, it is a multilateral rather than bilateral agreement. Secondly, through the arrangements for political negotiation, the NCA includes state- and nation-building processes which aim to address the causes of conflict.[1] Unfortunately, the high hopes that these factors would lead to a lasting peace have not been realised. More than five years later, the country is on the brink of a nation-wide clash following the political change and subsequent violent developments.

Before the disruption, the peace process was already facing difficulties. From the outset, the NCA was weakened by the fact that only eight EAOs signed the agreement. Seven other EAOs, including some of the most powerful groups, refused to sign the NCA and another six EAOs were not invited to sign. Moreover, peace talks with the signatories have not happened regularly or according to the planned schedule, with the result that the peace process has never gained momentum. When talks have occurred, challenges relating to procedural matters and the format of talks as well as the substance have contributed to a failure to reach agreement on key issues. As a result, there have been growing calls for reform of the peace process from all sides—EAOs, State actors, international and local observers.[2]

By the start of 2021, reform seemed inevitable. However, the February 2021 developments unsettled these efforts. It is unclear what form future peace talks will take. However, to be successful any such negotiations should take into consideration the changes in the peace-building environment and avoid simply returning to the pattern established between 2015 and 2020.

[1] Min Zaw Oo, "Understanding Myanmar's Peace Process: Ceasefire Agreements."

[2] For example, International Crisis Group (ICG), "Rebooting Myanmar's Stalled Peace Process"; Euro-Burma Office (EBO), "Assessing the Peace Process"; EBO, "Ethnic Unity"; Min Zaw Oo, Ne Lynn Aung, and Michaels, "Annual Peace & Security Review: 2020"; Federal Law Academy, "New Approaches to the Peace-Seeking Process in Burma/Myanmar."

2. Research Objectives and Methodology

This paper aims to contribute to the discussions around reform of the peace process. It focuses on the relationships among EAOs, which is an oft-neglected aspect of the peace-building environment. The paper is based primarily on the Centre for Diversity and National Harmony's ongoing monitoring of Myanmar's peace process. It draws on extensive informal discussions with EAOs, State actors, local and international observers, and on published reports by civil society, academics and the media.

3. Research Result and Analysis

There are more than 20 EAOs active in Myanmar. These groups have complex and interlocking histories. However, almost all EAOs claim to represent and be fighting for the rights of ethnic minorities. Moreover, they generally share similar grievances against the state. It is therefore tempting to see the EAOs as a single 'constituency' when it comes to peace negotiations. This tendency is reinforced by the public discourse of EAOs themselves. EAO statements regularly stress their commitment to solidarity and reflect a belief that EAOs have shared political goals. The assumption that these goals can best be achieved through joint action and—in the context of peace talks—collective negotiation with the State actors, has been a driving force behind several EAO alliances. The following sections examine how these assumptions hold up when considered in light of the actions of EAOs since the signing of the NCA.

a. The evolution of EAO alliances since 2015

The alliances formed by EAOs provide an indication of their relationships. Such alliances suggest that the members have similar goals or concerns and are on the same trajectory in their relations with the State. Formal EAO alliances also provide a forum within which EAOs discuss and agree positions. In negotiations, these alliances are a way for a group of EAOs to speak with a single voice. They are thus central to promoting unity among EAOs and allowing collective negotiation.

It is therefore useful to start by looking at how the major EAO alliances have evolved since the signing of the NCA in 2015.

Particularly, how the division of EAOs into NCA signatories (NCA-S-EAOs) and non-signatories (NCA-NS-EAOs) has resulted in a shift from a single alliance, which represented the majority of EAOs, to a proliferation of smaller groupings.

In 2015, the major EAO alliance was the 16-member Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT), which had been created for the purpose of negotiating the NCA.[3] The core of the NCCT were the 12 members of a pre-existing alliance called the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC). Only four powerful EAOs were not members of the NCCT: National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA); National Socialist Council of Nagaland – Khaplang; Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS); and United Wa State Party. These four each had their own reasons for remaining outside the broad coalition represented by the UNFC.[4] Since they did not form an alternative alliance, their presence did not challenge the idea that the UNFC and NCCT represented the mainstream position of EAOs.

The final challenge to the NCCT members' commitment to solidarity and collective negotiations was the fact that six NCCT members were not invited to sign the NCA in 2015. This left the EAOs who were invited to sign with an unenviable decision: break their commitment to solidarity by signing; or refuse to sign and risk throwing away all the progress that had been made since 2011. In the event, the NCCT members did not reach a shared position and the alliance was divided with six members (plus an observer) deciding to sign and four deciding not to sign.[5] As the NCCT was created to negotiate the NCA, the end of these negotiations and the split among its members, meant that the alliance no longer had a clear function and ceased to be operational.

In contrast, the UNFC predated the negotiations around the NCA and continued to exist after the signing of the NCA. In the end, the UNFC position was not to sign the NCA, due to the exclusion of some of its members. However, the UNFC did not completely reject the NCA. Its goal was to continue negotiations, including on allowing all member EAOs to sign. Three UNFC members took a different position

[3] The NCCT also had one observer, the All Burma Students' Democratic Front.

[4] BNI, "Deciphering Myanmar's Peace Process: A Reference Guide (2016)."

[5] The remaining six groups were not invited to sign.

and chose to sign the NCA. This led to these three EAOs leaving the alliance.

Despite these departures, the UNFC was still the largest EAO alliance. However, its role as the representative of the mainstream EAO position was challenged by the presence of a second coherent group: the NCA signatories. In 2016, the NCA-S-EAOs formed the Peace Process Steering Team (PPST) to coordinate their engagement in negotiations under the NCA.[6] EAOs were now divided into two almost equally sized alliances, the eight-member PPST and the ten-member UNFC. Both alliances engaged in collective negotiations with the State actors. However, since the UNFC was negotiating towards signing the NCA, there was a possibility that eventually the two sets of talks and the two alliances would converge

The situation became more complex with the emergence of a third alliance, the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC) in 2017. Initially, five members of the UNFC joined the FPNCC. However, unlike the UNFC, the FPNCC rejected the NCA and wanted to negotiate an entirely new peace agreement. This made being a member of both alliances problematic. It is therefore not surprising that by the end of 2017 only one EAO remained a member of both alliances.

The emergence of the FPNCC complicated the peace-building environment. Its establishment meant that there were three EAO alliances requesting recognition as negotiating partners in peace talks. Moreover, the FPNCC's rejection of the NCA was the first time there had been a collective EAO position that set out an alternative vision for the peace process.[7] Up to this point, it had been clear that negotiations with NCA-NS-EAOs would be about bringing those groups into the NCA. The FPNCC opened the possibility of an entirely separate peace process. However, in practice, the State actors have refused to negotiate on these terms or with the FPNCC as an alliance. Engagement with FPNCC members, as with other non-signatories, has remained

[6] Keenan, "Securing Agreement: The Peace Process Steering Team's Role in the Peace Process"; Burma News International (BNI), "Deciphering Myanmar's Peace Process: A Reference Guide (2016)."

[7] For an overview of the FPNCC's positions and statements see ICG, "Building Critical Mass for Peace in Myanmar"; BNI, "Deciphering Myanmar's Peace Process: A Reference Guide (2017-2018)"; Liu Yun, "Building Peace in Myanmar." While subsequent statements seem to have indicated a willingness to revise the NCA rather than outright rejection, the proposed revisions are so far-reaching that it would in practice be a completely new agreement although bearing the same title.

focused on persuading EAOs to sign the NCA. Nonetheless, having adopted a public, shared position may have contributed to solidifying the FPNCC members' opposition to the NCA and reluctance to break with the alliance by signing.

One reason that the FPNCC has had such an impact is the involvement of the United Wa State Party (UWSP), by far the most militarily powerful of the EAOs. Up to this point, the UWSP had remained aloof from the peace talks, which seemed unlikely to offer better terms than its existing bilateral ceasefire. It was one of the four groups which had not joined the NCCT but was nonetheless invited to sign the NCA in 2015. The UWSP declined this offer. The UWSP's leadership of the FPNCC is therefore significant, as it marks a shift towards active engagement with the peace process.

With the establishment of the FPNCC, the UNFC was no longer the sole representative of NCA-NS-EAOs. Moreover, the loss of four members including its chair—the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO)—left the UNFC weaker than the FPNCC, both in terms of numbers and the military force of its members.

The events of 2017 also showed the UNFC's inability to prevent members acting against its collective decisions. In the run up to the second Union Peace Conference (UPC) in May 2017, there was debate over participation by NCA-NS-EAOs. Eventually, non-signatories were invited to attend as 'specially invited guests', rather than observers. However, the government refused to invite the FPNCC to attend as an alliance, instead inviting the individual groups. Despite this, the FPNCC decided that its members should attend. In contrast, the UNFC decided not to attend. The KIO left the UNFC meeting and immediately travelled to the UPC; a clear defiance of the UNFC's collective position.[8]

The UNFC's weakness was further emphasised when two of its remaining members signed the NCA in 2018. Unlike in 2015, these two groups did not leave the

[8] ICG, "Building Critical Mass for Peace in Myanmar."

UNFC, making it the only EAO alliance to include both NCA-S-EAOs and NCA-NS-EAOs. The UNFC has not, however, been able to build on this fact to improve relations or promote cooperation between NCA-S-EAOs and NCA-NS-EAOs.[9] Completing the UNFC's decline, in 2019 four of the five remaining members announced that they wished to withdraw, and in August that year, the UNFC suspended its activities.

By January 2021, these developments had resulted in a wide-reaching reconfiguration of the landscape of EAO alliances compared to 2015. In place of a single alliance representing the mainstream EAO position, there are now two groupings of roughly equal size. The ten-member PPST represents the EAO signatories and the seven-member FPNCC represents the non-signatories. There is no overlap between these groups and attempts to create a body that would include both signatories and non-signatories have failed. Further deepening the division between the two groups is the fact that the FPNCC is officially opposed to the NCA, while the PPST exists to engage with the NCA.

The presence of two smaller alliances creates further complications. The UNFC has lost much of its influence but continues to act as a group. Meanwhile, the Northern Alliance is a primarily military grouping of four EAOs, all of whom are also members of the FPNCC. Nonetheless, the Northern Alliance engaged in peace talks with State actors between 2018 and 2020.

This fracturing of the EAO landscape has impacted the broader peace-building environment. In particular, it is no longer possible for the State actors to hold a single set of negotiations with all EAOs. Instead, they are engaged in several parallel sets of negotiations, moving at different speeds and with different goals. Moreover, the divergent alliances make it less likely that at some future date these separate talks will converge on a single peace process.

[9] Keenan, "A Disturbing Portent: Inter-Ethnic Tensions and the Peace Process" discusses the failure of the UNFC's attempt to mediate between the TNLA and RCSS.

Annex 6

THE IMPACT OF MYANMAR'S NATIONWIDE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT ON THE PEACE-BUILDING ENVIRONMENT

Forging and Fostering Peace
ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation



Figure 1: The evolution of EAO alliances, 2014-2021

b. How has the NCA affected EAO solidarity?

In addition to a shared enemy (the Myanmar Military - the Tatmadaw) the EAOs see themselves as united by shared political goals: the protection of their ethnic populations and the creation of a federal Myanmar. These claims of unity also enable the EAOs to tap into Myanmar's national history, particularly the narrative that all ethnic groups united in a shared struggle for independence. In doing so they delegitimise the Bamar government, which is positioned as a quasi-colonial power oppressing the ethnic minorities. Another part of this narrative is that the Tatmadaw uses 'divide and rule' tactics to maintain its position. This framing helps explain the importance attached to solidarity among the EAOs. It is evocative of the claim to be fighting for liberation and of the history of that struggle. It is also, of course, pragmatic. No EAO individually has the power to stand against the Tatmadaw or negotiate with the State actors on an equal basis.

Despite their theoretical commitment to solidarity and belief in shared objectives, tensions among the EAOs are not new.[10] However, events since 2015 have put a particular strain on the ability of EAOs to maintain solidarity. This section will examine how developments related to the signing of the NCA have showcased the limits of the commitment to solidarity. This has caused tensions within the EAO alliances, as the EAOs have shown signs that they no longer trust one another. At the same time, direct conflict between EAOs has increased, in some instances linked explicitly to the NCA.

The fact that some members of the UNFC and NCCT chose to sign the NCA showed the limits of their commitment to solidarity. Neither membership of these alliances nor the commitment to collective action were sufficient to persuade all the EAOs to prioritise solidarity over the (perceived) benefits of signing the NCA. Similarly, the decision of two groups to sign the NCA in 2018 was a direct breach of a renewed commitment that the members of the UNFC would act jointly and only sign when all members were able and willing to do so.[11] The KIO's decision to attend the UPC in

[10] For some examples of previous tensions among the EAOs and those surrounding the formation of the NCCT see Min Zaw Oo, "Understanding Myanmar's Peace Process: Ceasefire Agreements."

[11] BNI, "Deciphering Myanmar's Peace Process: A Reference Guide (2016)," 78–81.

2017 shows a similar disregard for the joint positions agreed by the UNFC. This move was described as a betrayal by the other UNFC members,[12] illustrating the emotive importance of solidarity.

There are signs that the EAOs are becoming less inclined to trust one another to act in solidarity. This is particularly obvious in the tensions that have arisen in the PPST around the role of the Karen National Union (KNU). The KNU is the most powerful of the NCA-S-EAOs.[13] Moreover, two of the other NCA-S-EAOs are splinter groups of the KNU. It was therefore almost inevitable that the KNU would take a leading role among the signatories. However, the other groups accuse the KNU of not merely leading, but attempting to dominate them. At the same time, the KNU's internal divisions have impacted its engagement with the peace process. This has added to the tensions, as the internal issues result in inconsistent leadership. In 2019, these internal divisions, and the belief that the other PPST members were too conciliatory, almost led the KNU to leave the PPST.

It was in this context, that the KNU put forward proposals to replace the PPST with a new body which would unite NCA signatories and non-signatories. The other PPST members objected to the KNU's proposed reforms for a variety of reasons. These included concerns that reflect a lack of trust that the KNU and other EAOs will show solidarity and act in the interests of all. The NCA negotiations have already made it clear that there are differences in priorities and that in some cases solutions which work for the KNU (and other larger groups) will not be viable for the smaller groups and vice versa.

At present, the eight smaller NCA-S-EAOs are the majority in the PPST. This helps limit the dominance of the KNU and RCSS. Increasing the membership would mean that these eight groups do not automatically have a majority. This would inevitably dilute their influence even without other changes to the functioning of the alliance. There was also a concern that reform of the PPST's structures and operating procedures would allow it to be dominated by the more militarily powerful groups and those seen as representing the main ethnic minorities (those with eponymous states). That the

[12] ICG, "Building Critical Mass for Peace in Myanmar."

[13] The only other NCA-S-EAO that is close in terms of power is the RCSS. All the others are much smaller.

KNU had already held a series of meetings with these groups added to these fears.

These concerns reflect a lack of trust in the commitment of EAOs to solidarity. They show that the PPST members were worried what would happen if they lost influence. They seemed to doubt that the more powerful groups would share and aim to address the concerns of smaller groups. At the same time, the PPST members appear to have been reluctant to relinquish the influence they have on negotiations through their representation and power within the existing structures of the PPST. This shows the limits of their own commitment to solidarity. The EAOs recognise the potential benefits of bringing the non-signatories into the discussions but were not prepared to sacrifice their current power to achieve this.

In some ways the FPNCC has been more successful at ensuring solidarity among its members. Despite a range of bilateral talks, none of the members have broken with the FPNCC to sign the NCA. It is particularly telling that two members, the Shan State Progressive Party (SSPP) and NDAA, explicitly said that they were interested in signing the NCA but would not do so without the approval of their allies. In one respect this shows the strength of the alliance and a commitment to solidarity. However, there are also indications that it has more to do with the dominance of the UWSP.

The position of the SSPP is particularly interesting to consider in this respect. The SSPP's area of operations neighbours the Wa Self-Administered Division which is controlled by the UWSP. In the circumstances, it is clearly to the SSPP's advantage to remain on good terms with the much more powerful UWSP. It is therefore unsurprising that the SSPP joined the FPNCC in 2017. Nonetheless, the group has given repeated indications that it is interested in signing the NCA. The SSPP is also the only EAO that is a member of both the FPNCC and the UNFC. The decision not to leave the UNFC may be a further indication that the SSPP is not fully committed to the FPNCC position, in particular the rejection of the NCA. Considered in this light, the hesitation about signing the NCA may be more about the relationship between the SSPP and UWSP than a commitment to solidarity. Moreover, the SSPP seems reluctant to trust the UWSP's fellow feelings for other EAOs or commitment to solidarity. Despite a public statement by the UWSP that it would not oppose other EAOs signing the NCA, the SSPP continued to express reservations

about signing without agreement from the UWSP.

There have also been signs that the KIO feels the UWSP is attempting to dominate the other FPNCC members. In June 2019 the UWSP indicated that it was unhappy with the KIO's leadership of the Northern Alliance's negotiations with the State actors. Meanwhile the KIO objected to the UWSP (which is not a member of the Northern Alliance) intervening with advice on how the Northern Alliance should proceed. The KIO suggested that if the UWSP wished to see a particular outcome, the UWSP should engage in negotiations itself. The same month, the KIO opposed a proposal that China ensure the security of the EAOs in a meeting with the Tatmadaw. Tellingly, the reason given for this objection was that it would make it seem that the KIO was subordinate to the UWSP.

As with the SSPP, the tensions between the KIO and the UWSP suggest that the other EAOs do not fully trust the UWSP. Rather than acting in solidarity with the other EAOs, it is seen as pushing them directions and positioning itself as their leader. This parallels the tensions in the PPST around whether more powerful EAOs can be trusted to promote and protect the interests of their less powerful allies.

If the power of the UWSP has ensured that the FPNCC holds together as an alliance, it has not led to positive demonstrations of solidarity and unity.[14] An example of the failure of the FPNCC to show such solidarity occurred in August 2020. The government invited all FPNCC members except the Arakan Army (AA) to attend the much-delayed fourth Union Peace Conference (UPC). The FPNCC members declined, but oddly did not say this was because the AA was not invited. Instead of using this opportunity to reiterate the commitment to inclusivity and make a show of solidarity, the EAOs used COVID-19 as an excuse for not attending the UPC.

The tensions within the various alliances suggest a decrease in trust among EAOs. This loss of trust is shown more vividly by the increase in fighting between EAOs. Such conflict was not unheard of before 2015 but was not common in the years immediately preceding the signing of the NCA. The Myanmar Peace Monitor did not explicitly identify any clashes between EAOs between 2012 (when its data starts) and September 2015 but has recorded multiple clashes in every subsequent year.[15]

[14] For example, the FPNCC has not made a joint statement on the February turmoil.

[15] "Peace Monitoring Dashboard."



Figure 2: Clashes between EAOs according to Myanmar Peace Monitor Dashboards 2013-2021

Much of this conflict has been between NCA-S-EAOs and NCA-NS-EAOs and in some instances blamed on the NCA. The RCSS has been accused by both EAOs and the Tatmadaw of taking advantage of its status as an NCA-S-EAO to try and expand its territory. It is this expansion that has brought the RCSS into conflict with the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and SSPP. These two groups even allege that the Tatmadaw has supported and fought alongside the RCSS, something that would not have been possible before the RCSS signed the NCA.[16] In reality, this seems unlikely, not least because the Tatmadaw distrusts the RCSS. However, the fact that such an allegation can be made shows the breakdown in trust between EAOs and the erosion of the narrative that EAOs are united in opposition to the Tatmadaw.

[16] Bynum, "Understanding Inter-Ethnic Conflict in Myanmar"; Keenan, "A Disturbing Portent: Inter-Ethnic Tensions and the Peace Process."

It should be noted that the NCA is not always seen as a driver of conflict. A counterexample is provided by the New Mon State Party, which signed the NCA in part because it hoped the NCA mechanisms would help end its conflict with the KNU and other NCA-S-EAOs. However, the need for a mechanism such as the NCA to resolve the dispute suggests a lack of trust among the EAOs. The mediation does not come through an EAO alliance nor is it based on ideas of solidarity. Instead, the EAOs are seen to be relying on a formal treaty.

This last example suggests the NCA may help to address problems arising from the lack of trust among EAOs. However, the other examples show that the NCA itself and developments relating to the NCA have contributed to this lack of trust. In these circumstances, the NCA is not necessarily a good tool for mediating between EAOs. Moreover, this section has shown that the decreasing reliance on solidarity makes it essential for the peace process to engage with the different priorities and objectives of EAOs rather than treating them as a single constituency. As with the evolution of EAO alliances, this suggests a growing complexity to the peace-building environment.

c. How has the NCA affected whether negotiations occur bilaterally or multilaterally?

In line with their commitment to solidarity, the EAOs are theoretically in favour of multilateral negotiation. However, further evidence of the fracturing of the EAO landscape and growing tensions are provided by the way this commitment breaks down in practice.

Before considering the EAO positions, it should be noted that the conduct of collective negotiations relies on the cooperation of the State actors. Prior to the NCA negotiations, the State actors had consistently refused to negotiate with EAO alliances, preferring to reach bilateral agreements with individual groups. The recognition of the UNFC and NCCT as negotiating partners during the drafting of the NCA was therefore a major change. Moreover, the NCA's character as a multilateral agreement ensured ongoing collective negotiations. However, these developments do not seem to have marked a general shift in approach by the State actors. The FPNCC has not been recognised as a negotiating partner, although it has a mandate from its members to conduct

negotiations. Moreover, one concern about reforming the PPST was that a new body might not be given the same status as the PPST.

Among the EAOs, the limits of the commitment to collective negotiation are shown by the fact that several groups have engaged in bilateral negotiation. In some cases, the format of these negotiations was dictated by the State actors. However, in other cases the EAOs have chosen bilateral meetings over engagement through an EAO alliance. For example, in November 2018 the KNU and RCSS both withdrew from negotiations under the NCA. In the following months, the two EAOs requested high-level bilateral meetings with the Tatmadaw and civilian government to address concerns about the peace process. These bilateral meetings played a part in bringing the EAOs back into the formal peace process. However, they also show the EAOs actively choosing bilateral over collective negotiation.

The reaction of other members of the PPST is relevant to understanding how EAOs think about collective negotiations. In November 2018, the remaining eight groups announced their intention to continue negotiations in the absence of the KNU and RCSS. On the one hand, this shows a commitment to the ongoing collective negotiations and contrasts with the KNU's and RCSS' unilateral decisions to withdraw and engage in bilateral negotiations. On the other hand, in continuing the negotiations, the PPST members were refusing to stand in solidarity with the KNU and RCSS.

This decision is especially significant in light of the tensions around the role of the KNU within the PPST (discussed above). The unilateral actions of the KNU and RCSS show the limitations of the PPST's ability to compel or persuade its members to accept collective positions. Meanwhile, by continuing negotiations the other PPST members signalled their refusal to simply follow the lead of the KNU. It is no coincidence that the KNU's reengagement with the peace process occurred in parallel with discussions on reform of the PPST.

A key development of these reform discussions was an agreement among PPST members on collective negotiation. The PPST reiterated a commitment to collective negotiation on points of concern to all EAOs. However, it agreed that EAOs are free to negotiate bilaterally on individual concerns. To an extent this was a pragmatic recognition of what was already happening. However, the bilateral negotiations undertaken by the RCSS and KNU went

beyond individual concerns to include issues relating to the entire structure and implementation of the NCA. In this context, the PPST statement could also be seen as an attempt to reassert the authority of the alliance by imposing limits on such bilateral negotiations.

Unlike the PPST, the FPNCC is not recognised as a negotiating partner by State actors. Therefore, it is less surprising that some of its members have turned to bilateral negotiations. Since 2018, the UWSP has had at least four bilateral meetings with the Tatmadaw.[17] During this period the group's attitude has been inconsistent. It has several times indicated a willingness to sign the NCA, if certain conditions are met. These conditions have included: the AA, TNLA, and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army being invited to sign;[18] that the UWSP be permitted to withdraw if it became unhappy; that the UWSP be allowed to negotiate some issues bilaterally; and that the Framework for Political Negotiation be reformed.

While going back and forth on its willingness to sign the NCA, the UWSP does not appear at any stage to have seriously pushed for multilateral negotiations. It is also noticeable that its conditions for signing have never included the agreement of the other members of the FPNCC. This contrasts with the hesitation of the SSPP and NDAA to sign the NCA without the acquiescence of the FPNCC. When the UWSP has invoked the importance of inclusivity, this has fitted a pattern of first suggesting a willingness to sign the NCA and then drawing back and making excuses for not signing, rather than being a concern raised consistently in the discussions.

The concessions that the UWSP has asked for are mostly ones that would benefit it exclusively, rather than all EAOs. For example, the request for bilateral negotiations was probably intended as a way to ensure the creation of a Wa State. This is known to be an objective of the UWSP but is opposed by Shan EAOs and political parties. Attempting to by-pass these objections through bilateral negotiations directly contradicts any notion of solidarity and mutual support among EAOs.

[17] Keenan, "A Dangerous Precedent: The UWSA and Statehood."

[18] These three groups are mentioned because they were among the NCCT members not invited to sign the NCA in 2015.

The negotiations with the Northern Alliance provide an interesting contrast. The Northern Alliance was created primarily as a military alliance and has not been formally recognised as a negotiating partner by the State actors. Nonetheless, there have been a series of meetings with the four members of the alliance. The negotiations have assumed that the EAOs will follow the same path and negotiate collectively, even when the outcome is expected to be bilateral agreements.

Despite some indications that the KIO has different priorities from the other members of the Northern Alliance and would have liked the talks to move faster, the group has never abandoned the collective negotiations for bilateral talks. In part this may be because the State actors did not pushed for such bilateral talks when the negotiations with the Northern Alliance were stalled in 2019. However, in October 2020 the KIO refused to abandon its allies and sign the NCA alongside a different EAO, despite a private proposal to this effect. The fact that this was a private rather than a public statement of the commitment to solidarity gives it added weight as evidence of the KIO's sincerity.

The other members of the Northern Alliance have proved similarly committed to collective negotiation. Although the AA held bilateral talks in late 2020, these were focused on deescalating the situation in Rakhine State, rather than overlapping with the substance of the Northern Alliance's collective negotiations. Following the February 2021 disruption the AA was initially eager to pursue negotiations, including welcoming a proposal by the UWSP to host a meeting between the Northern Alliance and the Tatmadaw. However, like the KIO before, the AA said that it would only move forward when the other members of the Northern Alliance were ready to do so.

The trajectory of the Northern Alliance's negotiations thus shows a real commitment to collective negotiation. The members have consistently refrained from proceeding with negotiations or accepting agreements until all four groups are agreed. This contrasts with the FPNCC, which has failed to secure collective negotiations and been unable to prevent member groups (including the Northern Alliance) pursuing independent negotiations. Similarly, the PPST has faced challenges in developing collective positions and persuading its members to sacrifice their own individual desires to the need for shared positions.

Taken together these developments suggest that EAOs have become less committed to the idea of collective negotiations. There are clear indications that the more powerful EAOs are starting to see the benefits of bilateral negotiations. To an extent this can be seen as a consequence of the NCA. The division of EAOs into signatories and non-signatories made it inevitable that there would be at least two parallel sets of negotiations. Moreover, the NCA process has led to negotiations on substantive issues relating to state- and nation-building. On these topics the interests and priorities of the EAOs diverge. It is therefore unsurprising that they have caused problems for attempts to negotiate collectively.

4. Conclusion

The NCA has had a significant impact on the peace-building environment in Myanmar. These have included reshaping the relationships between the actors in the peace process, including EAOs.

The NCA divided the EAOs into signatories and non-signatories. This division has been entrenched by the emergence of two major alliances, one representing signatories and one non-signatories. These EAO alliances have not led to a growth in solidarity, even among their members. If anything, EAOs—particularly the more powerful groups—have become more willing to act independently. This has contributed to a loss of trust among the EAOs. Both factors have impacted the ways in which the EAOs engage with the peace process, including in some instances a preference for bilateral rather than collective negotiations.

These changes contribute to an increasingly complex peace-building environment. They highlight the extent to which the EAOs cannot be considered a single 'constituency' and the need for a peace process to engage seriously with their different priorities and interests. Moreover, they demonstrate the potential pitfalls of reliance on ethnic solidarity as a driver of peace.

It remains to be seen whether the NCA will survive the political upheaval commenced in February 202. Even if it does, these events will have a profound impact on the peace-building environment. A full consideration of their impact on the peace-building environment in Myanmar is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is worth noting a few key developments. As of April 2021, both the Tatmadaw-appointed government and the alternative

government formed by elected-MPs—initially the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) and then the National Unity Government (NUG)—were trying to win the support of the EAOs. Some of the CRPH's moves, such as the abolition of the 2008 Constitution, represent major changes on issues that have been blocking progress in the peace process. These developments will fundamentally alter the parameters of any future political negotiations with the EAOs.

Initially, most EAOs seemed wary of supporting either the Tatmadaw government or the CRPH/NUG. However, the increasing violence against civilians has led several EAOs to oppose the Tatmadaw. Some, but not all, of these groups have joined the NUG. For example, the AA and RCSS both refused invitations to join the NUG, while the KNU Chairperson has publicly stated that the current situation should be resolved through dialogue rather than violence.

For the present paper, it is particularly interesting to note that the position of the EAOs in the above context do not follow the division between signatories and non-signatories. The PPST has taken a collective position to maintain cooperation with the CRPH and welcomed the formation of the NUG. However, the PPST also stated that it would abide by the NCA, which would preclude attacking the Tatmadaw. Moreover, at least four of its members have held talks with the military regime, while the KNU (one of the EAOs most actively engaged in conflict with the Tatmadaw) is divided. Among the non-signatories, the KIO is actively fighting the Tatmadaw, as are the other members of the Northern Alliance. This followed a change in position by the AA, which initially supported the Tatmadaw. Meanwhile, the UWSP and SSPP among others have said they will remain neutral, but as part of this position have met with representatives or the military regime.

Nonetheless, so far, the EAOs have been acting independently or through existing alliances. Although the PPST announced the intention to reach out to NCA-NS-EAOs, nothing has yet come of this initiative. Moreover, clashes between EAOs continued and even escalated. It would therefore be premature to assume that the said political upheaval will lead to renewed coordination or solidarity among EAOs or between EAOs and the National League for Democracy. Going forward, there is the possibility of increasing pressure on EAOs, both through incentives to support political change by the

Tatmadaw and through violence against those who resist. As events since 2015 have shown, the EAOs are not good at maintaining solidarity in the face of such pressure. Moreover, the existing trust problems will only be worsened by the uncertainties of the current situation. With all actors trying to adjust and position themselves, there are few incentives for transparency and the potential for misjudgement and miscommunication is high.

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Lesson Learned from the Peace Villages in Indonesia: The Role of Village Women in Policy-Making through Human Security Approach

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Abstract

The prolonged COVID-19 pandemic, combined with economic uncertainty, has increased the burden of societies living with existing socio-political issues, including poverty, natural disasters, sectarian conflicts, as well as discrimination against women. This paper contends that human security approach is suitable in providing people with opportunity to achieve prosperity, as well as fulfillment of rights and dignity that lead to sustainable development. This writing presents the learning from ten villages in Indonesia in implementing Human Security Approach (HSA) following the UN General Assembly Resolution 66/290 through the Peace Village Initiative in Java, Indonesia. This study explores the Peace Village Initiative that supports local women's active participation in policy-making, while also promotes peace and conflict transformation, poverty reduction and gender justice. The Peace Village aims to solve the problem of elitist public security policies that limit women's and marginalized group's participation, which are ineffective in the face of crisis, such as horizontal conflict or pandemic. By using qualitative, in-depth interview method, the study finds that the Peace Village Initiative is able to synergize the HSA and the gender justice approach with components of the economy and women's empowerment. The Initiative is able to strengthen women's economic access as well as serve as a medium for meetings among different groups, which resulted in collaborative initiatives. The Initiative manages to support women's participation in public and political issues, including in cross-sectoral groups of government, religious groups and village apparatuses that creates a participative task force. These collaborations create community resilience that is significant in the decision-making process during conflict resolution. This study offers recommendations for participatory-based policy development model, specifically on how to foster collaboration between women's groups and policy makers at the local and regional levels, specifically in Southeast Asian context.

LESSON LEARNED FROM THE PEACE VILLAGES IN INDONESIA:
THE ROLE OF VILLAGE WOMEN IN POLICY-MAKING THROUGH
HUMAN SECURITY APPROACH

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A. Background

The COVID-19 pandemic has impacted human life, not only on the health sector, but also on other sectors such as economy, culture, politics, and religious affairs. This situation brings uncertainty and insecurity to individuals, communities and countries. In the economic context, the pandemic has led to a significant increase in poverty. Even if the handling of COVID-19 in Indonesia went well, the poverty rate was projected to rise to 9.7% by the end of 2020, with 1.3 million people become the new poor. (Suryahadi et al., 2020). By mid-2021, despite the Indonesian government has rolled out mass vaccination and economic stimulus programs, the full scale of COVID-19 impact on Indonesia's economy and economic growth remains immeasurable.

Related to religious affairs, the pandemic has made online religious studies increasingly popular. At the same time, radical Islamic groups have used online platforms to spread their ideology and recruit members. Based on research conducted by the National Commission on Violence Against Women (Komnas Perempuan), in May 2020 the COVID-19 pandemic was also accompanied by the revival of radical and extremist groups in several regions in Indonesia (Komnas Perempuan, 2020). The pandemic is deliberately used by extremist groups to mobilize hatred against the government and considered it to be God's punishment to secular governments.

Similarly, the COVID-19 outbreak has had an impact on the increase of gender-based violence and discrimination, such as domestic violence and sexual violence triggered by limited mobility work situations, economic hardships, and tripled burdens faced especially by women that have to manage paid work, domestic unpaid labor, as well as community care. Moreover, unprepared with the scale of the pandemic, government policies in mitigating COVID-19 do not pay special attention to its impact on women (Komnas Perempuan, 2020).

The COVID-19 pandemic has had a significant impact, not only on health but also on security. Crisis conditions call for efforts to redefine the concept of security traditionally viewed as the absence of military threats or disturbances towards a nation. However, the definition of security has progressed to cover non-traditional perspective, which include non-military security concerns, such as threats or disturbances caused by natural and human-induced disasters, as well as disease outbreaks, such as COVID-19 (Nurhasanah, et al., 2020).

The non-traditional perspective on security that takes into consideration the human element as the focal point of the analysis is a response to conventional security studies focusing on military power and its role in maintaining stability. The non-traditional concept is referred to as "human security approach" that, in principle, places individual security as the point of reference and the main focus. Through the General Assembly Resolution 66/290, dated September 10th, 2012, the UN adopted human security approach to identify and address cross-cutting challenges to people's survival, livelihood and dignity by adhering to the principle of mainstreaming individual rights to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair (Human Security Unit of the United Nation, 2016). In the context of this study, the human security approach (HSA) is important because it is able to identify and respond to the fundamental needs of the community. Human security does not focus solely on physical security to stop armed violence, but also highlights the importance of communities' peaceful environment and people's needs to be met in the long term. The Resolution 66/290 also recognized the inter-linkages between peace, development and human rights, and equally considers civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights.

This working paper explores the women's community within 10 Peace Villages in Java, Indonesia, in implementing the HSA and gender justice in village policies. The Peace (Village program is a grassroots community initiative, in collaboration with UN Women, that commits to maintaining and fostering peace and justice. By combining the approaches of human security, gender justice, economic empowerment, peace-building and local wisdom, this movement has been able to encourage women's participation in policy making. Moreover, economic empowerment has not only been successful in improving the welfare of families, but has also become a channel among different groups to meet and build collaborative actions. These women's groups have succeeded in encouraging the establishment of village policy plans that adopt the principles of gender equality, inclusiveness and peace. This paper will discuss the three stages of the peace village program: first, the formation of women's groups to promote peace at the grassroots level; second, the collaboration between the community and the government on the prevention of radicalism and terrorism; and third, the implementation of women's groups' initiatives in village policy.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the women's groups have succeeded in demonstrating community resilience in facing crises. The women's groups of Peace Villages have successfully raised public awareness of health

protocols and the prevention of COVID-19, as well as encouraged anti-discrimination against COVID-19 patients and their families. Furthermore, these women's groups were able to play an important role in mitigating the economic impact of COVID-19, both by providing social assistance and by revitalizing women's businesses. The important point from the achievements of the 10 Peace Villages is that in building community resilience, the mainstreaming of the ownership and human-centered aspects in the implementation of the HSA is inseparable from the process. Women's groups in each Peace Village have different priorities. Those priorities are based on what exists in their local community. Additionally, in the implementation of the HSA, the approach to local wisdom is always a major consideration. As such, to raise ownership within the 10 villages, women's groups always encourage joint collaboration among all of the community elements in every action. The joint collaboration is achieved by consistently involving the government and village community police in implementing the action plans.

Before detailing the achievement of Peace Village, in the next section the paper will discuss the study's objectives and methodology, followed by the conceptual framework of the HSA and its implementation in the 10 Peace Villages. Subsequently, the paper will expound the research finding and analysis on the women's participation in addressing the issues they faced in their respective communities, namely intolerance and increase participation in terrorism, as well as integrating the HSA in village policies through the formation of women's agencies and joint working groups. The final section of the paper will present the important points that drive the success, along with elaboration on the challenges and lessons-learned related to the women's groups in integrating the HSA in village policies.

B. Research Objectives and Methodology

This paper has two main objectives. Firstly, it expounds the conceptual framework of the HSA and women in peace and conflict transformation, with their implementation in the 10 Peace Villages in Java, Indonesia. Secondly, it identifies the level of participation of village women in promoting village policies based on the HSA. The study utilizes qualitative methodology of case study approach with primary source of the women in the Peace Village. The case study approach is considered invaluable when used to obtain in-depth information on a particular phenomenon or event (Yin RK, 2009). Case study approach is used to identify the implementation of the Peace Village Action Plan to generate in-depth

and multi-faceted understanding. Research data collection was done using in-depth interviews of representatives in the 10 Peace Villages and a review of the impact evaluation of the Peace Village implementation in Java with main informants coming from the villages' governmental agencies and village women.

C. Conceptual Framework

This working paper uses two conceptual frameworks to analyze the role of women in peace-building as well as in promoting the HSA in village policies. The conceptual framework of the HSA is adopted from the United Nations (UN) General Assembly Resolution No. 66/290/2012 and UN Security Council Resolution 1325 regarding the role and contribution of women to preventing conflict and building peace.

a. Human Security Approach

The Human Security Approach (HSA) is a non-traditional security concept that focuses on the security at the individual level. The HSA is different from the traditional security concept that emphasizes on state security and its being free from outside attacks. Meanwhile, the HSA is centered on individual security (Wibowo, & Zamzamy, 2015). The concept of human security first appeared in the UNDP Human Development Report (1994). The document explains the concept of "security" in a narrow context, that is an understanding of security from aggression coming from outside, or which is more closely related to the notion of state security. The concept of human security should consider human conditions and threats, such as diseases, hunger, repression, etc., which can come from homes, communities, and even the state. This report identifies two components of human security, namely 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from desire'. From these two components, there are seven categories of human security namely, economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security (Martin and Owen, 2013). The HSA is a conceptual framework used by the UN to identify, develop and integrate various responses to current global issues. The HSA refers to the UN General Assembly Resolution No. 66/290 of 2012. This resolution indicated that the HSA would be a new approach for UN member states in responding to human rights, poverty and other complex problems. (Human Security Unit - United Nations, 2016).

Although the concept of human security has been commonly used in Indonesia, it does not have a legal basis in Indonesia, whilst the phrase 'national security' has appeared in the National Security Bill. This bill states that national security consists of four types: human security, public security, internal security and

external. The meaning of human security is explained as being free from threats of various kinds, such as pandemics, famine, natural disasters, poverty, crimes against humanity, and extreme stress. The national security bill itself is included in the Indonesian government's 2020-2024 national legislation program (Alexandra, 2015). Despite the lack of national legal basis, this working paper uses the HSA introduced by the Human Security Unit - United Nations (2016) as a conceptual framework to identify and analyze the implementation of HSA in the 10 Peace Villages. In detail, this paper analyzes to what extent the 10 Peace Villages apply the four principles of HSA, namely people-centered, comprehensiveness, context-specificity, and prevention-orientation in strengthening protections and empowerment of all humans and communities.

b. Women for Peace and Conflict Transformation

Another conceptual framework used in this working paper is the role of women in peace-building and conflict transformation as stated in the UN Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. The UN Resolution 1325 in principle focuses on the impact of war on women and the contribution of women in preventing conflicts and building peace (Puechguirbal, 2010).

Indonesia supports the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 through its statement at the Security Council Open Debate on Women, Peace and Security in 2010. Just like other UN member states, the support only turns into action when the country adopted the resolution into a national regulation and in Indonesia it was done in 2014 through Presidential Regulation (*Perpres*) No. 18 of 2014 concerning the National Action Plan for the Protection and Empowerment of Women and Children in Social Conflict (RAN P3AKS). This implementation is strengthened by the Ministry of Home Affairs' Circular No. 460/5131/PUM concerning the Acceleration of the Implementation of RAN P3AKS in the local regions. This regulation guarantees the protection and empowerment of women in conflict areas and women's involvement in policy-making related to conflict and peace issues in accordance with Indonesian conditions. The RAN P3AKS is divided into three main intervention programs, namely prevention, handling, and empowerment and participation.

To connect the two aforementioned concepts with relevant case study, this working paper shows to what extent the women's groups in the 10 Peace Villages are able to integrate the HSA and conflict transformation in sustaining peace in the Peace Village programs and activities. The Peace Village in Java, Indonesia

is an initiative to increase women participation in peace and conflict transformation that begun in 2013. This working paper will examine to what extent the women's groups in the 10 Peace Villages have been able to position themselves as active actors in promoting peace and preventing violence. This paper also observes how actively involved are the women's groups in the Peace Villages' empowerment and participation program.

D. Research Result and Analysis

This section discusses the transformation of the Peace Village women's groups by adopting the perspective of HSA and women in peace and conflict transformation. The transformation is explained through a method of time-keeping that measures which aspects of the HSA and gender equality have been successfully implemented. There are three stages of the transformation process. In the first stage, the women's groups in Peace Villages primarily focused on efforts to promote tolerance and peace among communities amidst the increasing religious sentiments and conflicts. In the second stage, the women agencies were encouraged to be active in promoting peace to counter the increasing trend of women's involvement in acts of radicalism and terrorism in Indonesia. In the third stage, women's groups in the 10 Peace Villages are able to make a positive contribution in handling the spread of COVID-19 while at the same time encouraging the adoption of the HSA in village policies.

a) Women's participation in promoting interfaith tolerance

The Peace Village was initiated by the Wahid Foundation (WF), an advocacy group for freedom of religion and belief in Indonesia that was started in 2003. During the decade of WF's journey, the foundation believes there are unresolved challenges in promoting tolerance and peace in Indonesia. It was seen that social and economic inequality is one of the driving factors for the birth and propagation of acts of intolerance and radicalism (Wahid Foundation, 2014). Intolerance and discrimination are prone to occur in areas with limited access to economic, educational, and information resources. Social inequality, coupled with the inability to access education, allows individuals to be provoked to hate and commit acts of violence against other groups.

Based on those considerations, in 2013, the foundation formulated a program called *Kampung Damai* (Peace Village) that focused on promoting peace and preventing women-targeted violence. The selection of women as the main target was because of their role in initiating peace at the grassroots level during large-scale conflicts in Indonesia. Women are

recognized as having conducted peace efforts indirectly through economic activities and meeting other basic needs. This value is what the Foundation tries to revitalize in its economic empowerment program for peace (UN WOMEN, 2013).

In the first stage, the program targeted women's groups in West Java. Its primary focus in West Java is due to the region's past of being prone to violence and discrimination against minority groups. By combining economic empowerment and peace-building approaches, this program seeks to encourage women to become agents of peace. The program is still ongoing eight years after its initiation, when this paper was written.

The program's output takes the form of savings and loans cooperatives through *Koperasi Cinta Damai (KCD) Wahid* and women's joint ventures that becomes a medium for women's economic empowerment as well as social inclusion. Social inclusion through economic empowerment is not only for ethnic and religious minorities, but is also targeted towards ex-jihadist women who find it difficult to reintegrate into the community. Social cohesion among women began to emerge through weekly savings and loan meetings. Muslim women who were previously antagonistic to Christian women are unified in the joint responsibility system existing in the cooperatives (Wahid Foundation, 2016).

The program aims to empower women through micro-finance and entrepreneurship as a method to address social inequalities and strengthen social and economic relations among interfaith communities. Until the end of 2015, the women's groups, who were the target of the development program, succeeded in producing positive interfaith synergy in the form of an interfaith community social enterprise. This program targeted 21 groups of interfaith women with a total of 308 members. Out of 308 members, 257 are Muslim, 3 are Catholic, 18 are Protestant, 2 are Christian, 4 are Buddhist, 20 are Confucian, 1 is Pentecostal, and 3 belong to the Indonesian Bethel Church. In addition, this program has been able to increase communities' commitment in promoting peace. Members of women's groups are committed to respecting differences in religions and denominations in their respective areas.

From the HSA perspective, the economic empowerment program tries to bring security to the community amid its increasingly religious sentiments. At the same time, this program succeeds in expanding economic access for women's groups through savings and loans cooperatives.

Although in the first stage the women's movement for peace was able to provide a sense of economic security as well as to contribute to community security, however,

government support remained lacking. Based on the findings found from the program evaluation results in 2014, it highlighted the lack of involvement, support and collaboration from the government. Local leaders and the village government recognize these women's groups in relation to the economic empowerment program. They consider that economic empowerment can have a positive impact on improving the economic conditions of families and communities. However, local and government leaders tend to reject the involvement of minority groups in those activities. The involvement of minority groups is considered a potential disruption to the stability and security of the village, which was addressed in the second stage of the program.

b) Women's active participation in the prevention of terrorism

An important stage for the Peace Village program was the integration of the HSA and women for sustaining peace that started in 2016. The stage aims to respond to an increase of involvement of women in acts of radicalism and terrorism (The Institute of Policy Analysis of Conflict, 2017). Moreover, research found that the driving factor for women's involvement in acts of radicalism and terrorism is the existence of personal and economic insecurities (WF and CSIS, 2017). With this understanding, the Peace Village program focuses on efforts to prevent the spread of intolerant and radical ideologies by addressing insecurity factors that are the driving factors for the involvement of women in acts of radicalism. Those are, namely, women's personal, economic, and community-level insecurities.

The establishment and sustained activity of the Peace Village by women's groups attempted to answer the problems of leadership, restlessness, and seclusion experienced by women. The program is expected to generate a sense of togetherness, personal closeness, and dignity for women who are in the process of searching for identity and fulfilment. It also provides economic support to increase the financial resilience of women's groups from being recruited by intolerant and radical groups. Thus, the Peace Village program during this stage concentrates primarily on diminishing the factors that drive women's involvement in acts of radicalism by enhancing group ties and their economic resilience.

In the latter stage of the program, the Foundation collaborated with UN Women. This collaboration realigned the program to focus on integrating aspects of economic empowerment, strengthening women's capacity related to peace-building, gender justice, entrepreneurship, preventing violent extremism, as well as strengthening the government's involvement. Additionally, the scope of the program was then expanded to

Central Java and East Java. The Peace Village women's groups in this stage did not only encourage women's active participation in promoting peace, but also created grassroots women's initiatives as a part of the local governments' policies by institutionalizing women's participation for peace-building through village regulations.

In this regard, the Peace Village women's groups with other stakeholders at the village/*kelurahan* and regency/city levels formulated nine indicators for the Peace Village[1] that are used as a reference to encourage development of the Peace Village Action Plan in government policies[2] (Wahid Foundation, 2019). The development of The Peace Village Action Plan in government policies can contribute to reducing gender discrimination and violence against women and increasing access to justice for women and preventing of violence extremism. With the adoption of the Peace Village model in government policies, community-based justice and conflict solving mechanisms will be strongly connected to the formal justice system and service providers provided by the government.

According to the program impact evaluation report (Wahid Foundation, 2018), the Peace Village had been able to strengthen local, peace and gender values among women's groups. The Peace Village women played their role to disseminate and share knowledge about peace-building and gender concepts to whom they met every day. As a result, these women's groups succeeded in assisting other community members in gaining a better understanding about how to prevent conflict, gender-based violence, and radicalism. At the same time, the economic empowerment program that was undertaken through saving and loan activities succeeded in enhancing women's financial literacy and entrepreneurship skills. These skills were considered important in improving economic access for the women. Financial literacy and business development integrated in the Peace Village program are acknowledged to have increased the capacity of the women in the

[1] The nine Peace Village indicators are commitment to a peaceful life, promotion and education, ethics of care, values of local wisdom, early warning system, a response system, women's participation, accountable governance, and infrastructure that support the spread of peace and prevent conflict and radicalism.

[2] There are seven stages of implementing a Peace Village as part of the village policy, namely, (1) Obligatory declaration as a Peace Village/Kelurahan; (2) Formation of a Peace Village/Kelurahan working group (Pokja) through the village/kelurahan development planning consultative forum (Musrenbangdes); (3) Ratification of the Peace Village/Kelurahan working group (Pokja) in the village regulation (Perdes), or village head's decree; (4) Preparation of the framework for the Peace Village/Kelurahan Action Plan by the village/kelurahan development planning consultative forum; (5) Ratification of the Peace Village/Kelurahan Action Plan in the village regulation, or village head's decree; (6) Implementation of the Peace Village/Kelurahan Action Plan; (7) Quarterly monitoring and evaluation by the working groups and women's groups.

household and in small business financial management. In addition, entrepreneurial development was not only able to encourage the women to find their identities, but also improved their families' economies, and increased their self-confidence in expressing their opinions.

The Peace Village program has targeted 30 villages/*kelurahans* in East Java, Central Java and West Java. The total number of program beneficiaries is 2,121 women. Out of the 30 villages that were targeted by the program, 10 villages/*kelurahans* have declared themselves as Peace Villages. The consequence of a village declaring as a Peace Village is that the village has an obligation to implement the nine indicators for Peace Villages/*Kelurahans"*. In a Peace Village, a working group consisting of women, local communities, religious/local leaders, and local government officials is formed to ensure that the indicators are adopted in the government system and implemented in the social practices.

Nglinggi Village in Klaten, Central Java was the first village to declare itself a Peace Village and has enacted the nine Peace Village indicators as part of their village policies. This was partly due to the social background of the Nglinggi community, which population has diverse ethnicities and religions, and partly because the village chief is a member of a minority group. The goal is to make every religious group, every woman, man and child enjoy their rights equally, without discrimination.

A distinct activity in this second stage is the establishment of village-level working group, or locally known as Pokja, consisting representatives of the village's government, apparatuses, women's groups, and local/religious leaders with the task of implementing the Peace Village Action Plan. The Pokja has been able to bridge and coordinate the roles and functions of the multi-stakeholders that have been working "individually" in the prevention of violent extremism. The horizontal coordination by the Pokja is based on equality between the multi-stakeholders. Out of the ten case study villages, seven villages with such policies are Gemblegan and Jetis in Klaten, Central Java; Candirenggo in Malang, East Java; Sidomulyo in Batu City, East Java; Guluk-Guluk, Prancak and Payudan Dundang in Sumenep, East Java. However, there were two villages that faced challenges in establishing the working group. The challenges have been mainly due to national and local political dynamics, whereby the politicization of religions during the 2019 presidential election and the regional head elections in 2020 increased local political polarization and the exclusivism of the opposition groups. Subsequently, there was rejection and persecution of women's groups of different political and religious views. This

exhibited a lack of commitment of the two villages' government to inclusiveness and tend to reject women's groups of different political and religious views. At the level of village heads, in the midst of massive pressure from intolerant groups, the two village leaders caved in to the pressure instead of supporting the Peace Village program.

Despite the challenges faced by the two villages, across all ten villages, the second stage of the program implementation has been able to contribute to the fulfillment of human security at the economic, political and personal levels. In terms of personal security, the women's groups were able to form group ties that expanded the diversity of their interactions and relationships. In the context of economic security, the program increased access to markets and economic opportunities for women through mentoring on economic empowerment and entrepreneurship. In relation to political security, women's groups made efforts to voice their opinions concerning village policies. Furthermore, the ratification of the Nine Indicators for Peace Villages/Kelurahans encouraged the realization of political security through the implementation of inclusive and gender-equitable policies.

Nationally, this program received recognition from the government as a grassroot initiative prototype for the promotion of peace driven by women. One of the program's important achievements was its designation as a priority by the Ministry of Women's Empowerment and Child Protection of the Republic of Indonesia. Another achievement was its integration within the National Action Plan for the Protection and Empowerment of Women and Children in Social Conflict (RAN P3AKS). As it achieved recognition in its second stage, the program continued to implement activities to adopt the aspects of peace-building, gender, economic empowerment and the HSA in village policies. This will be described further in the next section.

c) Building community resilience by integrating the HSA in village policies

The third stage of the women's action program in the 10 villages focuses specifically on implementing the Peace Village Indicators in village policies (Cite WF foundation). After the second stage, the 10 villages/kelurahans consisting of eight villages/kelurahans, which have formally adopted the nine indicators for Peace Villages/Kelurahans through their formal, legislated policies, and two villages which have not. In the third stage, the program aims to develop the Peace Village/Kelurahan Action Plans in the 10 villages/kelurahans by combining the approaches of human security, conflict prevention mechanism, peace-building and gender justice, as well as

sustainable women's economic empowerment. The program carried out a number of key interventions, including strengthening the capacity of women, working groups, village/kelurahan governments, and apparatuses; assisting in implementation of Peace Village Action Plans in the 10 villages; and developing local abilitty for monitoring and evaluation of the Plans. To support the integration of the HSA and gender justice in village policies, a novelty of this third stage program is the strengthening of women, working groups and the government and village apparatuses related to the HSA, the international women's human rights standards, and Indonesia's legislative framework on women's rights.

The preparation of this third phase of the program was undertaken several months before the COVID-19 pandemic occurred. When the COVID-19 pandemic hit Indonesia in March 2020, the program, which had originally planned to focus on preventing terrorism and gender justice, had to change its intervention strategy. All stakeholders, including the Foundation, village governments, women's groups, and working groups, were forced to respond to the impact of the pandemic by replanning the program strategy and agreeing that the program must be able to meet the basic needs, economic and health accesses of the community. In this context, women's groups are encouraged to become the main actors capable of promoting community resilience in facing crises during the pandemic.

While both women's groups and working groups previously focused on promoting peace, economic empowerment and gender justice, during the COVID-19 pandemic, they have adapted to the needs of the community by actively participating in reducing its negative impact. This adaptation has taken many forms. They actively disseminate health protocols among residents who believe that COVID-19 is a hoax and propaganda.

> "*Recently our village received lectures from the head of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI). His lectures included spreading incorrect information related to COVID-19, for example, COVID-19 was deliberately created and spread by China and there was a conspiracy to make this virus spread throughout the world. This message of negative sentiments and hatred caused the community to panic, particularly some residents, who believed in the information. In addition, there was a COVID-19 hoax that those who went to Puskesmas (community health centers) for medical treatment would be diagnosed with COVID-19. This made people reluctant to seek medical assistance at Puskesmas.*

> *That is why we thought of inviting a doctor from Puskesmas to clarify this information. The doctor explained clearly the handling of COVID-19 by health workers and the history of how this virus can be transmitted to humans. During the outreach activity, one of the sub-village (Dusun) heads, who came as a participant, asked directly about COVID-19 fake news that it was a Chinese conspiracy and all of the people, who were seeking treatment, would be diagnosed with COVID-19 by health workers. Then the doctor explained that the news was not true and was made to unsettle the public. On the one hand, we are happy to be able to hold this health outreach activity because it is a media for* tabayyun *(enlightenment in Arabic). If we, as a common people, explain it to the community, they usually don't believe us. Fortunately, one speaker was a doctor from the community health center, and another one was a religious leader from a trusted Islamic boarding school. As a result, the community became more open-minded*[3]*."*

[3] Direct interview with a member of Pasae Women's Group amd the Guluk-Guluk Peace

They also collaborate with city/regency health service officers and the village governments to provide assistance to the families of COVID-19 patients without discrimination. They support distance learning activities by lending smartphones or providing free internet access to children from poor rural families. They work with the government and the Wahid Foundation in distributing staple food packages to those in need. Finally, they are at the forefront of providing economic assistance to the most economically affected groups. For instance, the businesses tied to the women's groups have been revitalized based on the presence of additional capital, which has allowed for the hiring of new members from the affected communities.

These adaptations, made by the women's groups and working groups, occurred when the national government was trying to find a policy scheme to mitigate the COVID-19 pandemic. Local and village governments usually wait for instructions from the national government without doing any significant intervention efforts in preventing the spread of COVID-19 and its impact on the socio-economic life of the community. With the lack of official actions, women's groups and working's groups stepped up to fill the gap in the support structure.

Village Working Group during the 2nd monitoring of the Peace Village Program in 2020

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The COVID-19 pandemic has become a momentum for women's groups and working groups to show their existence in society as well as prove the community's resilience during times of crisis. These women's groups, which were previously underestimated by the village governments, are now being used as critical partners of the village governments. The COVID-19 crisis has made it clear that the active contribution of women's groups is very important in making the government programs successful. This situation certainly gives opportunity for the women's groups in 10 Peace Villages/*Kelurahans* to solicit the governments' commitment in developing The Peace Village Action Plan in their policies.

Seeing the women's groups' active participation in handling the COVID-19 pandemic, several village governments that were previously reluctant to make the Peace Village indicators an integral part of the village policies are slowly convinced to join the program. With the pandemic, it has become clear on how the implementation of the Peace Village actions and the role of women can provide positive impact to their residents. The pandemic has contributed to the development of the Peace Village implementation. Until this working paper is written, 4 out of 10 villages/*kelurahans* have adopted Peace Village Action Plan Policy. The four villages are Sidomulyo, Candirenggo, Payudan-Dundang, and Prancak, all in East Java. They have advocated the Peace Village Action Plan into policy. Two other villages, namely Tajur Halang in Bogor and Pengasinan in Depok, both in West Java, have progressed to issuing a decree for the formation of the working group.

Based on the Peace Village program monitoring report (2020), it was explained that the COVID-19 pandemic had at least given the government apparatuses new awareness regarding the concept of human security. Previously, the government apparatuses only saw the concept of human security in relation to public order. They admitted that the HSA is beneficial in preventing the spread of the negative impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its citizens. In addition, the report also noted that the active involvement of Peace Village women's groups during the pandemic was considered essential and contributed positively minimizing the negative impact of COVID-19.

> *"I was happy. This activity to overcome pandemic has become an unforgettable thing in my life because I was involved in the activities and actions organized by women's group in Prancak Village. The spirit of this women's group is extraordinary, that is, they want to run a program called Independent Women, Prosperous Families. Everything is done together starting from the planning, process and implementation of activities by having the principle that this activity is solely for the social-communal mission. So, they always carry social missions, namely patience and struggle.* The *Peace Village program allows me to make my life more meaningful because I can dedicate myself to various social and peace-building activities*[4]*."*

In the beginning of 2021, there are six more villages/*kelurahans*, outside the 10 case study villages, that are in the process of declaring themselves as Peace Villages. These six villages include Duren Seribu (Depok, West Java); Pondok Udik (Bogor Regency, West Java), Tipes (Solo, Central Java), Telukan (Sukoharjo, Central Java), Gunungrejo (Malang, East Java), and Gunungsari (Batu, East Java). The process is driven by women's groups aspiring for their villages to progress like the existing 10 Peace Villages. These women's groups are actively lobbying for their aspiration to gain support from all community members and village governments that may not be necessarily ready to embark on the program.

The biggest challenge faced by the women's groups in securing their village governments and community members support is related to the points of protection of religious minorities. For example, several village governments are still reluctant to declare their villages as Peace Villages because there are conservative groups falsely campaigning that the program's missions promote religious minorities. As the program's mission received resistance, the village governments support to the Peace Village program is limited to its initiative on economic empowerment, women's empowerment and the HSA, but they are still hesitant to support the points on protecting minority groups.

Another challenge is dealing with the village governments' concern about the security of their villages, with the thinking that using the term "peace" will connote that their respective villages were previously not peaceful. Specifically, the village governments are worried that they will be targeted by the radical jihadist groups affiliated with the Indonesian Mujahidin Council led by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, which do not agree with the Peace Village program. Despite the rigorous advocacy of the program by the local women's groups, the pressure from the radical group delays the program's implementation.

[4] Direct interview with Naufil Hasbie, 33 years old, Village Apparatus, Working Group Member in Prancak, Sumenep, East Java during the 1st monitoring of the Peace Village Program in March 2021.

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Despite work is still being needed to fully adopt the Peace Village program, women's groups' collaboration with the village governments in gender-responsive policy-making and crisis mitigation have been improved in the time of the COVID-19 pandemic. Within the ten case study villages that have adopted Peace Village Program, women's groups have increased their collaboration with village government to push for the ratification of the Peace Village Action Plan in the village policy. The Action Plan aims to reduce gender discrimination, violence against women, and increase access to justice for women. The example of the Plan's implementation is Rumah Ayom in Sidomulyo, Malang that serves to conduct early detection and provide response to gender-based violence, conflict, radicalism, and other crises. Rumah Ayom has established a networked task force system to detect and respond to conflict that starts from neighborhood unit (*Rukun Tetangga*), community unit (*Rukun Warga*), hamlet (*dusun*), up to the village levels. Furthermore, to pursue the fulfillment of comprehensive security within the HSA framework, the women's groups also worked in achieving personal, community, and economic securities, as well as to fulfill food and health securities. This was done through the women's efforts in documenting, monitoring, and cooperating with all stakeholders to assist the implementation of the human security approaches in the Peace Village Action Plan.

More recently, the women's groups obtain additional support to persuade their village governments in supporting the Peace Village Action Plan as the national government issued the National Action Plan for the Prevention and Mitigation of Violent Extremism that Leads to Terrorism (*Rancangan Aksi Nasional Pencegahan Ekstremisme Berbasis Pada Kekerasan yang Mengarah pada Terorisme* – RAN PE) in January 2021. In line with the RAN PE that was issued through Presidential Decree No. 7 of 2021, the Peace Village program supports the involvement and protection of women and children in efforts to prevent and combat violent extremism. With the recently issued regulation, the village governments would consider that it is an obligation to support the Peace Village Action Plan. Therefore, the RAN PE has provided a policy basis for the implementation of the Peace Village Action Plan. This enables women's groups to urge the village governments, who previously have been reluctant, to implement the Peace Village Action Plan.

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E. Conclusion

The Peace Village program is a long-term program in efforts to promote peace. This program began as an effort to close the gaps in the previous peace and tolerance promotion program that emphasizes advocacy and mediation efforts but did not pay much attention to the conditions of the grassroots communities. Within the grassroots communities of the 10 villages that are chosen as case study of this paper, it was found that lack of access to the economy and education often become the trigger for committing acts of violence against other groups, particularly toward religious minorities. With the finding, the program incorporated economic empowerment and peace-building activities with women's groups as its main empowered actor. This decision is based on the positive attributes of women in promoting peace and preventing conflict.

Within the Peace Village program there are three main phases of implementation. The first is the initiation phase, which initiate the formation of women's groups. In the context of the HSA, through economic activities, the program has succeeded in providing capital access and opening market access. Economic activities have also become a channel between communities of different religions and beliefs to meet and have dialogues to support the villages' building a sense of community and achieving economic security. The second phase began with addressing village communities' insecurity that was heightened due to the increased influence of radical ideologies. The Peace Village program began to focus on engaging women groups to collaborate with the government and community police. The program also continues to deepen women's capacities related to gender, peace and entrepreneurship. An important achievement in this period was that 10 villages out of the 30 villages/kelurahans declared themselves as Peace Villages. With the declaration, the residents, the governments and village security apparatuses (community police) have committed to implement the Nine Indicators for Peace Villages and to form a working group to aid its process. The adoption of the Nine Indicators for Peace Villages as formal village policies is an important step in implementing non-discriminatory and inclusive political policies. Furthermore, the Peace Village program in this phase also minimizes the impact of economic and community insecurities due to the influence of radical ideologies.

Lastly, the third stage evaluates the implementation of the Nine Indicator for Peace Villages within the village policies, especially focusing on the active role of women's groups during the COVID-19 pandemic. In these

challenging times, women's groups active participation has become the main driving factor that accelerated the establishment and continuation of the Peace Villages. The role of women's groups in supporting the provision of economic assistance, promotion of health protocols, facilitation of distance learning, and assistance to COVID-19 patients, had direct positive impact on the government's recognition of the role of women's groups.

The Peace Village program succeeded in achieving two goals. First, the program's women's groups succeeded in encouraging the adoption and implementation of the Peace Village Action Plan through acting as facilitators between informal villages' mechanisms and formal governmental mechanisms in realizing human security and gender justice. Second, the program's Action Plan when adopted as a village policy has made positive impacts in strengthening justice for women, reducing conflict, and increasing women's participation in policy-making. Since the program's establishment, four out of 10 Peace Villages have made the Peace Village indicators and HSA into a village policy. Six others are currently planning their village actions. Furthermore, in 2021, there are six villages that are in the process of declaring themselves as Peace Villages. The overall success of the Peace Village program highlights the importance of empowering grassroots communities, especially women, to promote peace by having the agility to alter its approach when unexpected situations, such as the pandemic, occur.

LESSON LEARNED FROM THE PEACE VILLAGES IN INDONESIA: THE ROLE OF VILLAGE WOMEN IN POLICY-MAKING THROUGH HUMAN SECURITY APPROACH

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Cohesion in the Time of Conflict: An Analysis of Social Cohesion in the Context of Ethnic Armed Conflict in Myanmar's Rakhine State

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Cohesion in the Time of Conflict: An Analysis of Social Cohesion in the Context of Ethnic Armed Conflict in Myanmar's Rakhine State

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ABSTRACT

Social cohesion initiatives have so far been limited in their effectiveness at resolving inter-communal tensions in Rakhine State. The outbreak of armed conflict between the Arakan Army and the Myanmar Military have added other dimensions to the situation of inter-communal conflict; not to mention, complicated evaluations of cohesion-oriented programming. In particular, the decline in expressions of anti-Muslim sentiments or hate messaging may be assumed to indicate an improvement in inter-communal relations. However, the prominence and the volume of anti-military and anti-government discourse should not be mistaken to have replaced local contentions against the Muslim population. Although fewer than during the period prior to the violence in 2017 (or even 2012 and 2016), there continue to occur physical clashes as well as social exclusionary behaviour targeting primarily Muslims.

The case study of Rakhine State, and specifically situations surrounding the recent ethnic armed conflict, provides important insight into the implementation and the evaluation of social cohesion programming. The analysis of information—gathered from primary and secondary sources, through interviews, surveys, and the regular monitoring of news and social media—about local contexts and evolving inter-communal dynamics seeks to provide a fair assessment of social cohesion activities, to aid in the development and implementation of such initiatives in the complex conflict environments common across Myanmar and Southeast Asia.

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BACKGROUND

On 25 August 2017, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) attacked approximately 20 police outposts in northern Rakhine State and killed 12 members of the Myanmar Military (hereafter referred to by its local name, '*Tatmadaw*'). This event was the catalyst to widespread violent crackdowns against Muslims and led to the mass exodus primarily of the community which self-identifies as Rohingya. Although significant in its scale and intensity, this incident marks but one in a longstanding history of tensions (and the outbreaks thereof[1]) between Buddhists and Muslims particularly in Myanmar's Rakhine State.

There are a number of precedents that likely contributed to the entrenchment of this religious divide. In the mid-1990s, the Ministry for the Progress of Border Areas and National Races (locally termed '*Na Ta La*') enacted a 'model village scheme', which aimed to resettle Buddhists in areas with a sizeable Muslim population to address a perceived "demographic imbalance".[2] A privately-funded Ancillary Committee for the Reconstruction of Rakhine National Territory in the Western Frontier also supported the establishment of a "Muslim-dry" buffer zone between the state capital of Sittwe and the formerly Muslim-populated Maungdaw Town.[3] It should be noted, however, that independent individuals—and not the Na Ta La nor the Ancillary Committee—were the ones who had taken advantage of the displacement of Rohingya Muslims from villages across northern Rakhine State following the violence in 2017 and attempted to resettle on the newly emptied lands. These individuals were later made to leave by local authorities.[4] In 2015, four 'Race and Religion Protection Laws' had successfully been passed at Myanmar's Union Parliament. Human Rights Watch, along

[1] There have been a number of violent incidents between Buddhists and Muslims prior to 25 August 2017. Some notable incidents occurred in 2012, as well as the first appearance by ARSA on 9 October 2016. Though not as great in scale as the attack in 2017, the 2016 incident also marked the first instance that the issues in Rakhine State had been brought to the attention of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) by a Myanmar Government.

[2] Francis Wade, *Myanmar's Enemy Within: Buddhist Violence and the Making of a Muslim 'Other'* (London: Zed Books, 2017), chap. 5, Kindle.

[3] AFP, 'Rakhine Seek Muslim-Free "buffer Zone" on Bangladeshi Border', *Frontier Myanmar*, 16 March 2018, https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/rakhine-seek-muslim-free-buffer-zone-on-bangladeshi-border/.

[4] This information was conveyed to the author by a local analyst with reliable knowledge of the issue, in May 2021.

with other similar organisations, had argued that these laws risked discrimination on religious grounds—disproportionately affecting the Muslim community—and serious inter-communal tensions. [5] The prominence of actors such as the Organisation for the Protection of Race and Religion ('*Ma Ba Tha*') and the renowned preacher Wirathu furthered the rise of Buddhist nationalism in the country, deepened perceptions of vulnerability among the Buddhist population, and reinforced the notion of the fearsome "Muslim Other".[6]

In September 2016, the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State was established to examine and propose solutions to the complex challenges in the region. Among its recommendations were five that targeted the improvement of social cohesion between communities, through the facilitation of inter-communal dialogue, the building of local capacity for mediation, the promotion of meaningful interaction and understanding between communities, and the combatting of hate speech.[7] In line with this, the Union Government facilitated and supported the formation of township-level Committees for Sustainable Peace and Development, the first of which was established in Maungdaw Township in June 2019. This Committee provides a space to dialogue for all ethnic members of the township including women and youth representatives, thereby building trust among the diverse communities as they work towards peace, reconciliation and development for all resident ethnic and religious groups. Maungdaw Township was also later designated a 'Model Township for Social Cohesion'. This initiative is part of the broader reform program of Myanmar's General Administration Department, which then required pilot projects to develop a particular township per State/Region. [8] Furthermore, in the period from 2017 to 2019, local non-

[5] As cited in Shameema Rahman and Wendy Zeldin, 'Burma: Four "Race and Religion Protection Laws" Adopted', Library of Congress, 14 September 2015, //www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/burma-four-race-and-religion-protection-laws-adopted/.

[6] Veena Das, 'Specificities: Official Narratives, Rumour, and the Social Production of Hate', *Social Identities* 4, no. 1 (1 February 1998): 109–30, https://doi.org/10.1080/13504639851915.

[7] 'Towards a Peaceful, Fair and Prosperous Future for the People of Rakhine: Final Report of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State', August 2017, https://www.kofiannanfoundation.org/app/uploads/2017/08/FinalReport_Eng.pdf.

[8] 'Union Minister U Min Thu Meets GAD Staff Of Shan State (South, North)', *Global New Light of Myanmar*, 8 February 2019, https://www.gnlm.com.mm/union-minister-u-min-thu-meets-gad-staff-of-shan-state-south-north/.

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governmental organisations and civil society groups conducted an estimated 200 social cohesion-oriented activities. Some examples include community dialogues, cultural festivals, sports tournaments, vocational trainings, and youth camps.

The impacts of these social cohesion activities were however complicated by the re-emergence of the Arakan Army (AA) in November 2018 and the escalation of its armed conflict with the Tatmadaw. The two armed groups clashed over 960 times in the two-year span they had been fighting, and caused approximately 464 deaths of the Vcumulative 1,118 casualties. [9] Nearly 240,000 persons had additionally been displaced. [10] The very real effects of the conflict on the socio-economic conditions of the broader population in Rakhine State—regardless of their ethnicity or religion—thereby shifted popular discourse away from the previous focus on anti-Muslim sentiments to tensions between the ethnic majority in 'mainland' Myanmar and the ethnic minorities at its periphery.

Public outrage at the Tatmadaw and the government for their roles in perpetrating atrocities and declining conditions in the region compounded long-held grievances by the ethnic Rakhine and translated the resentment against institutions into anger towards the generality that is the ethnic Bamar. Bamar rulers had seized the autonomous and self-governing Arakan Kingdom in 1784 and exercised control over the region for approximately 200 years. Attempts by rebel groups, such as the Arakan Independence Army and the Arakan Liberation Party, to challenge the status quo and regain autonomy for Rakhine State in the years since have not had much success. Enter the AA. The AA's slogan "the way of Rakhita" brought to the forefront of public memory the deep-seated feelings of oppression by the Arakanese and called on the Rakhine to pick up arms and fight for their renewed self-determination. [11] In addition, the AA maximised the political vacuum after the

[9] Figures based on independent monitoring by the author from 15 November 2018 to 28 November 2020.

[10] As of 2 November 2020, a total of 236,229 persons were reported displaced, with 82,217 residing in formal camps and 154,012 in informal settlements. See: Rakhine Ethnics Congress, 'စစ္ေဘးသင့္/ စစ္ေဘးဒုကၡသည္ အေရအတြက္ကိုတင္ျပျခင့္', *Facebook*, 2 November 2020, https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=972846993240493&id=250589055466294.

[11] ထြန်းထွန်းနိုင်, 'ရခိုင်ေတ AA ကို ဘာလို႔ ေထာက္ခံၾကသလဲ', *The Irrawaddy*, 7 February 2019, https://burma.irrawaddy.com/opinion/viewpoint/2019/02/07/182604.html; Kyaw Linn, '"Way of Rakhita": Dream or Nightmare?', *Asia Times*, 28 February 2019,

arrest of charismatic and popular Rakhine leader, Dr. Aye Maung. Many locals had become disenchanted with the Union Government, especially after the 2015 General Election when the winning National League for Democracy (NLD) party chose and appointed as the State Chief Minister its own member instead of a member of the ethnic Rakhine Arakan National Party (ANP), which had won the majority of seats in Rakhine State. The State Government was therefore viewed as a 'puppet' of the Union Government and unlikely to ensure the rights of the ethnic minority population. At the same time, ANP leaders lost substantial support as they were seen by the public to prioritise their personal economic interests and engage in corruption. Although a former member and founder of the ANP, Dr. Aye Maung was the exception. However, a police crackdown on demonstrators in Mrauk-U Town on 16 January 2018 led to his arrest,[12] subsequent sentencing to 20 years in prison under Section 122 [Offences against the State] and Section 505(b) [Defamation of the State] of the Penal Code, [13] and the revocation of his status as a Member of Parliament (MP) and prohibition from future political participation.[14] Even though Dr. Aye Maung's son had established and headed the Arakan Front Party, which won a seat in the Rakhine State Parliament following the November 2018 By-Election,[15] he was considered an inefficient leader and so a poor substitute for the political champion the people desired. The AA took advantage of these situations and stepped up as both the political and military leader of the ethnic Rakhine. It led the charge against primarily the Bamar, foregoing other issues including with the Rohingya Muslims in favour of solidifying efforts against a 'common enemy' in the Tatmadaw and the government.

https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/02/opinion/way-of-rakhita-dream-or-nightmare/.

[12] မင်းအောင်ခိုင်, 'ရဲက ပစ္စတ္ပ်ံးုပ်ိမ့်ံးုင့်ံးမးုေးၾကာင့့် ေျမာက္ဦးတြင့် လူ ၇ ဦးေသဆုံး ၊ ၁၂ ဦး ဒဏ္ရာ ရရွိ', *The Irrawaddy*, 17 January 2018, https://burma.irrawaddy.com/news/2018/01/17/149818.html.

[13] Development Media Group, 'ေဒါက္တာေအးေမာင့်ံးုင့့် စာေရးဆရာေဝဟင့်ေအာင္တို့ကို ံးုိ့ံင့်ံေတာ့် အၾကည့်ိုပ်က့်ေစမး, ပုဒ္ ၅၀၅(ခ) ျဖင့့် ေထာင့် ၂ ံးုစ့်, ံးုိ့ံင့်ံေတာ့ ပုန္ကန္း ပုဒ္ ၁၂၂ ျဖင့့် ေထာင္ဒဏ္ ံးုစ့် ၂၀ ခ်မွတ္လိုက္သည္။', *Facebook*, 19 March 2019, https://www.facebook.com/dmgnewsagency/posts/1337590749726666.

[14] 'ပြည်ထောင်စုရွေးကောက်ပွဲ ကော်မရှင်', *Union Election Commission*, 20 May 2020, https://www.uec.gov.mm/news_preview_detail.php.

[15] 'Announcement For The List Of Region Or State Hluttaw Representatives', *Global New Light of Myanmar*, 5 November 2018, https://www.gnlm.com.mm/announcement-for-the-list-of-region-or-state-hluttaw-representatives/; Ei Ei Toe Lwin, 'By-Elections: A Wakeup Call for the NLD', *The Myanmar Times*, 5 November 2018, https://www.mmtimes.com/news/elections-wakeup-call-nld.html; Corazon H. Ignacio et al., '2018 Myanmar By-Elections: Building the Foundation for Successful 2020 Elections' (The Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL), 2018), https://anfrel.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/2018-BE-report-English-version-PDF.pdf.

Annex 8

COHESION IN THE TIME OF CONFLICT: AN ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL COHESION IN THE CONTEXT OF ETHNIC ARMED CONFLICT IN MYANMAR'S RAKHINE STATE

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RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY

Social cohesion is generally viewed as a key variable to conflict prevention and mitigation measures, and the effectiveness of related initiatives at reducing inter-communal tensions depends on a variety of factors. Previous research has often focused on the actors, namely donors and implementing institutions as well as stakeholders who facilitate or hinder the conduct of social cohesion activities. This paper aims to analyse social cohesion in light of the situational context, in particular during active armed conflict. Using western Myanmar as a case study, the author seeks to provide concrete links between the changing inter-communal dynamics and the effectiveness of social cohesion initiatives. Have social cohesion activities in Rakhine State contributed to the mitigation of inter-communal conflict, in spite of ongoing fighting between the AA and the Tatmadaw? How have inter-communal dynamics changed since the escalation of conflict between the two armed groups? What are the implications of these changing dynamics on social cohesion initiatives as well as conflict management measures? And, what are the consequences of social cohesion in Rakhine State on the broader inter-communal—not to mention, political—context of Myanmar? In answering these questions, the author hopes to assist efforts to improve the development and implementation of such measures especially amid the complex conflict environments common across Myanmar and Southeast Asia.

This paper makes use of primary and secondary source data collected, encoded, and evaluated by the Centre for Diversity and National Harmony (CDNH) over the relevant timeframe, especially from November 2018 to 2020. The analysis focuses strongly on anecdotal evidences by key informants with good knowledge of the ground situation. Where possible, this information is supplemented with quantitative data from surveys and cross-referenced with sources such as official

government, Tatmadaw, and organisation websites; local and international news agencies; and selected social media accounts and pages. Certain key assumptions were made in the encoding of relevant data; these assumptions will be detailed where appropriate in the text.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Social cohesion does not yet have a universally accepted definition either within the academic community or among the organisations that implement these activities. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this paper, social cohesion will be understood as "the belief held by citizens of a given nation-state that they share a moral community, which enables them to trust each other".[16] Two points to be highlighted in this definition are "moral community" and "trust". Trust, whether in an individual or in a community, is facilitated by a shared understanding and agreement of

'acceptable'—or, 'moral'—actions. This common understanding that what is 'right' should take precedence and that what is 'wrong' is penalised minimises, if not eliminates, opportunities for conflict. At the same time, the absence of latent social tensions, as well as the fostering of trust, depends on deeper social bonds formed through dynamics of communication, interaction, cooperation, and reciprocity.[17]

Cohesion as well as communal-thinking does not occur in a contextual vacuum, just as individual behaviour is shaped by the environment as well as the person.[18] In particular, the socialisation of individuals to understand and accept the norms, beliefs, values, and expectations of the society in which they live contributes in large part to the idea of 'morality' they bring to the community.[19] Moreover, history—and the actors that take part in it—plays a role in developing and reinforcing societal norms and expectations. The narratives of

[16] Christian Albrekt Larsen, 'Social Cohesion: Definition, Measurement and Developments', n.d., 45.

[17] Xavier Fonseca, Stephan Lukosch, and Frances Brazier, 'Social Cohesion Revisited: A New Definition and How to Characterize It', *Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research* 32, no. 2 (3 April 2019): 231–53, https://doi.org/10.1080/13511610.2018.1497480.

[18] Kurt Lewin, 'Behavior and Development as a Function of the Total Situation', *Manual of Child Psychology*, 1946, 791–844, https://doi.org/10.1037/10756-016.

[19] William Little, 'Chapter 5. Socialization', in *Introduction to Sociology*, 1st Canadian Edition (BC Campus, 2014), https://opentextbc.ca/introductiontosociology/chapter/chapter5-socialization/.

historical events and experiences perpetuated by influential actors may further serve to solidify past beliefs and traditions and make the societies they influence resistant to change. Social cohesion initiatives must therefore consider the path dependence of socialisation as well as of underlying inter-communal tensions.

There are arguments for the interdependency of conflict management approaches, of which social cohesion is a part. In light of broader and evolving contexts in which contemporary conflicts occur, there is seeming value in analysing and evaluating prevention, mitigation, and reconciliation initiatives to account for their temporal and spatial connections to not just similar approaches but complementary activities. The proliferation of (particularly social) media, for instance, necessitates an examination of the diffusion of ideas across geographic space and the ways such analysis may be used to better understand and subsequently address inter-communal divides.[20] At the same time, a broader, more comprehensive approach to peace building must be tempered by conflict sensitivity considerations and aim to minimise unintended negative consequences especially from external interventions.[21]

ANALYSIS

The armed conflict between the AA and the Tatmadaw has shifted public discourse away from anti-Muslim narratives towards more anti-Bamar (and anti-Tatmadaw and anti-government) sentiment. This shift may mistakenly give the impression that relations between the Rakhine and the Rohingya communities are improving, especially given the simultaneous increase in social cohesion initiatives being implemented in northern Rakhine State. While there has indeed been some improvement in this regard, it is by no means sufficient to say that the two communities do not continue to suffer tensions and are ready and willing to cohabitate peacefully within the same state.

Social cohesion-oriented programming may be credited, to an extent, for the

[20] Paul F. Diehl and Patrick Regan, 'The Interdependence of Conflict Management Attempts', *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 32, no. 1 (2015): 99–107.

[21] 'Social Cohesion and Conflict', in *Research For Social Change* (Switzerland: UNRISD, 2003), https://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/(httpAuxPages)/2E3C00CD605CC744C1256E35004BBB9B/$file/chap3.pdf.

improvement in relations particularly between the Muslim and the non-Muslim communities. For example, inter-community sports tournaments, which had required each team to comprise members of different ethnicities and religions, were effective at promoting social, and later business, interactions among previously estranged communities. [22] On the other hand, some positive developments in inter-communal engagement are less easily attributable to the implementation of organisational activities. In May 2019, Sittwe Township saw a slow resumption in business interactions between Rakhine and Muslims. Some Rakhine business owners contracted Muslims for manual labour,[23]

while vendors at the Bu May Market in Sittwe Town were again selling goods to Muslim customers.[24] It would be easy to assume that the recommencement of business transactions between the communities is a product of social cohesion programming. However, it is just as likely that the preoccupation with the armed conflict has made locals ambivalent, if not tolerant, to Muslim engagement.

To exemplify the latter point: In March 2020, a local women's forum organised simultaneous anti-hate speech campaigns in all 17 townships of Rakhine State.[25] Hate messaging has historically targeted ethnic Rohingya and Muslims, while individuals or organisations who attempt to counter such activities are accused of being "Muslim-lovers" or "traitors to the Rakhine". The scope and general acceptance—or at least the lack of strong opposition—to the aforementioned event may therefore be seen as a success for social cohesion initiatives. It is further notable that organisers of the event included members of all ethnic and religious groups.

[22] This observation came about during an interview with an ethnic Thet community leader in August 2019 and was echoed by 10 Muslim and 19 non-Muslim community leaders across Maungdaw District. It is further supplemented by a survey of 200 Muslim and 300 non-Muslim respondents, of whom 74% had noted an increase in comfort level when interacting with communities different from their own following participation in such social cohesion activities.

[23] It should be noted that wages paid to Muslim labourers remained less than those paid to similar level wage-earners of Rakhine ethnicity.

[24] This information was conveyed in verbal communications by local Muslims and vendors to CDNH staff in May 2019.

[25] Soung Hnin Wai, 'သံတြဂြိမ်ဖန့် "ဖြစ်စဉ်ေသာတြဲလက္ခမ်းသိမီးအဖြ"မွဖိတ့ေခၚပါတယ့်', *Facebook*, 9 March 2020, https://www.facebook.com/soung.hninwai.10297/posts/785812718609100.

An initial analysis of hate speech on social media however reveals indication that inter-communal tensions remain unabated. In analysing hate speech, encoders defined and disaggregated 'hate speech' in three types. These types suggest increasing levels of severity. 'Insults' comprise rude words, phrases, or expressions used in reference to a group or based on one's belonging to a group. 'Sub-human' refers to the use of explicit and derogatory language, for example the comparison of humans to animals or 'lesser beings'. 'Call to violence denotes incitement to (often physical) acts of violence. [26] Although little of the recorded hate speech had been active calls to violence, the amount of insults and derogatory terms do not suggest an improvement in inter-communal relations (see Fig. 1). Furthermore, the target of messaging towards institutional actors—namely, the Tatmadaw, the government, the AA, or even the international community—supports the idea that public focus is on the state-nonstate conflict of the period (see Fig. 2). An ethnicity-based analysis of online hate messaging also supplements the shift away from Rakhine-Rohingya hostilities and towards Rakhine-Bamar frictions (see Fig. 3).[27] Perhaps summarised best by one hard-line anti-Muslim community leader: "[The Rakhine] are now preoccupied with the fighting. … The Tatmadaw is treating all of us badly. … [W]e don't have time to talk about the 'Bengali' (referring to the Rohingya)."[28]

[26] Some key assumptions had been made in the encoding of social media commentary. These include: 1) In cases wherein it is difficult to determine the identity and the location of commentators within or outside Rakhine State, such commentary has been disregarded in the encoding. 2) Rohingya commentators on social media were assumed to be members of the community in diaspora. This is in light of knowledge that most resident Rohingya have limited access—in means or ability—to social media. 3) Online commentators may have used 'government' as a catch-all term for the Union Government, the Rakhine State Government, any of the Parliament bodies, and/or a collective of any/all of the above. Specificities are noted when possible. 4) References to 'Bamar', 'Tatmadaw', and 'government' may have been made interchangeable. Specificities are noted when possible.

[27] Certain incidents or events, such as violent confrontations between members of particularly the Rakhine and the Rohingya communities, nevertheless provoke the occasional resurgence of former religion-based tensions.

[28] This quote is taken from an interview with a hard-line anti-Muslim community leader. The interview was conducted by CDNH staff in August 2020.



Figure 1. Type of Hate Speech per Date, January–April 2020. Figure uses data from the Centre for Diversity and National Harmony (CDNH

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Peace and Reconciliation



Figure 2. Hate Speech per Type of Target, January–April 2020. Figure uses data from the Centre for Diversity and National Harmony (CDNH)



Figure 3. Ethnicity-based Hate Speech per Target, January–April 2020. Figure uses data from the Centre for Diversity and National Harmony (CDNH).

The continued existence of inter-religious tensions is further revealed by incidences of violence not directly related to the armed conflict between the AA and the Tatmadaw. [29] Although the few and sporadic physical altercations between grassroots communities since fighting escalated in November 2018 (see Fig. 4) is in marked contrast to situations prior to the widespread violence that led to the 2017 mass exodus of the predominantly Rohingya Muslims, it is significant that majority of the incidents occurred in the northern part of Rakhine State, namely Buthidaung and Maungdaw Townships as well as Sittwe Township (see Fig. 5). These areas are the locations of most of the remaining, albeit displaced, Rohingya Muslim population. Separate to this is the involvement in recent violence of the Christian community in Ann Township. The Christian community in Rakhine State is mostly ethnic Chin, with whom the AA (and its Rakhine supporters) faces a dispute regarding control over the territory of Paletwa Township. Paletwa Township is currently delineated as part of neighbouring Chin State. Although it cannot be clearly determined, it may be inferred that the spike in Buddhist-Christian tensions in Rakhine State is in fact related to the armed conflict.

[29] Encoding of 'violent incidents' followed a few key assumptions: 1) Incidents involving persons with official positions—whether Tatmadaw, police, government, or local administration—were attributed to the AA, unless otherwise mentioned. This assumption is based on the occurrence of incidents following threats by the AA against similar persons-with-positions. 2) Incidents involving persons without positions were encoded under 'violent incidents' and not immediately linked to the state-nonstate armed conflict, unless explicitly mentioned. 3) The arrests of Muslims for human trafficking and/or unauthorised travel were not included in the encoding, either as 'violent incidents' or as indicators of 'inter-communal conflict'. Such incidences were assumed to indicate broader institutional and/or legal issues, beyond the scope of the research.

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

Figure 4. 'Violent Incidents' per Month, November 2018–May 2020. Figure uses data from the Centre for Diversity and National Harmony (CDNH).



Figure 5. 'Violent Incidents' per Township, November 2018–May 2020. Figure uses data from the Centre for Diversity and National Harmony (CDNH).

Other evidence of underlying tensions are visible in the implementation of activities by civil society organisations. Civil society organisations, in general, tend to cater exclusively to their ethnic or religious communities.[30] Few Rakhine organisations provide humanitarian or social welfare assistance to non-Rakhine communities,[31] not just Muslims. Any non-Muslim organisation willing to help Rohingya often does so discreetly, to avoid reprisal from their respective ethnic or religious communities.[32] Furthermore, organisations refrain from conducting activities openly promoting social cohesion and reconciliation; locals are also reluctant to attend events and trainings marketed as such. This is largely due to fear of potentially violent response by anti-Muslim hard-liners. In addition, there is a common misconception by both hard-liners and community members that participation in social cohesion activities equates to acceptance of the return of Muslims to their locales. Opposition to social cohesion programming therefore suggests a persisting unwillingness to cohabitate with the Muslim community.[33] More explicitly, progress on the repatriation of internally displaced Muslims in Kyaukpyu Town has repeatedly been hindered by disagreements between the displaced and the host communities. The displaced Muslims have argued that they be allowed to return to their original homes in the urban centre, but

[30] It should be noted this is the case not just in Rakhine State but across Myanmar.

[31] Rakhine State comprises various ethnicities and religions. Majority of the ethnic groups are Buddhist, including the Rakhine, the Bamar, the Daingnet, the Khami, the Maramagyi, the Mro, and the Thet. The Chin are predominantly Christian, though there are some Buddhists among the community as well. The Rohingya as well as the Kaman are Muslims. The Hindu are considered both an ethnic and a religious group.

There are few resources that detail the list and numbers of ethnicities across Rakhine State. A potential reference for the population by ethnicity in 2017 may be found at: Rakhine State Government, 'Population by Ethnic Group in Maungdaw District and Rakhine State' (Myanmar Information Management Unit (MIMU), July 2017), https://themimu.info/sites/themimu.info/files/documents/Population_by_Ethnic_Group_in_Maungdaw_District_and_Rakhine_State_Jul2017.xlsx.

[32] This information has been conveyed by a number of individuals and organisations, including one local women's network, to CDNH at various points over the reporting period (November 2018 to November 2020).

[33] Only 25% of non-Muslims, in a sample of 300 persons, admitted even minimal readiness to cohabitate with Muslims. Notably, 60% of the Rakhine who expressed willingness to live with Muslims are residents of Buthidaung and Maungdaw Townships. While this may be an indicator of success for social cohesion activities, given their proliferation in the aforementioned townships, the lack of broader acceptance for Rohingya residents may lead to unintended negative consequences—for example, a decline in intra-communal and not just inter-communal relations—not to mention, will inevitably fail to address societal and institutional barriers to cohesion.

resident Rakhine are opposed to the former's resettlement in villages and lands the Rakhine claim the Muslims have no legal ownership.[34] A few moderate Rakhine have expressed openness to the gradual reintegration of Muslims into the community. However, any public acknowledgement or statement to this end risks the very real threat by the majority hard-line community to the physical security of moderates.

There are a couple of additional instances which may mistakenly be construed as positive developments in inter-communal relations. First, locals in Rakhine State are increasingly calling for an end to segregation between communities, but few (if any) admitted a willingness to send their own children to mixed schools. Second, some Rakhine—and significantly, supporters of the AA—demanded that the Union Government grant Rohingya citizenship and subsequently ensure the latter enjoy full freedom of movement. Underlying these demands however is local desire for the Rohingya to leave, rather than enjoy equal rights within, Rakhine State.

Finally, the armed conflict, and particularly the influence exerted by the AA on the political mindset of the people, has similarly complicated evaluations of social cohesion programming. For instance, the decline in explicit anti-Muslim sentiment may have been a consequence of the AA's public statement in support of the case by The Gambia against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice. [35] The ongoing trial sees the Tatmadaw accused of committing genocide against the Rohingya

[34] သီဟထွန်, 'ကျောက်တစ်လုံး မွတ်စလင်ဒုက္ခသည်စခန်း ရွှေ့ပြောင်းရေး အငြင်းပွားဖွယ်ဖြစ်လာ', *Radio Free Asia*, 21 May 2020, https://www.rfa.org/burmese/program_2/controversial-kyauktalone-refugees-camp-relocation-05212020080026.html.

The issue of citizenship for Muslims, and especially the Rohingya, is a complex issue that is unfortunately beyond the scope of this paper. Interested parties may avail of the various articles and reports that have already tackled this issue, perhaps beginning with: Center for Diversity and National Harmony (CDNH), 'Myanmar's Citizenship Law: An Analysis' (Yangon, Myanmar, August 2018), https://www.cdnh.org/publication/myanmars-citizenship-law-an-analysis/.

[35] ULA / AA, 'ျမန္မာတပ္မေတာ္အားအျပည့္ျပည္သူ့ဒဏ္ရာတရားဂုဏ္ေမွ အေရးယူရန္လိုကီးပမ္းအားေထာက္ခံေၾကာင္းသေဘာထားထုတ္ျပန္ခ်က္', *ARAKAN ARMY*, 28 November 2019, https://www.arakanarmy.net/post/မနု-မ-တပ-မ-တ-အ-အ-ပည-ပည-ဆ-င-ရ-တရ-ဏ-မ-အ-ရ-ယ-ရန-ခက-ပမ-မ-အ-ထ-က-ခ-ၾက-င-သ-ဘ-ထ-ထ-တ-ပန-ခ-က.

community during events in 2017; the Myanmar Government and specifically the State Counsellor had been leading the legal defence. [36] Perceptions of a 'common enemy' have therefore caused an albeit shallow expression of unity between the Rakhine and the Rohingya. [37] However, there is little evidence to suggest this solidarity will last beyond the resolution of either the trial or the armed conflict. In addition, the decrease of anti-Muslim messaging may be explained as attempts by local Rakhine to curry favour and thereby receive support from international donors.

[36] Since the military coup on 1 February 2021, the State Counsellor has been in detention and faces a number of charges (see: 'ဒေါ်အောင်ဆန်းစုကြည်ကို နေပြည်တော်တွင် အမှုတခု ထပ်တိုး', *The Irrawaddy*, 12 April 2021, https://burma.irrawaddy.com/news/2021/04/12/240714.html; Khit Thit Media, 'ဒေါ်အောင်ဆန်းစုကြည်အား အကြမ်းဖက်လူသတ်ဖက်ဆစ် စစ်ကောင်စီက နိုင်ငံတော်သစ္စာဖောက်မှု၊ အာဏာ သိမ်းရန် ကြိစည်မှု၊ တပ်မတော်ပြိုကွဲစေမှု အပါအဝင် အမှုများ ထပ်တိုး တရားစွဲပြီး အစိုးရခေါင်းဆောင်များကိုလည်း အမှုအများအပြား ထပ်တိုးတရားစွဲဆိုထားသည်။', *Facebook*, 1 April 2021, https://www.facebook.com/khitthitnews/posts/1162135807557097.). It is therefore unlikely—at least for the duration of the coup—that she will continue in her role as part of Myanmar's legal defence team at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). This situation does not, however, preclude the case at the ICJ from continuing. At the time of writing, the military junta has yet to make public any intentions or actions with regard to the case. More detailed analysis of the implications following the coup may be considered for future research.

[37] Free Rohingya Coalition, 'ရခိုင်လူငယ်နှစ်ဦးနှင့် ဆွေးနွေးခန်', *Facebook*, 8 June 2020, https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=287611582285519; Ro Nay San Lwin, 'FRC Genocide Podcast Series မြန်မာပိုင်းအစီအစဉ်', *Facebook*, 8 June 2020, https://www.facebook.com/nslwin/posts/3651558821527334?__xts__[0]=68.ARATwq3oP5sGUGWvl08SJOV4LetRplyV7erk68W4t4U8V43hgox0_YfOku4rDaxiapzZDGA21-Ob07uWBCCe4zHu3YSvhe35vjghVUqBIXpsEExpqdqQ1Kw2rmGi-rbtvCPmsBIl6A2j5xL48GNyejccZVmrp7eeinXos6XmmFgja35DwLJzlxaeNMRF6wv-ZbYJpvrqIOp61GF8TWgcGinjAEVcWR5_-DurbyiOA5wR0-tTlq7445gaxeaHPAGF5bESp6wC_o1Vn5YqRxjAbuNV95a3psnXUjV_sm753mHTKZUyC2gMhYs6wR9A6-YihV6chuwliokrwOyQ4SUDY6mKplj2gFYI70_W; Tun Tun Naing, 'ရခိုင် နဲ့ ရိုဟင်ဂျာ ခေါင်းဆောင်တိ Ro Nay San Lwin ရို့ ထွန်းခင် ရို့နဲ့ ပူးပေါင်း အဖွဲ့ တစ်ခု ဖွဲ့ရဖို့ယာ။', *Facebook*, 18 May 2020, https://www.facebook.com/tuntun.naing.9/posts/2925836400863738; Aung Tin, 'ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေး သေသွားပြီ။ လက်နက်မကိုင်ရသေးသူတွေလည်း လက်နက်ကိုင်ကြရတော့မယ်။', *Facebook*, 11 February 2020, https://www.facebook.com/AungTinBMA/posts/2744925408918646?__xts__[0]=68.ARCi78F7qY9pcTmeY2nkYt4cR8wd6_me4W2MYswmyLDfhtxe06vSfqo2S-zpVUzAO7-PZvlgsVhLStnoG-HOqpATbQu_HjF_4WwMAXU9f5VlHd0Y-s9gTclQd4MnL2--FVcWc64_EiRmkXOSOur3bjjT06lsRD-wxX1xZfqD82P_y-J7tuLCZTbkRfmMA-ThYemRX-KZPQrc8FFaT76wCUdwAfnaKHu_fSEL7vdkeACLiVkUyv1FMUOa9cqpl1eyO7wvg17MV00UmNPofjTeEaKKNdQgDXRsXbxC2NOi4jY8OOmR3r11kABUNX8-0LYG0tobOu2vmeObG5otQc-nK_8ay_fluexZaQ.

There remains scepticism among the non-Muslim population that international aid disproportionately benefits the Rohingya, especially following the violence against and subsequent displacement of the community in 2017.

CONCLUSION

In spite of declining incidences of inter-religious violence and hate messaging during the period of armed conflict between the AA and the Tatmadaw, social cohesion activities have so far had limited effectiveness at reducing underlying tensions between the Rakhine and the Rohingya. Social cohesion programming has succeeded at providing opportunities for increased social and business interaction among communities. However, the ethnic Rakhine—not to mention the Khami, the Hindu, and the Mro—continues to be resistant to cohabiting with the Rohingya.

Moreover, there remain two significant gaps in social cohesion programming in Rakhine State. One is the limited occurrences of such activities in the southern part of the region, which hosts among others the ethnic Kaman Muslim population. Vehement opposition by anti-Muslim hard-liners in Kyaukpyu Township not only hinders the repatriation of the displaced Muslim community, but also deters broader societal cohesion in the state. The strength of inter-religious tensions with an ethnic community that is nevertheless officially recognised as indigenous serves as an almost pessimistic forecast for resolution of tensions with the Rohingya, who continue to be perceived as 'foreigners' to both Myanmar and Rakhine State. Therefore, it is important that 'low-hanging fruits' are addressed in conjunction with the greater ambitions for state cohesion.

Two, social cohesion initiatives have focused on building relations between the Rakhine and the Rohingya communities but have so far neglected the growing divide between the Rakhine (and other ethnic minorities) and the Bamar as a consequence of the armed conflict. There is a conflagration of inter-communal tensions, secessionist aspirations, and armed insurgency within the state, due to long-held feelings of resentment by the ethnic Rakhine against the majority Bamar. It is therefore imperative that in-roads are made, immediately and simultaneously with Buddhist-Muslim and Rakhine-Rohingya cohesion activities, to address the

grievances of the Rakhine as well as of other ethnic minorities in Rakhine State, to promote reconciliation among all communities, and to ensure that all locals regardless of ethnicity or religion enjoy—as well as believe that their fellows should enjoy—full rights and the full benefits of development.

A final point for consideration: The political turmoil of 1 February 2021 has little impacted pre-existing tensions in Rakhine State, both between the Rakhine and the Rohingya and between the Rakhine and the Bamar. Although there has been a cessation of active fighting between the AA and the Tatmadaw since the November 2020 General Election,[38] the status quo of that period remains. Public discourse continues to focus on the narrative of self-determination for the ethnic Rakhine—in the words of some nationalists, a "Rakhine Fatherland"—rather than on tensions with Muslims or Rohingya. Some social cohesion activities have also successfully been conducted in northern and central Rakhine State, with the participation of both Rakhine and Muslims.[39] However, there is still a dearth of support for the repatriation of displaced Muslims to Kyaukpyu Town. Furthermore, ethnic Rakhine have tended ,lto distance themselves from any who acknowledge and/or apologise for the plight of the Rohingya especially in 2017.[40] These include national-level actors such as the "anti-coup" coalition 'General Strike Committee of Nationalities' and the alternative government formed by elected MPs known as the 'National Unity Government'.[41] The more vocal commentators strongly criticised and condemned the recognition of the Rohingya

[38] ULA / AA, 'တစ္ဖက္သတ္အျပစ္ခတ္ရပ္စဲေရးအားထပ္မံသက္တမ္းတိုးျမႇင့္သည့္ထုတ္ျပန္ေၾကညာခ်က္', ARAKAN ARMY (blog), 11 November 2020, https://www.arakanarmy.net/post/တစ-ဖက-သတ-အပစ-ခတ-ရပ-စ-ရ-အ-ထပ-မ-သက-တမ-တ-မ-ငသည-ထ-တ-ပန-ၾကည-ခ-က.

[39] As of writing, there have been at least ten social cohesion-oriented activities conducted by civil society organisations in northern and central Rakhine State since February 2021. These activities include inter-communal sports tournaments, youth camps, and trainings on rumour management, civic education and social cohesion.

[40] This information was conveyed by local observers and political analysts in May 2021.

[41] 'Formation of the National Unity Government of Myanmar', Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) (blog), 15 April 2021, https://crphmyanmar.org/formation-of-the-national-unity-government/.

as an official, indigenous ethnic group, teither to Rakhine State or to Myanmar.[42]

This situation may also explain, at least in part, the AA's refusal to participate in the National Unity Government.[43] Some sources have privately suggested that the AA intends to protect the basic human rights of all residents of Rakhine State, but not to recognise nor legitimise the Rohingya as rightful residents. Similarly, senior members of the Tatmadaw, hard-line Rakhine nationalists, Rakhine politicians and community leaders have (at least verbally) acknowledged that all human beings, regardless of ethnicity or religion, deserve basic human rights. However, it should be emphasised that this definition of 'basic human rights' is so far limited to aspects of social welfare such as education, health care and livelihoods; these rights do not yet extend to any form of political participation.[44] At the same time, even some Rohingya activists who have expressed appreciation for apologies by ethnic Bamar are more sceptical about similarly contrite statements by certain ministers of the National Unity Government,[45] which are viewed as propaganda at best and excuses at worst. In conclusion, conflict situations and political crises may complicate but not diminish inter-communal tensions. Due consideration of the situational context—most especially the nuances that point towards the actual problem, its root causes, and a potential solution—is important for the effective development, implementation and evaluation of present and future social cohesion programming.

[42] This information is based on relevant data gathered through regular monitoring of the Myanmar social media environment by CDNH, in the period from February to May 2021. For example, see comments in: University of Medicine 2, Yangon Student Committee, 'တိုင်းရင်းသားလူမျိုးစုဝင်များထံ အပြစ်ဝန်ခံတောင်းပန်ခြင်း', Facebook, 26 March 2021, https://www.facebook.com/universityofmedicine2.studentcommitte.ec/posts/3945714242171162.

[43] Western News, 'ကိုယ့္ ရပ္တည္ခ်က္ႏွင့္ ကိုယ္ NUG တြင္ပါဝင္ပုံ AA ေျပာ', Facebook, 16 April 2021, https://www.facebook.com/westernnewsagency/posts/272267117913133.

[44] This information was conveyed during informal conversations between CDNH and local sources in May 2021.

[45] 'Dr Win Myat Aye Said National Wide Myanmar', 30 April 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u8YEBaHnRKQ.

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COHESION IN THE TIME OF CONFLICT: AN ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL COHESION IN THE CONTEXT OF ETHNIC ARMED CONFLICT IN MYANMAR'S RAKHINE STATE

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Local Women and Peacebuilding in Thailand's Deep South: Perspectives from the Peace Survey

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Local Women and Peacebuilding in Thailand's Deep South: Perspectives from the Peace Survey

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Local Women and Peacebuilding in Thailand's Deep South:

Perspectives from the Peace Survey

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Abstract

Thailand's Deep South, which comprises Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and four districts of Songkla Province has experienced violent political conflict, which has resulted in 20,692 casualties since 2004. Men have mainly been the victims of direct violence that includes shootings, bombings, and ambushes. Although women make up only 10% of those impacted by physical violence, they are primarily responsible for taking care of the family and so are disproportionately impacted by the indirect consequences of violence. The term "peace-building" encompasses efforts to end violent conflict through peace talks or negotiations. It also refers to the many efforts to bring peace at the community level. In this context, local women have played a prominent peace-building role and it is important to understand their perspectives as a distinct stakeholder group in peace-building efforts.

This paper unpacks the quantitative data contained in the Peace Surveys of 2016 to 2020 to spotlight the opinions of local women from a total sample of 7,958 respondents. The Peace Survey is a general opinion survey exploring local perspectives on conflict, peace-building, and the peace process. It is an initiative of 24 academic and civil society groups in Thailand's Deep South.

The Peace Surveys highlight that it is not only women in civil society groups that actively support the peace process. This knowledge can be beneficial for developing future peace-building interventions. It also helps shed light on the topic of gender and peace-building in this region.

Keywords: Local women, Peace-Building, Peace Survey, Thailand's Deep South

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Introduction

From January 2004 to September 2020, the conflict in Thailand's Deep South has resulted in 20,692 incidents, 7,162 deaths and 13,348 injured. Although women make up only 9.1% of deaths and 18.52% of injured,[3] they have been affected by the enforcement of Martial Law, imposed in 2004, and the Emergency Decree, imposed in 2005. These special laws provide security officials with wide-ranging powers to facilitate investigation of suspected insurgents. Military officers have conducted home visits to collect DNA from women and children. Female relatives or wives of suspected insurgents have also been detained and accused of supporting insurgent operations or of assisting their husbands or brothers to flee.[4]

Studies have shown that including a gender perspective in conflict can highlight gendered inequalities in the context of conflict and post-conflict reconstructions. Women, men, and children experience and respond to violence differently. To address the gendered consequences of conflict, the broad spectrum of women's roles should be understood to identify the most suitable policy responses.[5] Women's assistance in the context of intra-state conflict has ranged from providing medical care or ensuring that basic needs of food or shelter are met. Yet, armed conflict obstructs and impairs social structures and economic capabilities. This can disproportionately affect women because existing norms/traditions may already infringe on the rights and independence of women.[6]

Galtung has argued that women's involvement in peace processes can lead to better and more durable solutions[7]. However, women's inclusion in peace-building efforts remain low. From 1992 to 2011, women made up 9% of negotiators, 2.4% of chief mediators, 3.7% of observers, and 4% of signatories. Out of 585 peace agreements that were signed between 1990 and 2010, only 16% made direct reference to gender or women.[8]

In Thailand's Deep South peace process, women have held far more informal roles than formal ones.[9] One reason for this is the lack of empirical knowledge regarding the roles women can

[3] Deep South Watch Database. *Incidents in Southern Thailand from January 2004 - September 2020.* Pattani, February 2021.

[4] Anchana Heemmina. *Report on Eliminating Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief and the Achievement of Sustainable Development Goal 16 (SDG 16) in the Southern Border Provinces of Thailand*. Pattani: Duayjai Group, 2020. https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Religion/Submissions/CSOs/62.the-duayjai-group.docx

[5] Christian Dietrich and Clodagh Quain. *Gender in Conflict*. European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2014.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Johan Galtung. *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*. London: SAGE Publications.1996: 271.

[8] Pablo Castillo Diaz and Simon Tordjman, *Women's Participation in Peace Negotiations: Connections between Presence and Influence*. United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, 2012. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/03AWomenPeaceNeg.pdf

[9] Duanghathai Buranajaroenkij. *Women and the Peace Process in the Deep South of Thailand*. Bangkok: Peace Resource Collaborative, 2018:18.

play[10] even though women do, for example, display characteristics of a good negotiator.[11] Women may also be "natural peace-builders" as in the cases of Sri Lanka, the Middle East and Kashmir.[12] In Thailand's Deep South, women engage in community peace-building through work on rehabilitation, human rights, and quality of life promotion.[13] It is important to discuss how women's roles vary across ethno-religious divides as these socio-cultural differences have implications for government policy.

A survey on southern women's attitudes conducted in 1993 titled "Women in Rural Southern Thailand: A Study of Roles, Attitudes, and Ethno-Religious Differences" found that rural women perceived themselves as having an important role in earning family income and a dominant role in the management of family finances. It found that Malay-Muslim women were more likely to be employed outside the agriculture sector, for example, in petty trading. The authors suggested this may have been related to an increase in economic pressures on Malay-Muslim households. On the question of political participation, respondents rated their participation in five different kinds of political activity. Although voting was rated highly, aspirations to take local office were low. While women rated all their roles as important, childcare and guidance were ranked highest. Income earner and household financial manager were also rated highly. Women reserved their lowest rating for community activities. This suggests that (political) leadership roles in the village were reserved for men with women instead seeking out and focusing on economic roles.[14]

When violence resumed in 2004, women were initially portrayed only as victims. In particular, the conflict exposed women to discrimination and sexual violence. However, many studies have sought to move away from the victim narrative and have shown how women have adopted more social roles around reconciliation or peace-building. This study aims to shed light on the beliefs that local women have around conflict and peace-building.

Over the past 17 years, many stakeholders have attempted to tackle the

[10]Cate Buchanan, Thania Paffenholz, Antonia P. Prentice. *Fresh Insights on the Quantity and Quality of Women's Inclusion in Peace Processes: Expert Views on Findings from the "Broadening Participation" and "Civil Society and Peacebuilding" Projects.* CMI, 2014. https://www.peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/GenderPolicyBrief.pdf

[11]Lilian Auma Owuor. *The Role of Women in Peacebuilding: A Case Study of Molo Division in Nakuru District.* M.A. Thesis, University of Nairobi, 2007: 22.

[12]Lisa Schirch and Manjrika Sewak. *Women: Using the Gender Lens* in *People Building Peace II: Successful Stories of Civil Society*. ed. Paul van Tongeren, Malin Brenk, Marte Hellema, and Juliette Verhoeven. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005: 97.

[13]Soraya Jamjuree. *Heal the Wounds of the Cruel Day with Faith and Care.* Bangkok: Komol Publishing, 2007: 87-90.

[14] Arin Sa-idi, Kuson Nakachart, Srisompob Jitpiromsri, Sunandpattira Nilchang and Dwight Y. King, *Women in Rural, Southern Thailand: A Study of Roles, Attitudes and Ethno-Religious Differences.* Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science, No.1, 1993: 93-94.

conflict. This includes government, civil society organizations (CSOs), and resistance movement groups. All these stakeholders claim that " the answers to solving the conflict rest with the people". The Peace Survey is an attempt to find those answers. It was inspired by Northern Ireland's Peace Polls. Between 1996 and 2008, Dr. Colin John Irwin of Queen' s University Belfast led 10 surveys as a means of communicating the public's views to the negotiating parties. It was an example of direct public engagement in peace talks. The Peace Poll contributed to the signing of the 1998 Belfast Agreement following a referendum confirming public support for the agreement.[15]

The Peace Survey is a quantitative research project conducted by 24 academic institutes and CSOs. The project has helped draw out the perspectives of local people on the conflict and on the socio- economic situation. Conducted five times since 2016, each survey applied systematic random sampling across 37 districts in Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and four districts of Songkla Province. Random sampling was also applied at each subsequent administrative level across 144 sub-districts, 164 villages and finally, in 1,640 families. One person aged between 18 and 70 from one family was selected as a respondent. The total number of accumulated samples from the five surveys was 7,953,[16] and of this figure 4,407 were women.[17] Most of the questions across the surveys remained the same. However, the 5th Peace Survey incorporated new questions, which are also discussed in this report.

Since 2013, there have been a total of 1,791 incidents demonstrating a significant decrease in the number of violent incidents. In 2019, there were only 411 incidents.[18] Yet, according to 72.8% of respondents, the situation remains unchanged. One explanation for this may be the persistence of underlying socio-economic and gender problems related to the conflict, issues that tend to get raised only in the limited fora of research reports, panels, and workshops.

Findings

1. General Information

This next section outlines respondent characteristics, which reflect a representative sample of the population.

More than half the respondents (55.4%) were women. The majority of respondents were Muslim (78.1%) and a little over a fifth were Buddhists (21.7%). Around a third of female respondents were aged 41 - 55 years (34.6%). This was followed by the 26 - 40 age bracket (34.4%), the 56 - 70 age bracket (21.2%),

[15]Rungrawee Chalermsripinyorat. *Peace Poll: A Comparative Study of Conflict in Northern Ireland and Southern Border Provinces of Thailand.* Bangkok: Peace Resource Collaborative, 2017: 9.

[16]Peace Survey Network. *Survey of People's Opinions on the Peace Process in Thailand's Deep South.* Pattani: Center for Conflict Studies and Cultural Diversity, 2017-2020.

[17]Ibid.

[18]Deep South Watch Database. *Incidents in Southern Thailand in 2003*. Pattani, February 2021.

and lastly the 18 - 25 age bracket (9.8%). Most women identified themselves first and foremost as Muslim (48.6%) followed by Thai (19.7%), Malay (19.6%), Buddhist (8.2%), or Patani (2.4%). Most female respondents use the local Malay dialect (57.8%), followed by the Southern Thai dialect (14.9%), Central Thai (2.9%), standard Malay (1.3%), Chehe (1.5%), or other (0.6%). This differed only slightly to the general information provided by male respondents. Fewer female respondents identified as Thai (19.7%) compared to male respondents (22.4%). Moreover, fewer female respondents spoke Central Thai (2.9%) compared to male respondents (4.0%).

Table 1: Gender

	Frequency	Percent
Women	4,407	55.4
Men	3,546	44.6
No answer	5	0.1
Total	7,958	100

Table 2: Religion

	Gender			
	Women		Men	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Muslim	3,434	78.1	2,658	75.5
Buddhist	954	21.7	854	24.2
Christian	2	0	5	0.1
Other	1	0	0	0
Unspecified	4	0.1	5	0.1
Total	4,395	100	3,522	100

Table 3: Age Group

	Gender			
	Women		Men	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
41-55	1,522	34.6	1,345	38.0
26-40	1,516	34.4	1,102	31.1
56-70	932	21.2	717	20.2
18-25	431	9.8	377	10.6
Total	4,401	100	3,541	100

Table 4: Identification

	Gender			
	Women		Men	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Muslim	2,125	48.6	1,607	45.5
Thai	860	19.7	789	22.4
Malay	857	19.6	695	19.7
Buddhist	360	8.2	292	8.3
Patani	104	2.4	80	2.3
Chinese	0	0	3	0.1
Other	33	0.8	35	1.0
No answer	31	0.7	29	0.8
Total	4,370	100	3,530	100

Table 5: Language

	Gender			
	Women		Men	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Local Malay Dialect	2,534	57.8	2,043	58.1
Southern Thai Dialect	652	14.9	556	15.8
Local Malay mixed with Thai	651	14.8	409	11.6
Southern Thai Dialect mixed with Central Thai	242	5.5	236	6.7
Central Thai	127	2.9	140	4.0
Chehe	67	1.5	55	1.6
Standard Malay	58	1.3	45	1.3
Other Local Dialect	4	0.1	4	0.1
Chinese	0	0	1	0
Other	25	0.6	16	0.5
No answer	26	0.6	14	0.4
Total	4,386	100	3,519	100

Over a third of female respondents selected primary school as their highest level of education (38.6%). This was followed by junior high (19.5%), high school (13.1%), or undergraduate (11.4 %). Some respondents did not complete any level (10.4%), while others attended vocational college (6.6%). A small proportion completed postgraduate education (0.5%).

In terms of religious education, a third of female respondents had not received any formal education in religion (33%). Around a quarter had studied at Tadika[19] (24.0%), followed by Mutawasid[20] (13.6%), Ibtida-i[21] (13.4%), Sanawee[22] (10.4%) and Pondok (2.2%). Less than one percent studied Islam Education at undergraduate level (0.3%), Buddhist Theology (0.4%), or Islamic Education at postgraduate level (0.1%). In

[19] Religious early stage school

[20] Primary Islamic Education

[21] Middle Islamic Education

[22] Senior Islamic Education

terms of general education, a higher percentage of female respondents compared to male respondents received no education (10.4% vs. 6.1%). However, a higher proportion of female respondents completed undergraduate education (11.4% vs. 6.5%). A similar proportion of men and women did not receive any religious education (35.2% vs. 34.8%) although more female respondents than male respondents received religious education at Ibtida-I, Mutawasid, or Sanawee.

Table 6: Education Levels

	Gender			
	Women		Men	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Primary School	1,700	38.6	1.463	41.3
Junior High	859	19.5	762	21.5
High School	575	13.1	576	16.3
Vocational College	290	6.6	280	7.9
Undergraduate	503	11.4	230	6.5
None	456	10.4	216	6.1
Postgraduate	21	0.5	13	0.4
PhD	0	0	1	0
Total	4,404	100	3,541	100

Table 7: Religious Education

	Gender			
	Women		Men	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
None	1,542	35.2	1,226	34.8
Tadika	1,050	24.0	986	28.0
Primary education (Ibtida-i)	588	13.4	445	12.6
Middle education (Mutawasid)	595	13.6	401	11.4
Senior education (Sanawee)	455	10.4	264	7.5
Pondok	97	2.2	136	3.9
Bachelor's degree	14	0.3	11	0.3
Master's degree	1	0.0	0	0
Buddhist Theology	19	0.4	33	0.9
Other	21	0.5	22	0.6
Total	4,382	100	3,524	100

Regarding occupation, agriculturist accounted for 35% followed by housewife (16.7%), businessperson/employee (8.9%), other (7.5%), unemployed (6.2%), student (2.7%), civil servant (2.6%), security official (0.7%), teacher (2.6%), or religious leader (0.1%). Although housewife was the third most common occupation given by female respondents, more female respondents worked as businessperson/employee compared to male respondents (8.9% vs. 6.1%). There was also a higher proportion of female respondents in the traditionally female-dominated role of teacher (2.6%vs.1.1%).

LOCAL WOMEN AND PEACEBUILDING IN THAILAND'S DEEP SOUTH:
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Table 8: Occupation

	Gender			
	Women		Men	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Agriculturist	1,541	35.0	1,546	43.7
Service/transportation/construction worker	718	16.3	913	25.8
Housewife	737	16.7	73	2.1
Businessperson/employee	390	8.9	217	6.1
Other	331	7.5	202	5.7
Unemployed	271	6.2	186	5.3
Civil servant	115	2.6	127	3.6
Security Official	32	0.7	114	3.2
Student	117	2.7	74	2.1
Teacher	116	2.6	38	1.1
Religious Teacher (e.g. Ustaz)	28	0.6	27	0.8
Religious leader (e.g. Imam, Bilal, or Monk)	4	0.1	14	0.4
No answer	1	0	4	0.1
Total	4,401	100	3,535	100

In terms of monthly income, most female respondents (39.5%) made between 5,001 - 10,000 baht per month. The second highest group fell into the 3,001 - 5,000-baht range (31.7%), followed by no income (10.1%), 10,001 -20,000 baht (8.8%), 2,001 - 30,000 baht (2.5%), 30,000 – 40,000 baht (1.1%) and other (0.9%). Less than one percent earned more than 50,000 baht (.2%) or between 40,001 – 50,000 baht (0.4%). The most notable difference between male and female respondents was the proportiono of women receiving no income (10.1%) compared to male respondents (5.2%).

Table 9: Income Levels

	Gender			
	Women		Men	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
5,001-10,000 baht	1,737	39.5	1,706	48.1
3,001-5,000 baht	1,394	31.7	804	22.7
10,001-20,000 baht	389	8.8	553	15.6
No income	444	10.1	184	5.2
Less than 3,000 baht	211	4.8	119	3.4
20,001-30,000 baht	111	2.5	103	2.9
30,001-40,000 baht	47	1.1	44	1.2
40,001-50,000 baht	18	0.4	5	0.1
More than 50,000 baht	9	0.2	11	0.3
Other	38	0.9	14	0.4
No answer	2	0.0	1	0.0
Total	4,400	100	3,544	100

2. Feelings of Safety

In the 5th Peace Survey, respondents ranked how safe they felt doing certain activities (1 = not safe at all, 2 = not safe, 3 = safe, 4 = very safe). On average female respondents felt safest in places of worship (3.25), doing religious and cultural activities (2.99), in a government office (2.94), attending a public panel/seminar (2.69) and lastly, the market (2.58). On average female respondents felt the least safe to freely express their opinion, either by expressing support for (1.73) or criticizing Patani insurgents (1.73) or criticizing the government (1.94). Both male and female respondents ranked much the same set of activities as prompting feelings of safety or otherwise. However, male respondents had a slightly higher average score across all activities. Respondents generally agreed that criticizing either the government or Patani insurgents was not safe.

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Table 10: Feelings of Safety (Women)

Top ranked activities	**Average score**	**Lowest ranked activities**	**Average score**
Being in a place of worship	3.25	Criticizing government	1.94
Doing religious and cultural activities	2.99	Criticizing Patani insurgents	1.73
Being in a government office	2.94	Expressing support for Patani insurgents	1.73
Attending a public panel/seminar	2.69		
Going to the market	2.58		

Table 11: Feelings of Safety (Men)

Top ranked activities	**Average score**	**Lowest ranked activities**	**Average score**
Being in a place of worship	3.29	Criticizing government	2.10
Participating in religious and cultural activities	3.07	Criticizing Patani insurgents	1.85
Being in a government office	3.04	Expressing support for Patani insurgents	1.80
Participating in a public panel/seminar	2.84		
Going to the market	2.72		

Disaggregating between Muslim and Buddhist female respondents, it was interesting to note that both Muslim and Buddhist women felt safest in a place of worship, doing religious or cultural activities, or at a government office. However, Buddhist women also said they felt safe passing through a checkpoint and being visited by officials at home. By contrast, Muslim women ranked attending a public panel/seminar or going to the market as safer activities.

Table 12: Feelings of Safety (Muslim Women)

Top ranked activities	**Average score**	**Lowest ranked activities**	**Average score**
Being in a place of worship	3.26	Criticizing government	1.85
Doing religious and cultural activities	2.90	Criticizing Patani insurgents	1.75
Being in a government office	2.88	Expressing support for Patani insurgents	1.74
Attending a public panel/seminar	2.68		
Being in a market	2.66		

Table 13: Feelings of Safety (Buddhist Women)

Top ranked activities	**Average Score**	**Lowest ranked activities**	**Average Score**
Being in a place of worship	3.22	Meeting and talking with strangers	2.17
Doing religious and cultural activities	3.22	Criticizing Patani insurgents	1.71
Being in a government office	3.10	Expressing support for Patani insurgents	1.68
Passing through a checkpoint	2.84		
Being visited by officials at home	2.82		

3. Role of Women in Peace-Building

In the 5th Peace Survey, respondents were asked to identify what they thought were the most important roles women should play in the peace process. Respondents answered; career/income support and social development (78.8%); human rights protection of women, children, and youth (74.0%); rehabilitation and victim support (66.7%); environmental and natural resource protection (65.3%); and peace knowledge dissemination (64.7%). Opinions on the role of women were ranked similarly across gender and religion. Respondents broadly agreed that women should focus primarily on career/income support as well as human rights protection of women, children and youth.

Table 14: Role of Women in Peacebuilding

	Gender			
	Women		Men	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Career/income support and social development	698	78.8	567	75.5
Human rights protection of women, children, and youth	655	74.0	531	70.7
Rehabilitation and victim support	591	66.7	479	63.8
Environment and natural resource protection	578	65.3	467	62.2
Peace knowledge dissemination	574	64.7	468	62.3

Table 15: Role of Women in Peacebuilding

	Women			
	Muslim		Buddhist	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Career/income support and social development	476	73.8	216	92.3
Human rights protection of women, children, and youth	445	69.0	204	87.2
Rehabilitation and victim support	385	59.7	201	85.9
Environment and natural resource protection	380	58.9	192	82.1
Peace knowledge dissemination	392	60.8	177	75.6

4. Opinion on Peace Talks

In the 5th Peace Survey, respondents were asked to share their opinions of the peace talk process. Nearly half the female respondents felt the conflict had not changed (48.1%). A little over a quarter felt the situation had worsened (26.7%) while less than a fifth felt the situation had improved (17.3%). Nearly half the female respondents had heard about the peace talks (48.5%) and a smaller proportion actively followed news about the peace talks (35.8%). A little over half of female respondents expressed support for peace talks as a way to solve conflict (52.7%). However, a large proportion

expressed no confidence (39.8%) or little confidence that peace talks would have any impact (27.9%). Roughly a third of respondents chose not to answer (5.2%) or did not know (27.1%).

Table 16: Opinion on the Conflict

	Gender			
	Women		Men	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Worse	237	26.7	167	22.2
Unchanged	426	48.1	363	48.3
Better	154	17.3	145	19.3

Table 17: Media Reports on the Conflict

	Gender			
	Women		Men	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Have not heard	374	42.2	259	34.5
Heard	430	48.5	427	56.9
No answer	82	9.3	65	8.7

Table 18: Interest in Peace Talks

	Gender			
	Women		Men	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Not interested	462	52.1	352	46.9
Interested	317	35.8	309	41.1
No answer	107	12.1	90	12.0

Table 19: Confidence in Peace Talks

	Gender			
	Women		Men	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
No confidence	353	39.8	338	45.0
Confidence	248	27.9	214	28.5
Don't know	240	27.1	161	21.4
No answer	45	5.2	38	5.1

Table 20: Support for Peace Talks to Solve Conflict

	Gender			
	Women		Men	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Not supportive	78	8.8	64	8.5
Supportive	467	52.7	435	57.9
Unsure	193	21.8	152	20.2
No answer	148	16.7	100	13.4

It was interesting to see more Buddhist female respondents had heard about the peace talks (56.4% vs. 46%), were interested to follow news about peace talks (50% vs. 30.8%) and were generally more supportive of the process (63.2% vs. 49.1%). Yet, more Buddhist female respondents (47.9% vs. 37.2%) lacked confidence that peace talks would have a positive impact compared to their Muslim counterparts.

Table 21: Opinion on the Conflict

	Women			
	Muslim		Buddhist	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Worse	171	26.5	65	27.8
Unchanged	299	46.0	122	52.1
Better	112	17.4	41	17.5

Table 22: Media Reports on the Conflict

	Women			
	Muslim		Buddhist	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Have not heard	282	43.7	86	36.8
Have heard	297	46.0	132	56.4
No answer	66	10.3	16	6.8

Table 23: Interest in Peace Talks

	Women			
	Muslim		Buddhist	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Not interested	357	55.3	99	42.4
Interested	199	30.8	117	50.0
No answer	89	13.8	18	7.6

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Table 24: Support for Peace Talks to Solve Conflict

	Women			
	Muslim		Buddhist	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Not supportive	56	8.7	22	9.4
Supportive	317	49.1	148	63.2
Unsure	154	23.9	37	15.8
No answer	118	18.3	27	11.6

Table 25: Confidence in Peace Talks

	Women			
	Muslim		Buddhist	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
No confidence	240	37.2	112	47.9
Confidence	175	27.2	72	30.7
Don't know	197	30.5	38	16.2
No answer	33	5.1	12	5.2

5. Human Rights Violations

Findings suggest that the experience of human rights violations differ across gender and religion**.** Muslim female respondents highlighted**:** hijabs prohibited in Buddhist schools (88.1%); counter-insurgency operations, especially village cordon and searches (84.1%); torture in detention (82.1%); being photographed at checkpoints (79.4%); collection of personal data (75.7%).

Buddhist female respondents cited**:** university quotas and scholarships for Muslims (76.7%); no Buddhist food in hospitals (58%); other types of human rights violation (50%); state officials shot by insurgents (44.5%); bombing deaths (40.6%).

Male respondents identified the following experiences: banning public

panels (51.6%), insurgent warnings against participation in public hearings (51.6%), and being photographed at checkpoints (48.2%).

Table 26: Human Rights Violations (Women)

	Frequency	Percent
Hijabs prohibited in Buddhist schools	186	59.2
Collecting personal data	191	57.2
No Buddhist food in hospitals	113	56.8
Bombing deaths	342	56.2
Insurgents shot during clashes with security forces	123	55.7

Table 27: Human Rights Violations (Muslim Women)

	Frequency	Percent
Hijabs prohibited in Buddhist schools	163	88.1
Counterinsurgency operations in villages	221	84.4
Torture in detention	372	82.1
Being photographed at checkpoints	216	79.4
Collecting personal data	143	75.7

Table 28: Human Rights Violations (Buddhist Women)

	Frequency	Percent
University quotas and scholarships for Muslims	46	76.7
No Buddhist food in hospitals	65	58
Other types	2	50.0
State officials shot by insurgents	53	44.5
Bombing deaths	138	40.6

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Table 29: Human Rights Violations (Men)

	Frequency	Percent
State officials banning public panels	111	51.6
Insurgent warnings against participation in public hearings	48	51.6
Being photographed at checkpoints	255	48.2
Torture in detention	419	47.9
Counterinsurgency operations in villages	221	45.5

6. Concerns about the Peace Talks

Female respondents' top concerns about the peace process were that they would not end violence (61.0%); that violence would increase (59.6%); conflict parties do not respect the agreement (57.4%); conflict parties refuse to listen to each other (52.3%); conflict parties do not show each other respect (51.8%). These concerns were similar for all respondents' groups.

Table 30: Concerns about the Peace Talks

	Women	Men	Muslim women	Buddhist women
	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent
Peace talks do not end violence	61.0	63.7	59.3	66.6
Violence increases	59.6	61.2	58.6	62.9
Conflict parties do not respect the agreement	57.4	60.7	55.9	62.5
Conflict parties do not listen to each other	52.3	55.6	51.6	54.8
Conflict parties do not show each other respect	51.8	54.8	51.2	53.9

7. Local Governance Reform

Local government reform rooted in local participation is one solution the government should consider. A little over a quarter of female respondents opted for special decentralization under Thai law

(16.5%). A little over a quarter preferred decentralization similar to other parts of the country (16.1%). A smaller proportion of respondents chose to maintain the status quo (12.8%) and less than ten percent chose independence (8.7%). However, 21% stated that they could not accept the region becoming independent. About a third preferred not to answer (30.1%). A larger proportion responded with "don't know" highlighting the question's sensitivity. There were only small differences in answers across gender. When comparing across religion, Buddhist female respondents chose decentralization that was similar to other parts of the country as their preferred option.

Table 31: Local Governance Reform (Women)

		Decline	Accept	Don't know/No answer
No change in governance	Frequency	351	563	1158
	Percent	8.0	12.8	26.3
Decentralization as in other parts of the country	Frequency	237	708	1,437
	Percent	5.4	16.1	32.6
Special decentralization under Thai law	Frequency	284	726	1,513
	Percent	6.4	16.5	34.3
Independence	Frequency	923	379	1,756
	Percent	21	8.7	39.8

Annex 9

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Table 32: Local Governance Reform (Men)

		Decline	Accept	Don't know/No answer
No change in governance	Frequency	288	470	840
	Percent	8.1	13.3	23.7
Decentralization as in other parts of the country	Frequency	189	684	982
	Percent	5.3	19.3	27.7
Special decentralization under Thai law	Frequency	238	684	1,041
	Percent	6.7	19.3	29.3
Independence	Frequency	775	317	1,334
	Percent	21.9	8.9	37.7

Table 33: Local Governance Reform (Muslim Women)

		Decline	Accept	Don't know/No answer
No change in governance	Frequency	255	410	937
	Percent	7.4	11.9	27.3
Decentralization as in other parts of the country	Frequency	161	529	1,170
	Percent	4.7	15.4	34
Special decentralization under Thai law	Frequency	186	552	1,231
	Percent	5.4	16.1	35.8
Independence	Frequency	592	292	1,466
	Percent	17.2	8.5	42.7

Table 34: Local Governance Reform (Buddhist Women)

		Decline	Accept	Don't know/No answer
No change in governance	Frequency	92	148	217
	Percent	9.6	15.5	22.7
Decentralization as in other parts of the country	Frequency	73	176	261
	Percent	7.7	18.4	27.4
Special decentralization under Thai law	Frequency	96	171	275
	Percent	10.1	17.9	28.8
Independence	Frequency	327	85	283
	Percent	34.3	8.9	29.7

8. Conflict Resolution Measures

Respondents were asked to rank measures according to what they considered most urgent. The answers were as follows; create a safe space in communities (3.61); avoid violence against soft targets (i.e. civilians) (3.49); form a human rights fact-finding committee (3.42); guarantee safe passage of persons involved in peace talks (3.35); protect human rights (3.31).

When disaggregating female respondents according to religion, Muslim respondents' most urgent measures included "demilitarization" and "no scapegoating/ report progress of talks to the public".

Table 35: Top 5 Urgent Measures (Women)

(1=not urgent at all, 2=not urgent, 3=urgent,4=very urgent)	Average score
Create a safe space in communities	3.61
Avoid soft targets (i.e. civilians)	3.49
Form human rights fact-finding committee	3.42
Guarantee safe passage of persons involved in peace talks	3.35
Human rights protection	3.31

Table 36: Top 5 Urgent Measures (Men)

	Average score
Create a safe space in communities	3.44
Avoid soft targets (i.e. civilians)	3.35
Human rights protection	3.23
Form human rights fact-finding committee	3.12
Guarantee safe passage of persons involved in peace talks	3.03

Table 37: Top 5 Urgent Measures (Muslim Women)

	Average score
Create a safe space in communities	3.43
Avoid soft targets (i.e. civilians)	3.34
Do not scapegoat/report progress of talks to the public	3.33
Human rights protection	3.18
Demilitarization	3.13

Table 38: Top 5 Urgent Measures (Buddhist Women)

	Average score
Create a safe space in communities	3.47
Avoid soft targets (i.e. civilians)	3.41
Human rights protection	3.10
Form human rights fact-finding committee	3.04
Guarantee safe passage of persons involved in peace talks	2.96

When asked to rank the top five measures that could solve the problem in the long term, female respondents replied: career and income support (75.5%); address the drug problem (73.0%); deal with organised crime (39.1%); improve education and contextualize it to local needs (38.3%) and; offer remedies to affected parties without discrimination (31.8%). Buddhist women also ranked a strong military response as one of their top five measures (47.0%) while male respondents included promoting local identities, languages, and culture (35.6%).

Table 40: Top 5 Solutions (Women)

	Frequency	Percent
Career and income support	669	75.5
Address the drug problem	647	73.0
Deal with organised crime	346	39.1
Improve education and contextualize it to local needs	339	38.3
Offer remedies to affected parties without discrimination	282	31.8

Table 41: Top 5 Solutions (Men)

	Frequency	Percent
Address the drug problem	555	73.9
Career and income support	541	72.0
Improve education and contextualize it to local needs	291	38.7
Deal with organised crime	283	37.7
Promote local identities, languages, and cultures	267	35.6

Table 42: Top 5 Solutions (Muslim Women)

	Frequency	Percent
Career and income support	487	75.5
Address the drug problem	461	71.5
Improve education and contextualize it to local needs	258	40.0
Deal with organised crime	234	36.3
Offer remedies to affected parties without discrimination	202	31.3

Table 42: Top 5 Solutions (Buddhist Women)

	Frequency	Percent
Address the drug problem	181	77.4
Career and income support	175	74.8
Strong military response	110	47.0
Deal with organised crime	107	45.7
Improve education and contextualize it to local needs	80	34.2

Discussion

The demographic information highlights a variety of differences between male and female respondents as well as among female respondents. Findings showed that almost half of female respondents (48.6%) identified as Muslim first and foremost. Labels that followed were Thai, Malay, Buddhist, Patani and other. The demographic results also indicated that a variety of languages were spoken with 57.8% speaking the local Malay dialect, followed by the Southern Thai dialect, Central Thai, and others. There seemed to be a broad consensus in terms of education level and occupation. Although most female respondents completed primary school, a high proportion did not receive any education compared to men. However, more women completed undergraduate level or had a higher level of religious education. Nevertheless, the proportion of respondents that were either housewives or unemployed was high (16.7%, 6.2% respectively) and income remained low with 39.5% earning between 5,001 and10, 000 baht per month.

Early on in the conflict, women were seen more as victims. However, studies have shown the diverse roles that women adopt during conflict, particularly with respect to peace-building. Skills that women can employ as peace-builders include active listening, understanding, expressing empathy with marginal viewpoints, and telling stories rather than making statements.[23] In the Deep South, women CSOs have conducted home visits and collaborated with government to establish a compensation and rehabilitation commission.[24] However, in the ongoing formal peace process, women play no such distinctive role because their meaningful participation is wedged between the state's top-down agenda and the hierarchy of local social norms that marginalize women.[25]

When asked about the main peace-building roles that women play, respondents ranked career and income support and social development highest (78.8%). This was followed by human rights protection of children, youth, and women (73.9%), rehabilitation and victim support (66.7%), environmental and natural resource protection (65.3%), and disseminating peace knowledge (64.3%). These responses suggest there are many supporting roles that respondents expect women to adopt.

In terms of news, 48.5% of female respondents said they followed news about the peace talks. However, 26.7% felt the situation was getting worse. That said, both Muslim and Buddhist women expressed support for peace talks as a way to solve the conflict (52.7%) despite a large proportion

[23] Francesca Polletta and PCB Chen. *Gender and Public Talk: Accounting for Women's Variable Participation in the Public Sphere*. Sociological Theory, Vol 3, No.4. 2013: 305.

[24] Duanghathai Buranajaroenkij. *Women and the Peace Process in the Deep South of Thailand*. Bangkok: Peace Resource Collaborative, 2018: 35-37.

[25] Amporn Marddent. *Religious Discourse and Gender in Southern Thailand*. Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, Vol 12, No 2. 2019: 243.

lacking confidence in the process. On governance, 6.5% of female respondents expressed a preference for special decentralization under Thai law. This was followed by decentralization as in other parts of the country (16.1%). Long term solutions included; creating a safe space in communities, avoiding violence against soft targets (i.e. civilian) as well as career and income support (75.5%). Addressing the drug problem was also ranked highly (73.0%), as was dealing with influential groups and organised crime (39.1%).

Differences in opinion across religion highlight the challenges that will need to be dealt with in the event that formal talks lead to an agreement. In particular, different perceptions with respect to human rights violations are indicative of the grievances that Buddhists and Muslims have. Muslim respondents highlighted prohibiting the wearing of the hijab in Buddhist schools. Meanwhile, Buddhist respondents highlighted university quotas and scholarships for Muslims. By contrast, male respondents raised the issue of government restrictions on public panels.

Research from other conflict-affected contexts such as Afghanistan, Liberia, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sierra Leone, shows women as active agents of peace at the local level, but without recognition from governments, community members, and often the women themselves.[26] Further, their valuable peace-building experience in the private sphere and local community has not translated into participation in national and international processes. These lost opportunities infringe women's right to participate in decisions affecting their lives, and lead to a peace that does not meet the whole community's needs, thus risking a return to conflict.[27] Studies show that women's understanding of peace tends to start at the family and community level, and includes issues relevant to the private sphere, for example, peace within the household, education of children, and the attainment of individual rights and freedom.[28]

How can women build lasting peace, taking into consideration gender relations and ethno-religious diversity? Empirical data and understanding of how local women act as agents for peace help create an environment conducive to women's participation in peace-building. In the Deep South, women have started to be recognized as key actors at the policy level. Deep South administrative policy between 2017 and 2019 emphasizes the involvement of women and youth in decision-making at all levels. Recently, Executive Order 230/2557 was issued as an umbrella policy to moderate the recommendations of all participating women.

There have also been local efforts to establish a mechanism to involve grassroots women's organization in a collaboration

[26] Dinesh Kumar Singh. *Women, Security, Peace and Conflict in Southeast Asia*. Indian Journal of Political Science, 71, 2, April-June 2010: 651-661.

[27] Zohra Moosa, Maryam Rahmani, and Lee Webster. *From the Private to the Public Sphere: New Research on Women's Participation in Peacebuilding*. Gender and Development, 21, 3. 2013: 453-472.

[28] Ibid.

between UN Woman, the National Human Rights Commission (NHRCT), the Southern Border Provinces Administration Center (SBPAC), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Office of Women's Affairs and Family Development (OWAFD) under the Ministry of Social Development and Human Security. This collaboration aims to incorporate UNSCR1325 into domestic activities.[29] With this collaboration, there is a window of opportunity that could contribute to greater participation on the part of local women with respect to peace processes and peace-building in general.

Conclusion

The Peace Survey is instrumental for understanding Deep South people's opinions on conflict, peace-building and the peace process. Women's voices matter, and this study specifically draws out their perspective. This study can contribute to gender mainstreaming processes in peace-building and to the promotion of international mechanisms on women, peace, and security. Data shows that local women may not only take responsibility as household heads but also taking up roles related to community protection, economic survival and peace-building in public spaces. However, women's inclusion in peace dialogues remain a significant lacuna. Gender-sensitive information should be communicated to stakeholders. In this context, the political, social, and economic marginalization of women in Thailand's Deep South should be addressed through a special women's agenda that allows for coordination on these cross-cutting issues, and that creates avenues for innovative solutions.

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The Responsibility to Provide: Cultivating an Ethos of Responsible Sovereignty in Southeast Asia

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The Responsibility to Provide: Cultivating an Ethos of Responsible Sovereignty in Southeast Asia

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Abstract

Are ASEAN Member States responsible actors that care and provide for not only their own but also regional neighbours in need? This study aims to understand and explain, through identifying, mapping and analysing, a nascent "ethos" of interstate responsibility that arguably has risen between and among ASEAN countries – in an embryonic and uneven fashion, to be sure, and presently more evident in some countries than in others.

Referred to here as "the responsibility to provide" (or "responsible provision"),[1] this ethos assumes that sovereign nations ought to provide for the welfare of their people. In the event they are unable to satisfy that requirement, they bear the responsibility to see what other resources they can garner, including those furnished by the international community, to provide for their people. The ethos has also manifested as acts of hospitality shown to neighbours affected by natural disasters and/or as forms of assistance provided – from relief aid, financial and developmental assistance, military equipment and training, to peacekeeping forces – to neighbours coping with economic difficulties, problems of militancy and terrorism and so forth.

By way of a case-study method that "builds theory" through an inductive process of "soaking-and-poking" through various empirical cases,[2] this study aims to establish patterns of responsible conduct from bilateral and multilateral cooperative activities undertaken by ASEAN states and its dialogue partners. In contrast to "the responsibility to protect" (R2P), with which ASEAN states have an ambiguous relationship,[3] the concept of responsible provision introduced here does not challenge ASEAN's long-standing principle of non-intervention as its fulfilment does not hinge

[1] An early effort by this author at theorising the responsibility to provide on ethical-cum-philosophical grounds is, See Seng Tan, *The Responsibility to Provide in Southeast Asia: Towards an Ethical Explanation* (Bristol: Bristol University Press, 2019).

[2] Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2004).

[3] Alex J. Bellamy and Mark Beeson, "The responsibility to protect in Southeast Asia: Can ASEAN reconcile humanitarianism and sovereignty?" *Asian Security* 6, no. 3 (2010): 262–79, and Alex J. Bellamy and Catherine Drummond, "The responsibility to protect in Southeast Asia: Between non-interference and sovereignty as responsibility," *The Pacific Review* 24, no. 2 (2011): 179-200.

THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROVIDE: CULTIVATING AN ETHOS
OF RESPONSIBLE SOVEREIGNTY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Forging and Fostering Peace
ASEAN Institute for
Peace and Reconciliation

solely on the responsibility of other nations to furnish what an ASEAN country may lack in providing for its population. Rather, whether as recipients or providers, ASEAN Member States share the obligation to furnish succour, safety and security to affected populations: recipients through their consent and providers through their contributions of aid, assistance and the like.[4]

This study expects to find patterns of interstate disposition and practice consonant with responsible provision across areas of non-traditional security cooperation – growing but incipient and patchy patterns rather than mature and uniform ones, as one might expect of a still nascent ethos. The claim here is not that ASEAN states are already formed responsible or ethical agents, but that it would be a misrepresentation to denote them as being essentially irresponsible and wholly self-centred actors. Going forward, the further entrenchment and settlement of the responsibility to provide within the diplomatic-security fabric of Southeast Asia is likely to prove a key normative foundation on which the region's future peace and well-being rest.

[4] See Seng Tan, "Providing for the Other: Rethinking Responsibility and Sovereignty in Southeast Asia," *Critical Studies on Security* 5, no. 3 (December 2017): 270-86, and See Seng Tan, "Towards a 'Responsibility to Provide': Cultivating an Ethic of Responsible Sovereignty in Southeast Asia," in *Norms of Protection: Responsibility to Protect, Protection of Civilians and Their Interaction*, eds. Angus Francis, Vesselin Popovski, and Charles Sampford (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2012), 249-67.

Background

Conventional wisdom on Southeast Asia suggests a region given to political backwardness, despite its relative economic well-being.[5] Military coups in Thailand in 2014 and more recently in Myanmar in February 2021 underscore the region's susceptibility to authoritarian reversal of past democratic gains.[6] While the region's public health response to the COVID-19 pandemic has varied from country to country, there are suggestions that some ASEAN states use the pandemic to justify crackdowns on political freedoms and civil liberties.[7] Developments like the campaign waged by the Tatmadaw (Myanmar's military) against the Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine State between 2016 to 2017 and Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte's war on drugs and its human rights consequences in the Philippines also foster the impression of Southeast Asia as a culpable region.[8] In the light of the ambivalent relationship the ASEAN states have with the R2P global norm, their strict adherence to non-interventionism, as well as the ineffectiveness of ASEAN at addressing serious interstate and intrastate crises in its own backyard, such developments give rise to the perception that Southeast Asian governments and regimes – including the democratically elected ones – do not behave responsibly toward their own peoples, let alone their neighbours.

Granted, the issue is not simply one of an absence of political will to act responsibly, whether individually or collectively. It also has to do with the relative lack of state and regional capacities to act meaningfully, as evidenced by inadequate social safety nets in some Southeast Asian countries during the 1997 Asian financial crisis or insufficient expertise and resources in post-crisis relief and rebuilding in the wake of natural disasters like the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.[9] Whichever the case, critics would not be incorrect to point to all these evidences as reflective of the region's general inability and/or unwillingness to address its own predicaments. They are rendered the more tragic, so claimed, because of the apparent refusal by countries to protect not only their own populations, but those of their neighbours, from plights and tribulations whether natural or man-made.

On the other hand, regional conduct and developments suggest that the ASEAN states have in fact been working to address and redress some of these gaps. Their patterns of cooperation are by no means developed and mature, nor are they evenly distributed throughout the region. At the very least, they show that Southeast Asians "learned" from their experiences and are tentatively working toward a more tangible practice of mutual responsibility.

Research Objectives and Methodology

The research for this study relies on a case-study method that "builds theory" through an inductive process of "soaking-and-poking" through various empirical cases. Using this method, this study aims, firstly, to identify and map patterns of responsible conduct from bilateral and multilateral activities undertaken by ASEAN states and its dialogue partners in the areas of economic and financial cooperation, disaster management and humanitarian relief, and counter-terrorism. Secondly, the study seeks to understand and explain those patterns as emblematic of a growing but still embryonic normative sense of ethical commitment within Southeast Asia.

Theoretical Framework

In the 1990s, developments in regional conflict management in Africa led the Sudanese diplomat and legal scholar Francis Deng and his associates to advance the ground-breaking notion of "sovereignty as responsibility".[10] For Deng et al, sovereignty is not merely about the rights of nations but equally their responsibility to perform the tasks expected of effective governments and to meet the needs of the societies under their care. In the 2000s, this re-envisioning of sovereignty was further

[5] Lee Morgenbesser, *The Rise of Sophisticated Authoritarianism in Southeast Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020).

[6] In Myanmar's case, the 2021 coup was the fourth such coup in the country since the "constitutional coup" of 1958.

[7] Joshua Kurlantzick, "The Pandemic and Southeast Asia's Democratic Struggles," *Current History* 119, no. 818 (2020): 228-33.

[8] Sebastian Strangio, "What Should ASEAN Do About the Rohingya Crisis?" *The Diplomat*, 21 October 2020. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/what-should-asean-do-about-the-rohingya-crisis/, accessed 11 February 2021; Vanda Felbab-Brown, "The human rights consequences of the war on drugs in the Philippines," *Brookings*, 8 August 2017. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/the-human-rights-consequences-of-the-war-on-drugs-in-the-philippines/, accessed on 11 February 2021.

[9] Helen E. S. Nesadurai and J Soedradjad Djiwandono, eds., *Southeast Asia in the Global Economy: Securing Competitiveness and Social Protection* (Singapore: ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, 2009); John Telford and John Cosgrave, "The international humanitarian system and the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami," *Disasters* 31, no. 1 (2007): 1-28.

[10] Francis M. Deng, Sadikiel Kimaro, Terrence Lyons, Donald Rothchild, and Ira William Zartman, *Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1996).

developed by an international commission into "the responsibility to protect", or the R2P,[11] which the United Nations (UN) subsequently adopted and refined into a doctrine regarding the protection of populations from grave harm by way of three conditions or "pillars": the protective responsibilities of states; the provision of international assistance and capacity building; and – most controversial and challenging for the ASEAN states – timely and decisive response including military action.[12] Stressing that nations are obligated to protect populations against which crimes against humanity – such as genocide, ethnic-cleansing and war crimes – are being perpetrated, the UN took the extraordinary step to sanction the use of "timely and decisive" military intervention by the international community against errant governments guilty of those offences.

However, efforts to implement the R2P have proved challenging. Despite their being the most enthusiastic backers and practitioners of humanitarian intervention, the adherence by Western liberal powers to the doctrine – as evidenced by different responses to the war in Libya and the Syrian refugee crisis[13] – has at best been mixed. This is neither a criticism of the R2P nor of its backers as much as an acknowledgement that saving strangers is a dangerous business that ought to give even the most enthusiastic humanitarian pause where indiscriminate interventionism is concerned.[14]

Moreover, at the conceptual and theoretical level, an inadvertent outcome of the R2P attaining the status of a global norm has been the framing of the debate on the responsibility of states primarily in terms of the R2P. Viewed through the R2P prism, sovereignty is either about right, where non-intervention is treated as the absolute and inviolable dispensation of states, or about *protective* responsibility,

[11] *The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* (Ottawa, ON: International Development Research Centre, 2001).

[12] *Implementing the Responsibility to Protect*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations A/63/677, 12 January 2009. Available at: http://globalr2p.org/pdf/SGR2PEng.pdf, accessed on 3 March 2021.

[13] See, Justin Morris, "Libya and Syria: R2P and the spectre of the swinging pendulum," *International Affairs* 89, no. 5 (2013): 1265-83, and Nathalie Tocci, "The Responsibility to Protect in Libya and Syria: Europe, the USA and Global Human Rights Governance," in *The West and the Global Power Shift: Transatlantic Relations and Global Governance*, eds. Riccardo Alcaro, John Peterson, and Ettore Greco (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 221-46.

[14] Mark Duffield, "The liberal way of development and the development-security impasse: Exploring the global life-chance divide," *Security Dialogue* 41, no. 1 (2010): 53-76.

where states are not only obligated to protect their populations from crimes against humanity but face the prospect of becoming targets for humanitarian intervention by the international community should they fail to protect their own. Given Southeast Asia's ambiguous relationship with the R2P, the stark contrast between right and protective responsibility fosters the unwarranted conclusion that the ASEAN states are thereby irresponsible or unethical, perhaps even immoral. The narrow and quite demanding definition of responsibility allowed here not only ignores the wide range of conduct in which states engage but potentially ignores those as indicative of responsible behaviour.

This is not to imply that advocates of sovereign responsibility do not appreciate practical realities that militate against conceptual assumptions and doctrinal expectations. For example, insisting that the world cannot stand by idly in the face of untold suffering, Francis Deng nonetheless argued, "We cannot live on ideals that cannot be fulfilled. We have to aspire to the ideals, but we have to deal with the reality on the ground. *And the reality on the ground is that we need the cooperation of the Member States to fulfil our mission*."[15] In like vein, Javier Perez de Cuellar, the former UN Secretary-General, once contended that rather than impaling ourselves unnecessarily on the horns of a dilemma between respect for sovereignty and the protection of human rights, what is involved is "not the right of intervention" but *the collective obligation of States to bring relief and redress in human rights emergencies*."[16]

It is therefore in that middle ground between respect for sovereignty and non-intervention, on the one hand, and the R2P on the other where ASEAN states are arguably finding and locating themselves so far as their responses to non-traditional security challenges go. Despite the purported sanctity of the non-intervention norm (and its corollary, non-interference) in ASEAN's regional diplomacy, it could be said that ASEAN states are generally agreeable to the R2P conditions of protective responsibility and provision of assistance to others, whilst at the same time sensitive to the practical sensibilities of

[15] Francis Deng, "Idealism and realism: Negotiating sovereignty in divided nations," The 2010 Dag Hammarskjöld Lecture, 10 September 2010, Uppsala University (Uppsala: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 2010), 13, italics added.

[16] Javier Perez de Cuellar, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organisation* (New York: United Nations, 1991), 14, italics added.

implementing just such a responsibility. This informal consensus is evident from regional academic-practitioner consultations[17] and, as shown below, what ASEAN states have actually done and are doing in their humanitarian and cooperative security efforts. As the defence minister of an ASEAN member country emphatically stated at the 2008 Shangri-La Dialogue, it is the responsibility of all national governments to provide for the welfare of their people, and should they be unable to do so, then "it is their responsibility to see what other resources they can garner to help provide for the people"[18] – an expression of regional commitment that was underscored that same year when ASEAN responded to assist Myanmar when that member country was devastated by Cyclone Nargis in humanitarian relief and post-crisis reconstruction.[19] Indeed, the Nargis incident suggests that ASEAN states may even grudgingly accept, at least theoretically, the R2P condition of timely and decisive action, but through diplomatic and not military means.[20]

What does the responsibility to provide or responsible provision look like in practice? First, in view of the non-interference norm, it places the onus of responsible provision on both the provider and recipient countries to jointly seek and establish the requisite consensus for the implementation of that responsibility.

[17] See the following reports, *Report of the Regional Consultation on the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP)*, 8-9 April 2010 (Singapore: Centre for Non-traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2010), and *Report of the Policy Roundtable on Civilian Protection: Issues and Challenges*, 9 February 2010 (Singapore: Centre for Non-traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2010).

[18] Teo Chee Hean, "Plenary speech by minister for defence Teo Chee Hean at the Shangri-La dialogue 2008," Singapore Ministry of Defence, 1 June 2008. Available at: http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/resources/speeches/2008/01jun08_speech.html, accessed on 11 March 2021.

[19] Mely Caballero-Anthony and Belinda Chng, "Cyclones and humanitarian crises: Pushing the limits of R2P in Southeast Asia," *Global Responsibility to Protect* 1, no. 2 (2009): 135-55. When ASEAN Foreign Ministers met in Singapore to discuss the Nargis response, one of the three options that the 9 ASEAN members presented to Myanmar was that ASEAN would step aside and let the R2P process take over. See Moe Thuzar and Lex Rieffel, "ASEAN's Myanmar Dilemma," *Perspective*, no. 3, 8 January (Singapore: ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, 2018).

[20] Unless the military is deployed for humanitarian and search-and-rescue missions. Even then, in the wake of the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami in December 2004, when the Singapore's armed forces activated Operation Flying Eagle, its biggest ever deployment of men and materiel to Indonesia and Thailand, involving some 1,500 personnel, three supply ships, twelve helicopters and eight transport aircraft, there were anxious whispers around the region regarding what Singapore, with its force and lift capabilities on full display, could do to its Southeast Asian neighbours if it harboured bellicose intentions. The irony is that, at times, even "altruistic" missions like humanitarian relief and search-and-rescue could end up unintentionally exacerbating security dilemmas and driving security competition between would-be rivals. Tan, *The Responsibility to Protect in Southeast Asia*, 87-88.

Second, it welcomes consensual efforts by the international community and international organisations in assisting the ASEAN Member States to build capacity to care for not only their domestic constituencies but those of their regional counterparts – again, assuming their consent for external assistance is given – as well. Third, should any ASEAN state be unable to provide for its citizens in times of natural disasters – and may for whatever reason be unwilling to allow international actors to do so – it is the collective responsibility of that state and its fellow ASEAN members and regional partners to come to a diplomatic solution, with respect to reasonable security concerns of that state in question, to ensure a humanitarian crisis is averted. Whilst ASEAN countries see utility in the idea of the putative responsibility and accountability of states to both their domestic and external constituencies, social persuasion and peer pressure, rather than outright coercion, serve as the principal means through which provider countries work with prospective recipient countries to reach consensual outcomes.

Research Result and Analysis

The embryonic ethic of responsible provision in Southeast Asia this study seeks to map is not necessarily a recent development. As a consequence of Southeast Asians' growing awareness of and shared concern over the rise of transnational challenges facing the region – natural disasters such as devastating tsunamis and cyclones, viral epidemics like the 2003 SARS crisis, economic shocks like the 1997 financial crisis – the ASEAN member countries and their dialogue partners have been developing mechanisms aimed at enhancing their capacities to assist one another and to respond collectively and meaningfully to those challenges. For instance, the Asian financial crisis clarified for the ASEAN states that performance legitimacy, the hallmark of the illiberal governments in Southeast Asia, should be defined not only in terms of their ability to sustain their economic competitiveness, but equally their capacity to provide their populations with adequate social protections in times of crisis.[21]

The financial crisis also underscored the need for regional mechanisms and solutions to ensure that

[21] Sarah Cook, *Social Protection in East and South East Asia: A Regional Review* (Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, July 2009).

Southeast Asians have the wherewithal to handle their own crises.[22] This shared concern led to the creation of the Chiang Mai Initiative, which started out as a network of bilateral currency swap deals that would act as a financial safety net for the region and expanded subsequently into a single multilateral accord with a US$240 million fund. It also led to the ad-hoc formation of the ASEAN Social Safety Net Task Force aimed at assisting affected states in building capacities and sharing experiences in addressing the social impact of the crisis. Indeed, regional responses to the financial crisis have been seen and understood by East Asians themselves – including the Chinese, who proactively sought to assist their neighbours' efforts at recovery – in terms of a regional responsibility to provide for one another.[23]

Despite the absence of any legal obligation to assist, the ASEAN states have shown an increasing readiness to respond to cross-border humanitarian emergencies and security problems. Back in 1976, ASEAN issued a declaration on "mutual assistance on natural disasters" but little of consequence came out of it in this area of disaster relief. Elsewhere, much like the Asian financial crisis did, seminal events such as the SARS crisis in 2003 and the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 as well as other major non-traditional security challenges all served to catalyse regional attention and action.[24] In the case of the tsunami, it led the ASEAN Member States to ratify the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER). It was the devastating impact by Cyclone Nargis on Myanmar in 2008 – and the acute tensions that arose from external pressure from an international community seeking to justify humanitarian intervention and the deep distrust that that move evoked in Myanmar's ruling junta – that eventually paved the way to ASEAN playing a middleman role within a tripartite arrangement comprising the Myanmar government, the UN and ASEAN to facilitate the influx of international assistance for relief and reconstruction to Myanmar.[25] "ASEAN really stepped into

[22] Worapot Manupipatpong, "The ASEAN Surveillance Process and the East Asian Monetary Fund," *ASEAN Economic Bulletin* 19, no. 1 (2002): 111-22.

[23] Yang Jiang, "Response and responsibility: China in East Asian financial cooperation," *The Pacific Review* 23, no. 5 (2010): 603-23.

[24] Lilianne Fan and Hanna Krebs, *Regional Organisations and Humanitarian Action: The Case of ASEAN*, HPG Working Paper (London: Humanitarian Policy Group, September 2014).

[25] "Myanmar: ASEAN SG thanks friends and partners for post-Nargis support," Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 27 August 2010. Available at:

the breach in the third week of May [2008] and provided a really vital bridge, if you like, between two fairly mistrustful sets of stakeholders," as Dan Collison of the humanitarian outfit Save the Children in Myanmar acknowledged. "In terms of providing some predictable humanitarian space, it … worked very well."[26]

Specific to the area of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), the ASEAN countries have formed the ASEAN Militaries Ready Group to support humanitarian missions, endorsed standard operating procedures for the utilisation of national assets in humanitarian emergencies under the AADMER agreement, and sought ways to enhance the interoperability of the region's armed forces when executing those missions. Crucial pieces of the regional architecture for HADR – the already mentioned AADMER, the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (better known as the AHA Centre), the Standard Operating Procedure for Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations (SASOP), the ASEAN Militaries Ready Group (AMRG) on HADR, the ADMM and ADMM-Plus, as well as national-level assets like the Singapore-based Regional HADR Coordination Centre (RHCC) – have been put in place. Ironically, for a region ill-disposed to engaging in military-to-military transparency, the fact that the SASOP includes provisions such as a template for the roles and terms of reference for both provider countries and recipient countries suggests that regular – but, as per ASEAN convention, non-binding – reportage of one's military assets for disaster management effectively contributes to a limited version of a regional arms register.[27] It remains to be seen how well Southeast Asians can successfully translate their regular conduct of multilateral military exercises into collective coordinated responses to real humanitarian crises.

In this respect, the Rohingya refugee crisis is a glaring indictment of the

https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/myanmar-asean-sg-thanks-friends-and-partners-post-nargis-support, accessed 18 March 2021.

[26] Cited in Katherine Baldwin, "ASEAN finds new purpose with Cyclone Nargis response," *AlertNet*, 4 May 2009. Available at:

http://www.alertnet.org/db/an_art/55076/2009/04/1–125433–1.htm, accessed on 18 March 2021.

[27] Tan, *The Responsibility to Provide in Southeast Asia*, 85. Also see, Tomotaka Shoji, "ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) and ADMM Plus: A Japanese perspective," *NIDS Journal of Defense and Security* 14 (2013): 9.

region's relative inaction in the face of a major humanitarian problem in its backyard. Although the AHA Centre played a role in delivering assistance to the affected Rakhine region – about 80 tonnes of relief items, according to a November 2017 report by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs[28] – and a number of ASEAN Member States rendered symbolic gestures of assistance, the Rohingya crisis exposed the long road the ASEAN countries still have to travel in fully actualising the notion of responsible provision – much in the same way countries that back the R2P may have with fully realising the aspiration of responsible protection. In the same vein, although ASEAN's institutional developments in the HADR field imply a growing capacity in ASEAN and its wider regional offshoots like the ADMM-Plus to conduct preventive diplomacy,[29] ASEAN's inadequate response to the Rohingya crisis – further complicated by the COVID-19 pandemic lockdowns and the February 2021 coup[30] – serves as an important reminder that even the European Union, with its long-standing experience and success in preventive diplomacy, does not always do the needful as the feeble response by the EU to the Syrian refugee crisis showed.[31]

Another litmus test for ASEAN responsible provision is the grouping's ongoing effort to engage the post-coup military regime in Myanmar. In April 2021, the ASEAN leaders, together with junta chief Min Aung Hlaing, jointly produced a "five-point consensus" that called, *inter alia*, for the immediate cessation of violence, the pursuit of a peaceful resolution by all parties mediated by ASEAN, and the provision of humanitarian assistance through the AHA Centre.[32] Criticism of ASEAN's ineffectiveness grew following the junta's continued use of

[28] *Myanmar: Humanitarian Bulletin* 3, 23 September – 13 November 2017 (New York: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2017).

[29] See Seng Tan, "Can ASEAN's Institutions Do Preventive Diplomacy?" in *Diplomacy and the Future of World Order*, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2021), 179-91.

[30] See, for example, mention of the Rohingya question in the statements from the ASEAN foreign ministers and leaders' meetings on Myanmar in March and April 2021, respectively, as well as the ASEAN Chairman's statement of the 38th and 39th Summits.

[31] Megan Greene and R. Daniel Kelemen. "Europe's failed refugee policy," *Foreign Affairs*, 28 June 2016. Available at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2016-06-28/europes-failed-refugee-policy, accessed on 18 March 2021.

[32] See, "Chairman's Statement on the ASEAN Leaders' Meeting, 24 April 2021." Available at: https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/Chairmans-Statement-on-ALM-Five-Point-Consensus-24-April-2021-FINAL-a-1.pdf, accessed on 30 November 2021.

force against civilians in Myanmar. At an emergency foreign ministers' meeting in October 2021, ASEAN rendered the extraordinary decision to allow only a "non-political representative from Myanmar" to the ASEAN Summit later that month – thereby barring the involvement of Min Aung Hlaing.[33] How robust and effective ASEAN's efforts in this respect remains to be seen.

Counter-terrorism cooperation is another area where the ASEAN countries have increasingly demonstrated a readiness towards responsible provision. Prior to the Bali bombings carried out by Jemaah Islamiyah (a local affiliate of Al Qaeda) in October 2002, the ASEAN states adopted a declaration on joint action on counter-terrorism – including an agreement signed by subsets of states to strengthen border controls, establish hotlines, share intelligence and adopt standard procedures for search and rescue – all of which laid the groundwork for the adoption of the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism (ACCT) in 2007, which all of the ASEAN states fully ratified by 2013.[34] Unusually for a consensus-oriented organisation like ASEAN, the ACCT in fact entered into force in 2011 as it only required ratification by six ASEAN member countries (out of ten) to do so. The ACCT serves as an overarching framework through which the respective and varied counter-terrorism policies of the ASEAN states could be coordinated and region-wide endorsement secured. The ACCT introduced a common definition of terrorism in Southeast Asia and established a shared understanding to exclude the nature of the motive behind the act – be it political, religious or ideological – from criminalisation of terrorism.[35]

Perhaps nowhere is responsible provision more likely to gain traction than in the ways the ASEAN countries are increasingly collaborating in the post-Marawi context. When local pro-ISIS groups in the Philippines launched a conventional ground war against the Philippine armed forces in Marawi in southern Philippines in 2017, Marawi, referred to by some as "the Mosul of Southeast Asia," was viewed by

[33] Whether such pressure has been effective remains to be seen. See, Moe Thuzar, "ASEAN Snubs the State Administration Council (For Now)," Fulcrum: Analysis on Southeast Asia, 19 October 2021. Available at: https://fulcrum.sg/asean-snubs-the-state-administration-council-for-now/, accessed on 30 November 2021.

[34] Tan, *The Responsibility to Provide in Southeast Asia*, 92.

[35] See Seng Tan and Hitoshi Nasu, "ASEAN and the Development of Counter-Terrorism Law and Policy in Southeast Asia," *UNSW Law Journal* 39, no. 3 (2016): 1220-34.

regional security planners as a game-changer that would militarise counter-terrorism strategy in Southeast Asia, where terrorism has long been treated as a law-and-order issue.[36] With the region's militaries strengthening their counter-terrorism capabilities and looking to deepen their collaboration with one another – for instance, the Marawi conflict saw Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore offering military assistance to their imperilled fellow ASEAN member – through new regional intelligence sharing initiatives like the Our Eyes Initiative (ASEAN's version of the Five Eyes Alliance[37]), defence cooperation in Southeast Asia looks set to expand in ways that would have been thought inconceivable a mere few years ago. To be sure, these developments are by no means easy especially for a region with a difficult history of rule by the military.[38] Even as the ASEAN states brace themselves for a growing role for their militaries in counter-terrorism, the need to mind the consequences such a direction could have for civil liberties at home as well as regional sensitivities abroad cannot be overstated.

Ultimately, in a region mindful of the non-interference principle, the onus in times of emergencies rests with the affected countries themselves to invite the help of international organisations and other countries. However, this logic does not free the others from their obligation to assist.[39] Both recipient and provider equally share the responsibility to furnish succour, safety and security to affected populations: the recipient through her grant of consent and invitation; the provider through her contributions of aid, assistance and the like. Nowhere is this more evident than in the framework guiding relations between

[36] See Seng Tan, "Sending in the Cavalry: The Growing Militarization of Counterterrorism in Southeast Asia," *PRISM: The Journal of Complex Operations* 7, no. 4 (8 November 2018). Available at: https://cco.ndu.edu/News/Article/1682045/sending-in-the-cavalry-the-growing-militarization-of-counterterrorism-in-southe/, accessed on 18 March 2021.

[37] The Five Eyes is an intelligence alliance comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States.

[38] Marcus Mietzner (ed), *The Political Resurgence of the Military in Southeast Asia: Conflict and Leadership* (London: Routledge, 2012).

[39] Indeed, a prospective provider cannot not respond to the prospective recipient because their very identities are predicated upon conditions of sociality rather than of autonomy. In other words, the fundamental importance of the other to my very being is such that without her and her infinite demand for my hospitality, there can be no "I" or self. As Zlatan Filipovic has suggested, one is a subject only and insofar as one is awakened or "sobered up" to responsibility for the other person. See, Zlatan Filipovic, "Introduction to Emmanuel Levinas: 'After you, sir!'" *Moderna språk* 1 (2011): 58-73.

providers of assistance and recipients of that assistance within ASEAN and the ADMM-Plus. For example, among the terms of reference (TOR) for the ASEAN Militaries Ready Group on HADR, the following principles in that TOR document reflect the spirit of invitation and consent, such as the tenth principle – "The decision to deploy military personnel, assets and other resources shall remain under the prerogative of Assisting State, and *upon the request or consent by the Affected State*" – and the fourteenth principle – "The Affected State shall exercise the overall direction, control, coordination and supervision of assistance within its territory."[40] So long as the affected countries give their consent – a consent which provider countries may, if need be, compel through the use of peer pressure and social persuasion.[41] As a foreign minister from the region has allowed, "While ASEAN may work on the principle of consensus, ASEAN also works on the principle of peer pressure, and peer pressure can be very effective. And it is not easy for an ASEAN member country to take a rigid position when all the other nine countries are in opposition."[42] But as ASEAN's difficult engagement with Myanmar has shown, a responsible provision built around consensus and non-interference principles clearly has its limits. Yet the solution is likely not to be found in the rejection of those principles as such, but in the continued and concerted quest by ASEAN Member States to working flexibly and pragmatically within – and, where necessary, around – those limits.

Conclusion

The path towards an ethos of responsibility to provide in Southeast Asia is neither simple nor straightforward. If anything, nurturing and maintaining the mutual commitment and collective but consensual adherence to responsible provision is hard work indeed. To be sure, there is a strong pragmatic logic behind

[40] "Terms of reference: ASEAN militaries ready group on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (AMRG on HADR)," Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 22 April 2016, 2. Available at: http://mod.gov.la/10thADMM/assets/4.7.1-tor-on-amrg-as-of-20160422.pdf, accessed on 16 March 2021.

[41] Tan, *The Responsibility to Provide in Southeast Asia*, 53. Also see, See Seng Tan, "Herding cats: The role of persuasion in political change and continuity in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 13, no. 2 (2013): 233-65.

[42] "Remarks by minister for foreign affairs George Yeo and his reply to the supplementary questions in parliament during the committee of supply (CoS) debate," Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 3 March 2011. Available at: http://app.mfa.gov.sg/2006/press/view_press.asp?post_id=6820, accessed on 11 March 2021.

these acts of responsible provision. For example, the explanation furnished recently in an assessment of Southeast Asian responses to the COVID-19 pandemic placed the motivation for "responsible regional conduct" squarely on policy pragmatism rather than on ethical grounds.[43] In making an argument on behalf of the responsibility to provide, this study does not reject the case for pragmatism. But as the philosopher Hans Jonas once suggested about the significant place of ethics and morality – or their lack – in international affairs, it is not always and only due to cunning reason or realpolitik that states behave badly for such convenient rationalisations leave no room for moral depravity.[44] Likewise, it may not always and only be due to pragmatic choices that states engage in what could be regarded as responsible conduct. Nor has the intent here been to insist that Southeast Asian states are fully formed ethical agents and wholly responsible actors. Indeed, the signs that the aspiration on responsibility to provide is being translated into reality are thus far embryonic. But it is something worth cultivating and developing further. According to the ethicist Philip Hallie, "Deeds speak the language of the great virtues far better than words do. Words limp outside the gates of the mystery of compassion for strangers."[45] Responsibility is as responsibility does, and Southeast Asia would be the better for it.

[43] As Slater has argued, "The main reason is pragmatism. Unprecedented crises demand flexibility. Southeast Asian states will show zero hesitation about increasing state intervention and supporting private businesses to cope with the economic and epidemiological impact of the coronavirus. There will be no hypernationalism and slamming of national borders. Neither the United States nor China will be chucked overboard as external partners to rally political support and distract from internal failings." Dan Slater, "Southeast Asia's Grim Resilience: Pragmatism Amid the Pandemic," *Commentary* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), 1 July 2020. Available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/07/01/southeast-asia-s-grim-resilience-pragmatism-amid-pandemic-pub-82227, accessed on 3 March 2021.

[44] Hans Jonas, "Matter, mind, and creation: Cosmological evidence and cosmogonic speculation," in *Mortality and Morality: A Search for the Good After Auschwitz*, ed. Lawrence Vogel (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1996),188.

[45] Philip Hallie, *Lest Innocent Blood Be Shed* (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), 42.

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BRUNEI DARUSSALAM
2021

JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ
OF THE 54th ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING
2 AUGUST 2021

1. The 54th ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting (AMM) was held on 2nd August 2021 via videoconference. The Meeting was chaired by Brunei Darussalam under the theme "We Care, We Prepare, We Prosper." We reaffirmed ASEAN's commitment to care for its people and prepare for future opportunities and challenges, in order to advance sustainable development for shared prosperity in the region.

ASEAN COMMUNITY BUILDING

ASEAN Community Vision 2025

2. We reaffirmed our commitment to further strengthen the ASEAN Community as well as ASEAN's unity and Centrality to address common challenges as well as to advance ASEAN's comprehensive recovery from the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. We recognised the importance of promoting an ASEAN identity and awareness among its peoples, and that the strength of the ASEAN Community lies in putting people at its centre and fulfilling their desire to live in a region of lasting peace, security and stability, sustained economic growth, shared prosperity, and social progress. In this regard, we reaffirmed ASEAN Member States' common values and principles, as enshrined in the ASEAN Charter.

3. We reaffirmed our commitment towards the full and effective implementation of the ASEAN Community Vision 2025 as well as to develop the Post-2025 Community Vision, including establishing a High-Level Task Force and developing a Roadmap for the development of the Post-2025 Vision. Amidst the unprecedented challenges and socio-economic impacts brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic, we commended the ongoing work of all ASEAN Sectoral Bodies and Organs for progress achieved in the implementation of the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) Blueprints 2025, as well as the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC) 2025. We welcomed the Mid-Term Review (MTR) of the three ASEAN Community Blueprints and MPAC 2025, and the implementation of their recommendations to ensure their full completion.

4. We reaffirmed our shared commitment to maintaining and promoting peace, security, and stability in the region, as well as to the peaceful resolution of disputes, including full respect for legal and diplomatic processes, without resorting to the threat or use of force, in accordance with the universally recognised principles of international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

5. We reaffirmed our belief that regionalism and multilateralism are important principles and frameworks of cooperation, and that their strength and value lie in their inclusivity, rules-based nature and emphasis on mutual benefit and respect.

6. We remain determined to continue promoting ASEAN identity and awareness among its peoples and enhancing ASEAN's visibility through, including but not limited to, promoting the display of the ASEAN Flag in ASEAN Member States and the use of the ASEAN Anthem at all ASEAN official functions.

Key Deliverables

7. We highlighted the importance of a whole-of-ASEAN approach in pursuing our Community building efforts and agreed on the need for ASEAN to pursue a Strategic and Holistic Initiative to Link ASEAN Responses to Emergencies and Disasters (ASEAN SHIELD) across the three ASEAN Community Pillars, with a view to better protect the society, economy and the broader developmental agenda, as well as to enable a strategic, holistic, coordinated and cross-pillar response in mitigating impacts of emergencies and disasters that have or may affect the Southeast Asian region. We therefore look forward to the submission of the Bandar Seri Begawan Declaration on the ASEAN Strategic and Holistic Initiative to Link ASEAN Responses to Emergencies and Disasters to the 38th ASEAN Summit.

8. We welcomed the launch of the ASEAN Village in Palu City in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia, as part of ASEAN's post-disaster recovery project, with the support of the people of Brunei Darussalam and the Government of the Philippines, the Government of Australia and Direct Relief, through the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre), following the natural disasters that occurred in 2018. The construction of the ASEAN Village demonstrates the importance of ASEAN solidarity through a coordinated multistakeholder and holistic approach to disasters and emergencies. This initiative exemplifies the essence of "One ASEAN One Response" and the intent of the ASEAN SHIELD.

9. We agreed on the need to strengthen multilateral cooperation to effectively address current as well as emerging global and regional challenges of common concern and areas of mutual interest. We therefore welcomed the ASEAN Chair's proposal to prepare an ASEAN Leaders' Declaration on Upholding Multilateralism in 2021 for the 38th ASEAN Summit to reaffirm ASEAN's commitment to upholding and promoting multilateral cooperation, anchored in international law, towards achieving peace, security, stability, and prosperity in the region and beyond.

10. We acknowledged the emerging significance of the blue economy as well as the growing interest from external partners to engage ASEAN Member States on the concept, both bilaterally and regionally. To this end, we welcomed the convening of the ASEAN Workshop on the Blue Economy, which promoted a common understanding of the concept for the region and identified the potential areas of cooperation under it, where ASEAN Member States can engage each other as well as external partners. To this end, we looked forward to continuing discussions on this issue, with a view to submitting a proposed ASEAN Leaders' Declaration on the Blue Economy for the 38th ASEAN Summit's consideration.

11. Recognising the increasing pace of digital transformation in our region, especially amidst the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, which saw the accelerated adoption of digital technologies in our economies and societies, we welcomed the progress in the development of the Consolidated Strategy on the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) for ASEAN and looked forward to its submission to the 38th ASEAN Summit, for consideration.

12. We recognised the need to ensure sustainability and progress in ASEAN's work through equipping junior officers of ASEAN Member States with the knowledge and skills to face new challenges. To this end, we welcomed the proposed establishment of a Junior Fellowship Programme with the ASEAN Secretariat to enhance familiarisation with the work of ASEAN, develop skilled officers, enable networking and strengthen the sense of ASEAN identity.

Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic

13. We remained deeply concerned with the continued human cost and suffering as well as profound socio-economic impacts of COVID-19, and acknowledged the ongoing whole-of-government efforts of ASEAN Member States as well as a whole-of-Community approach by ASEAN in advancing its collective efforts to respond to COVID-19 and recover swiftly. We further noted the important coordinating role of the ACC and the active work of the ASEAN Coordinating Council Working Group on Public Health Emergencies (ACCWG-PHE), as well as the work of the ASEAN health sectoral body and other relevant sectoral bodies, which demonstrates ASEAN's solidarity and ability to address unprecedented challenges of the pandemic in a coordinated multi-sectoral, cross-pillar and multi-stakeholder manner.

14. We welcomed the progress made in implementing the ASEAN Comprehensive Recovery Framework (ACRF) and its Implementation Plan, which serves as a consolidated strategy for ASEAN to emerge more resilient and stronger from the COVID-19 pandemic. We welcomed the establishment of the ACRF Support Unit at the ASEAN Secretariat. We encouraged the continued support and contribution from all stakeholders, both internal and external, private and public, for the effective implementation of the ACRF. In this regard, we underscored the importance of strengthening ASEAN's cooperation with external partners and international organisations to address the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic.

15. We welcomed the continued contributions from ASEAN Member States and external partners to the COVID-19 ASEAN Response Fund which now has pledged contributions amounting to USD 20.8 million. We also welcomed the utilisation of the Fund to procure COVID-19 vaccines for the peoples of ASEAN and ASEAN Secretariat staff through the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), in order to help ensure that the people of ASEAN are vaccinated, as "no one is safe until everyone is safe".

16. We looked forward to the operationalisation of the ASEAN Regional Reserve of Medical Supplies for Public Health Emergencies (RRMS) to enhance regional resilience in response to medical emergencies and welcomed the contribution of medical supplies by

ASEAN Member States, ASEAN external partners, international organisations, and other sources.

17. We looked forward to the implementation of the Regional Strategic and Action Plan on ASEAN Vaccine Security and Self-Reliance (AVSSR) 2021-2025 towards realising vaccine security and self-reliance for all in ASEAN.

18. Noting the need to enhance vaccine production and distribution in the region, we called for enhanced collaboration and sharing of experience with ASEAN's partners in research, development, production, and distribution of vaccines, providing equitable access to medicines for COVID-19, making COVID-19 vaccines available and affordable to all as global public goods, as well as preparing for other future public health emergencies.

19. We looked forward to the timely establishment and early operationalisation of the ASEAN Centre for Public Health Emergencies and Emerging Diseases (ACPHEED), which would serve as a centre of excellence and regional resource hub to strengthen ASEAN's regional capabilities to prepare for, prevent, detect, and respond to public health emergencies and emerging diseases. In this regard, we appreciated and welcomed the support from Japan and Australia towards the ACPHEED, while encouraging other external partners to support its operationalisation.

20. We encouraged the maintenance of necessary interconnectedness in the region by facilitating, to the extent possible, the essential movement of people, including business travels, while safeguarding public health in line with our efforts to combat the pandemic. In this regard, we welcomed the development of the ASEAN Travel Corridor Arrangement Framework (ATCAF) and commended the work of the Ad Hoc Task Force on the Operationalisation of the ATCAF. We looked forward to the early operationalisation of the ATCAF, following its adoption by the ACC.

Review of the Implementation of the ASEAN Charter

21. We took note of the work of the Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN (CPR), assisted by the ASEAN Secretariat on the follow-up of the Scoping Report and looked forward to the Review of Implementation of the ASEAN Charter. We noted that the review exercise is aimed at identifying outstanding issues in the implementation of the ASEAN Charter and the necessary steps in ensuring the smooth and efficient functioning of the ASEAN system, and tasked the CPR to work expeditiously on the Review for submission to the ACC.

Review of the Implementation of the ASEAN Charter

22. We underscored the importance of narrowing the development gap within and among ASEAN Member States and enhancing ASEAN's competitiveness as a region. In this regard, we welcomed the progress made from the first year of the implementation of the IAI Work Plan IV (2021-2025), which guides our collective efforts to narrow the development gap within ASEAN and between ASEAN and the rest of the world, and to enhance ASEAN's competitiveness as a region, taking into consideration emerging challenges and priorities, including the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. We noted the ongoing discussion on the

concept note on the development indicators and classifications to achieve decent living standards and narrow the development gaps in ASEAN, and welcomed the role of IAI Task Force in facilitating this process.

Sub-regional cooperation

23. We emphasised the importance of ASEAN Centrality and unity in promoting ASEAN's sub-regional development. We recognised the relevance of sub- regional development to ASEAN's regional integration and community-building process, especially in narrowing the development gap and enhancing ASEAN's regional competitiveness, enhancing regional connectivity, and ensuring ASEAN's sustainable development and inclusive development. We encouraged closer coordination between ASEAN sectoral bodies and sub- regional cooperation frameworks in achieving our goal of narrowing the development gap among and within ASEAN Member States. In this regard, we welcomed the upcoming ASEAN Forum on Sub-regional Cooperation: Narrowing the Development Gaps in Sub-Regions for Comprehensive Recovery and Sustainable Development to be held in Viet Nam in the third quarter of 2021.

24. We reiterated the commitment to further promote equitable development across the ASEAN Community by aligning sub-regional growth, including in the Mekong area such as the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS) the Brunei Darussalam-Indonesia-Malaysia- Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA), the Indonesia-Malaysia- Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT-GT), and the Singapore-Johor-Riau (SIJORI) Growth Triangle with the comprehensive development of ASEAN. We welcomed the support by external partners in the relevant processes.

ASEAN Connectivity

25. We welcomed the progress in implementing the MPAC 2025 which helps in achieving sustainable development and supporting post-pandemic recovery efforts as we strive towards a seamlessly and comprehensively connected and integrated ASEAN. We also welcomed the commencement of the Assessment of Future Sustainable Infrastructure Trends and Priorities in a Post-Pandemic ASEAN and the convening of the Socialisation Forum on the Framework for Improving ASEAN Infrastructure Productivity in May 2021. We looked forward to the operationalisation of the MTR of MPAC 2025 recommendations to enhance implementation at the regional and national levels.

26. We acknowledged the importance of partnerships in mobilising resources to implement MPAC 2025 and promote greater synergies amongst various connectivity strategies, including through the Connecting the Connectivities approach. In this regard, we noted the key recommendations of the Seminar on "Connecting the Connectivities: Synergy through Enhanced Partnership" which was held in January 2021.

Promoting Complementarities between the ASEAN Community Vision 2025 and the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

27. We reaffirmed our commitment to enhancing sustainable development cooperation, including with partners, by promoting the Complementarities Initiative. We reiterated our continued support for the effective implementation of the Complementarities Roadmap

(2020-2025) and for the work of the ASEAN Centre for Sustainable Development Studies and Dialogue (ACSDSD). We acknowledged the outcomes of the 5th High-Level Brainstorming Dialogue (HLBD), which recognised that sustainable development and sustainability is essential in mitigating the socio-economic impact of COVID-19 and building a better and more resilient future. We encouraged the acceleration of efforts to deliver the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in view of the Decade of Action for the SDGs and the reversal in the progress of achievement of the SDGs particularly on poverty (Goal 1) and inequality (Goal 10) caused by the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. We welcomed a new economic model that is restorative and regenerative by design, and in this regard, welcomed the endorsement of the Bio-Circular-Green Economy Network, which is expected to contribute to greater competitive, efficient and resilient ASEAN.

ASEAN Smart Cities Network

28. We emphasised the importance of ASEAN Smart Cities Network (ASCN) as a platform for catalysing cooperation in smart and sustainable cities development in the region through technological and innovative solutions. Recognising the crucial role of cities and urban innovation in the region's post-pandemic recovery, we encouraged synergising the ASCN's efforts with other on-going urban initiatives, such as the ASEAN Sustainable Strategy (ASUS) under MPAC 2025. We welcomed the work of ASCN in developing an online portal and a smart city investment toolkit towards strengthening partnerships in delivering smart city projects, sharing of good practices, and bridging resource gaps. We also welcomed Dialogue Partners and other external partners to continue their active engagement with ASCN, in accordance with the Guidelines for ASCN's Engagement with External Partners.

ASEAN Secretariat

29. We noted that the new ASEAN Secretariat Building, since its full operationalisation, has hosted an increasing number of meetings including the ASEAN Leaders' Meeting on 24 April 2021. We looked forward to the optimisation of the use of ASEAN Secretariat facilities for hosting meetings. In this regard, we encouraged Chairs of ASEAN and ASEAN sectoral bodies to conduct ASEAN meetings at the ASEAN Secretariat, in accordance with the Modalities for Chair of ASEAN and ASEAN Sectoral Bodies to Host Meetings at the ASEAN Secretariat. We also acknowledged the importance of strengthening the ASEAN Secretariat's cross-pillar institutional capacity and provision of policy support to the ASEAN Community-building process, and therefore welcomed the initiative to Strengthen the Analysis and Monitoring Function of the ASEAN Secretariat.

ASEAN POLITICAL-SECURITY COMMUNITY

Implementation of the APSC Blueprint 2025

30. We welcomed the final Report of the ASEAN Political Security Community (APSC) Blueprint 2025 MTR and were encouraged that the majority of the activities undertaken in the implementation of the APSC Blueprint 2025, thus far, had medium to high impact on ASEAN Community building, and 80% of the activities were expected to be sustained in the future. We expressed our satisfaction with the encouraging progress made with 97% of the action lines in the APSC Blueprint 2025 having been acted upon. We acknowledged the Report's suggestions to include in the monitoring of the progress of ASEAN Political Security Community building emerging issues such as but not limited to the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP); ASEAN's collective response to the COVID-19 pandemic; developments in cybersecurity; and Women, Peace and Security Agenda.

Non-Traditional Security Threats

Terrorism and Violent Extremism

31. Recognising the importance of a collective and comprehensive approach to address terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism and radicalisation, we expressed our continued support for the ASEAN Plan of Action to Prevent and Counter the Rise of Radicalisation and Violent Extremism (PoA PCRVE) 2018-2025 and encouraged the continued implementation of the Work Plan of the PoA PCRVE (Bali Work Plan) 2019-2025 through cross- sectoral and cross-pillar cooperation by all relevant ASEAN Sectoral Bodies/Organs/Entities, as well as Dialogue Partners and External Parties.

Illicit Drugs

32. We reiterated the importance of cross-sectoral and cross-pillar coordination to combat illicit drug activities in the region and reaffirmed our commitment towards a drug-free ASEAN and a zero-tolerance approach towards illicit drugs. We stressed the importance of implementing the ASEAN Work Plan in Securing Communities Against Illicit Drugs 2016-2025 (ASEAN Work Plan 2016-2025) and noted with appreciation the progress of the ongoing Mid-Term Review of ASEAN Work Plan 2016-2025.

Trafficking in Persons

33. We reaffirmed our collective commitment to combating trafficking in persons in a more holistic manner through cross-sectoral and cross-pillar coordination. We noted progress in the implementation of the Bohol Trafficking in Persons Work Plan (2017-2020), which involved nine ASEAN Sectoral Bodies, and looked forward to the final review of the Work Plan and its way forward.

34. We expressed concern over the irregular movement of persons in the Southeast Asia region. We noted that criminal groups had taken advantage of the socio-economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic to exploit vulnerable groups. We acknowledged the close connection between irregular movement of persons, trafficking in persons, and smuggling of migrants. We reaffirmed the need for ASEAN Member States' coordinated responses in addressing the issues of trafficking in persons, smuggling of migrants and related transnational crime, including irregular movement of persons.

Cybersecurity

35. We welcomed the progress in ASEAN cybersecurity cooperation and reaffirmed our commitment to building an open, secure, stable, accessible, interoperable, and peaceful ICT environment in ASEAN in view of the rapidly growing threats in the cyber sphere. Noting the transboundary and cross- cutting nature of cybersecurity, we welcomed the establishment of the cross- sectoral and cross-pillar ASEAN Cybersecurity Coordinating Committee (ASEAN Cyber-CC), which held its Inaugural Meeting in November 2020 and welcomed the proposal to develop a Regional Action Plan on the Implementation of the Norms of Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace to facilitate ASEAN Member States in prioritising the implementation of the 11 norms based on their readiness and interests. We recognised the role of cybersecurity activities and training programmes of the ASEAN-Singapore Cybersecurity Centre of Excellence (ASCCE) in Singapore and the ASEAN-Japan Cybersecurity Capacity Building Centre (AJCCBC) in Bangkok in complementing existing ASEAN efforts in cybersecurity capacity building.

Peace and Security

36. We reaffirmed the importance of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) as the key code of conduct in governing inter-state relations in the region and as a foundation for maintaining regional peace and stability. We remain committed to further promoting the principles embodied in the TAC and emphasised the importance of all High Contracting Parties in fulfilling their obligations under the Treaty. We looked forward to the accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, the Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Sultanate of Oman, State of Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates to the TAC. We also welcomed the growing interest of non-regional countries to accede to the TAC, on the basis of respect for and in conformity with the purposes and principles of the TAC.

37. We congratulated the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) on the occasion of its 15th anniversary and in this regard, welcomed the Bandar Seri Begawan Declaration in Commemoration of the 15th Anniversary of the ADMM Towards A Future-Ready, Peaceful and Prosperous ASEAN and the Bandar Seri Begawan Declaration by the ADMM-Plus in Commemoration of the 15th Anniversary of the ADMM on Promoting A Future-Ready, Peaceful and Prosperous ASEAN. We were pleased to observe further progress in ASEAN defence cooperation. We looked forward to the contribution of the ASEAN Cyber Defence Network (ACDN) and the ADMM Cybersecurity and Information Centre of Excellence (ACICE) in safeguarding our cyber space. The ACDN aims to link the cyber defence operation centres of ASEAN Member States to promote and enhance a secure and resilient cyber space through greater collaboration. The ACICE will strengthen cooperation between defence establishments against disinformation and misinformation. We noted that the ADMM recently performed a stocktaking exercise and adopted the Concept Paper on ADMM's External Engagements, which are aimed at affirming ASEAN Centrality and strengthening the working processes in the defence sector. We commended the decision of the Post-Implementation Review of the annualisation of the ADMM-Plus to continue the annual convening of the ADMM-Plus which underscores the importance of ADMM and ADMM-Plus as the region's main multilateral platforms for practical defence and security cooperation and strategic dialogue. We also commended the ADMM-Plus commitment to maintain ASEAN's leading role in the shaping of regional security architecture. We acknowledged the defence sector's continued commitment and contribution to ASEAN's collective response to the COVID-19 pandemic through the ASEAN Centre of Military Medicine (ACMM), the Network of ASEAN Chemical, Biological and Radiological Defence Experts and the ASEAN Military Medicine Conference (AMMC).

38. We noted the development of ASEAN cooperation on law and legal matters, undertaken by the ASEAN Law Ministers' Meeting (ALAWMM) and the ASEAN Senior Law Officials' Meeting (ASLOM) in supporting the ASEAN Community- building agenda and strengthening a rules-based ASEAN. We also welcomed the finalisation of the Terms of Reference of the ASLOM Working Group on ASEAN Extradition Treaty and looked forward to the progress on the development of an ASEAN Extradition Treaty.

39. We looked forward to the 1st Senior Officials' Meeting of the Central Authorities on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (SOM-MLAT) to be convened by Brunei Darussalam in the last quarter of 2021 to discuss various issues in ensuring the effective implementation of the MLAT and strengthening the AMS capacity to combat transnational crimes.

40. We welcomed the outcomes of the 7th and 8th Annual Meetings of the ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy (ASEANTOM) in November 2020 and July 2021 respectively, that discussed ways to enhance cooperation among the nuclear regulatory bodies and further strengthen nuclear safety, security, and safeguards in the region. We also welcomed the progress of the implementation of the Practical Arrangements (PA) between ASEAN and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on Cooperation in the Areas of Nuclear Science and Technology and Applications, Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards, signed in September 2019 through the convening of relevant activities and initiatives.

41. We reiterated our commitment to preserve the Southeast Asian region as a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone and free of all other weapons of mass destruction as enshrined in the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ Treaty) and the ASEAN Charter. We stressed the importance of the full and effective implementation of the SEANWFZ Treaty, including through implementing the Plan of Action to Strengthen the Implementation of the Treaty on the SEANWFZ (2018-2022). We reaffirmed our commitment to continuously engage the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and intensify the ongoing efforts of all parties to resolve all outstanding issues in accordance with the objectives and principles of the SEANWFZ Treaty. Our ASEAN experts could explore ways to bridge the differences, including the possibility of engaging with the NWS experts. We look forward to the submission of the biennial SEANWFZ Resolution through the First Committee to the 76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA).

42. We noted ASEAN-IPR's activities with relevant ASEAN Bodies' and ASEAN External Partners to promote the culture of peace and moderation in ASEAN. We encouraged the ASEAN-IPR to find innovative solutions to ensure its sustainability and activities. We also noted ASEAN-IPR's continued support for ASEAN Women for Peace Registry (AWPR) to implement the ASEAN Leaders' Joint Statement on Promoting Women, Peace and Security.

43. We welcomed ASEAN's efforts in promoting and empowering women's participation and leading roles in peace and security in the region, particularly the launch of the ASEAN Regional Study on Women, Peace and Security. The Regional Study reaffirmed ASEAN's commitment to gender equality, women's leadership, and women's role and participation in implementing the ASEAN Comprehensive Recovery Framework. We noted the role of

the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC) in the development of an ASEAN regional plan of action on the WPS Agenda, and looked forward to the implementation of the other recommendations of the Regional Study by other relevant ASEAN sectoral bodies, where appropriate. We noted Member States' initiative to promote the WPS Agenda in the region through the support of the Southeast Asian Network of Women Peace Negotiators and Mediators in convening the Regional Forum of Women Peace Mediators and Negotiators in June 2021.

44. We commended the role of the ASEAN Regional Mine Action Centre (ARMAC) as a centre of excellence in promoting ASEAN's efforts to address the issue of explosive remnants of war (ERW) for interested ASEAN Member States and raise awareness of the danger of ERW among affected communities. We welcomed the convening of ARMAC's hybrid workshop on "Achieving Sustainable and Inclusive Development in Landmine/ERW Affected Countries" in Siem Reap, Cambodia, in July 2021.

Maritime Cooperation

45. We noted the United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/75/239 emphasising in the Preamble, the universal and unified character of the 1982 UNCLOS, and reaffirming that the Convention sets out the legal framework within which all activities in the oceans and seas must be carried out and is of strategic importance as the basis for national, regional and global action and cooperation in the marine sector, and that its integrity needs to be maintained.

46. We welcomed positive developments in maritime cooperation among ASEAN Member States, including through continued constructive dialogues on issues of common interest and concern under the ambit of ASEAN-led mechanisms. We encouraged ASEAN Member States to intensify cooperation in promoting maritime security, safety and freedom of navigation and overflight, addressing transnational crime at sea, creating conducive environment for peaceful settlement of disputes, ensuring marine sustainability, providing humanitarian assistance to persons and vessels in distress at sea, combating Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, promoting maritime connectivity and commerce, strengthening marine scientific research, in accordance with international law, including the 1982 UNCLOS, the relevant Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and the relevant instruments and conventions of the International Maritime Organization (IMO).

47. We noted with satisfaction the successful convening of the 10th ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF) and 8th Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF) held in December 2020, and reaffirmed the role of the AMF and EAMF in promoting maritime cooperation in the region through dialogue and consultation. Taking into account the cross-cutting nature of maritime cooperation, we encouraged stronger coordination among ASEAN cross-sectoral bodies and other relevant ASEAN mechanisms to avoid duplication of efforts.

Human Rights

48. We congratulated the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) on its progress and achievements in promoting and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, and in the implementation of its Priority Programmes/Activities over the past years on human rights, including in areas such as women, children and persons with disabilities, as well as migrant workers. AICHR's work in the context of public health and recovery response to the COVID-19 pandemic, especially its consideration for the needs of the vulnerable groups, was highly commendable. We also appreciated the AICHR's efforts to remain responsive and adaptive in rolling out its priority programmes strategically focused on human rights and other cross-sectoral issues. We tasked our Senior Officials to continue working on the implementation of the decision made by the 52nd AMM on AICHR and looked forward to the establishment of the Panel of Experts. We noted the proposal from AICHR to hold an ASEAN Human Rights Dialogue 2021 in September 2021.

49. We noted the development of the Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Framework for tracking implementation progress of the AICHR's Five-Year Work Plan 2021-2025. Moving forward, we encouraged the AICHR to continue its efforts to fully and effectively discharge its mandate and functions, particularly in promoting and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms of the peoples of ASEAN, and to reinforce its cooperation with external partners and regional entities while retaining its public outreach and communications through the AICHR website and social media to engage all members of society in contributing to the building of a people-oriented, people-centred ASEAN Community.

ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY

Priority Economic Deliverables

50. We expressed our commitment to support the timely realisation of Brunei Darussalam's Priority Economic Deliverables (PEDs) under the AEC Pillar, which are divided into three strategic thrusts of Recovery, Digitalisation, and Sustainability. We remain confident that, despite the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, ASEAN would not be deterred from realising these PEDs as targeted.

51. We are encouraged by the forward-looking development of the PED on the development of the Work Plan on the Implementation of the ASEAN Agreement on E-Commerce 2021-2025, which aims to advance effective implementation of the ASEAN Agreement on E-Commerce over the next five years both at regional and national levels, thus paving the way for ASEAN to transform itself into a leading digital community. We also looked forward to the complete ratification, and timely entry into force of the ASEAN Agreement on Electronic Commerce. We reiterated the importance of finalising the Regional Action Plan on the Implementation of the Norms of Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace to enable ASEAN to be forward looking in this emerging area.

52. We also supported the PED on Circular Economy that is geared towards the achievement of a resilient economy, resource efficiency, and sustainable growth in the region. We noted the development of the Framework for Circular Economy for the AEC, which aims to provide

clear and strategic direction to the AEC work on circular economy, and look forward to its adoption later this year. We noted how potential areas of cooperation on sustainable development and clean and renewable energy, among others, can complement the AEC work on the circular economy. We also looked forward to the PEDs specific to advancing ASEAN energy and minerals cooperation that seek to respond to the emerging opportunities and challenges of ASEAN's continuing efforts towards energy security and energy transitions in line with the ASEAN Plan of Action for Energy Cooperation (APAEC) 2016-2025, including through cooperation with the ASEAN Centre for Energy as well as the responsible development of the region's mineral resources amidst the increasing intensity of minerals demanded by the modern digital age, low carbon recovery and growth, and sustainable development in accordance with ASEAN Minerals Cooperation Action Plan (AMCAP) 2016-2025. Towards accelerating energy transition and strengthening energy resilience, we were pleased to note the positive progress made in the implementation of the APAEC Phase II 2021-2025. To highlight the regional energy transitions and energy security agenda, we looked forward to the adoption of the Joint Declaration on Energy Security and Energy Transition.

Tourism

53. We commended the tremendous efforts by ASEAN tourism sector in implementing creative and innovative solutions, such as utilising digital technology, to aid the tourism sector's resilience amidst the pandemic and to ensure that the tourism sector is responsive and can be safely reopened. We look forward to the implementation of the Post-COVID19 Recovery Plan for ASEAN Tourism as one of the PEDs. We also noted with appreciation the development of an ASEAN Guidelines for Hygiene and Safety for Workers and Communities in the Tourism Industry as part of the ACRF to instil trust and confidence in the resumption of travel to Southeast Asia. These initiatives would help rebuild the ASEAN tourism industry, a major driver for regional economic growth and social advancement, to be more sustainable, inclusive and resilient.

AEC Mid-term Review

54. We welcomed the launch of the Report of the Mid-Term Review (MTR) of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) Blueprint 2025 and are pleased to note the good progress made in the implementation of the 23 sectoral work plans in the Blueprint. Acknowledging the significant contribution of the AEC to ASEAN's Community-building process, we look forward to the early and effective followup by AEC sectoral bodies on the recommendations in the MTR as we enter the second phase towards achieving the AEC's 2025 goals.

Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership

55. We welcomed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Agreement that was signed in November 2020 amidst the COVID-19 global pandemic. We recognised the significant contribution that the RCEP could make to the overall post-pandemic economic recovery, expansion of regional trade and investment, job creation, and inclusive global economic growth and development. We noted the progress of the preparatory work for the entry into force of the RCEP and looked forward to its completion. We reaffirmed our commitment to expedite respective domestic ratification procedures to have the RCEP Agreement enter into force as targeted in early 2022.

Air Transport

56. We welcomed the successful conclusion of the negotiations on the ASEAN-EU Comprehensive Air Transport Agreement (AE CATA) at the Extraordinary ASEAN-EU Senior Transport Officials Meeting held on 2 June 2021, which would help bolster air connectivity and economic development between ASEAN and Europe. We also welcomed the adoption of the first set of ASEAN-wide COVID-19 operational guidelines by the 26th ASEAN Transport Ministers Meeting held on 24 November 2020 for the protection and safety of passengers and operational air crew, as well as cleaning and disinfection of aircraft, aiming to mitigate the risk of COVID-19 transmission, restore passenger confidence, and support the safe resumption of aviation activities in ASEAN.

Agriculture and Forestry

57. We noted that sustainable food production and resilient agricultural practices, including sustainable production of vegetable oils, are essential to the attainment of the SDGs by 2030 and will contribute to the regional and global effort towards economic recovery and green growth. We welcomed the convening of the First Meeting of the Joint Working Group on Palm Oil between the European Union and Relevant ASEAN Member Countries to continue promoting mutual understanding on the sustainable production of vegetable oils and address the challenges in this sector in a holistic, transparent, and non- discriminatory manner. To this end, we reaffirmed our support for the relevant Member States to promote collaboration and sustainability efforts and practices in the vegetable oil sector.

58. We looked forward to the early establishment and operationalisation of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Animal Health and Zoonoses (ACCAHZ) to provide a comprehensive, integrated, and concerted regional approach that will coordinate national approaches in animal health and zoonoses measures.

Payment Connectivity

59. We also welcomed the launch of the Singapore-Thailand real time retail payment system cross-border linkage which is a tangible milestone for payments connectivity in supporting ASEAN's digitalisation drive and enabling financial inclusion in the region. We look forward to further expanding this bilateral linkage into a network of linked retail payment systems across ASEAN.

ASEAN SOCIO-CULTURAL COMMUNITY

60. We reaffirmed our commitment to a people-oriented and people-centred Community that embodies an adaptive spirit of preparedness and resilience to build a peaceful, cohesive, caring and prosperous region, reflective of ASEAN's past commitments with renewed aspiration in consolidating and strengthening ASEAN's common goals. To this end, we looked forward to the adoption of the ASEAN Strategic Policy Framework on Promoting an Adaptive Community of Fostering Greater Understanding, Tolerance and a Sense of Regional Agendas among the Peoples of ASEAN at the 38th ASEAN Summit in October 2021. We welcomed the adoption of the Narrative of ASEAN Identity by the 37th ASEAN Summit in November 2020, and agreed to actively promote the Narrative through relevant activities.

Social Welfare and Development

61. We reaffirmed our commitment to fostering cooperation in social welfare and development aimed at raising the standard of living, especially for the poor and vulnerable groups in ASEAN and seeking the active involvement of all sectors of society. In this regard, we noted the progress on the initiative of the ASEAN Outstanding Social Welfare and Development Awards (AOSWADA) by the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Social Welfare and Development (AMMSWD) which will serve as a platform to foster sustained partnerships and cooperation among non-government organisations, civil society organisations, and the private sector in ASEAN.

Gender Mainstreaming

62. We reaffirmed our commitment to advocate gender equality and ensure meaningful participation of women and girls in the region's social and economic development. We welcomed the launch of the ASEAN Gender Outlook in March 2021.

63. We commended ASEAN's efforts and Member States' initiatives on women empowerment and the convening of the first ASEAN Women Leaders' Summit with the theme "Women's Role in Building a Cohesive, Dynamic, Sustainable, and Inclusive ASEAN Community in a Post-COVID-19 World" in November 2020. We also commended the continued efforts and contributions of the ASEAN Women's Entrepreneur Network (AWEN) in strengthening entrepreneurship capacities and skills for women in ASEAN.

Education

64. We noted with appreciation the recent adoption of the ASEAN Workplan on Education 2021-2025, and look forward to its implementation, which reaffirms the principles of quality, equity and inclusion in education and is anchored on a lifelong learning framework encompassing different stages and modalities of education and catering to the needs and contexts of all learners. We also reaffirmed ASEAN's commitment to collectively improve access to digital connectivity and skills to support teaching and learning, and to ensure inclusion and equity, harness partnerships with the private sector, and empower children and young people to shape the digital transformation of education in the region.

Human Resource Development

65. We welcomed the adoption of the ASEAN Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) Council's Rules of Procedure and the finalisation of its inaugural medium-term work plan to be noted at the 38th ASEAN Summit. We took note of the completion of the Regional Report on Human Resources Development Readiness in ASEAN and implementation of the ASEAN Declaration on Human Resources Development for the Changing World of Work.

66. We underlined the importance of strengthening labour market information in the region to promote more evidence-based policies. We were therefore pleased to note the data updating of the ASEAN Informal Employment Statistics and the first data collection for the monitoring framework of the ASEAN Roadmap on Elimination of Worst Forms of Child Labour by 2025. We further noted the completion of the Regional Study on Labour Productivity in ASEAN launched in February 2021, which led to the exploration of the establishment of a regional labour productivity index for ASEAN.

Youth and Sport Development

67. We looked forward to the establishment of the ASEAN Youth Academy in Brunei Darussalam as an institution dedicated to the youth of ASEAN that enables knowledge exchange and skills development through hands-on experience and direct interaction with ASEAN officials and experts. We noted with satisfaction the completion of the study on ASEAN Awareness, Values and Identity in the context of the fifth domain of the ASEAN Youth Development Index and looked forward to the launch of the report by the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Youth (AMMY).

68. We congratulated the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Sports (AMMS) for the adoption of Terms of Reference (TOR) of the Technical Working Group for the Preparation of ASEAN's Joint Bid for the FIFA World Cup 2034 (TWG-FWC) and looked forward to the convening of its first meeting. We also welcomed the potential expansion of sports sectoral cooperation with our Dialogue Partners. In reaffirming our commitment to promoting the protection of the integrity of sport by preventing doping and promoting a commitment to the concepts of ethics in sports and fair play, we also looked forward to the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between ASEAN and the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA).

Environment and Transboundary Haze Pollution

69. We underscored our resolve and commitment towards building a resilient community with the capability and capacity to adapt and tackle climate change. We reaffirmed our commitment to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Paris Agreement in particular the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in light of different national circumstances. In this regard, we look forward to the 26th United Nations Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP26) in November 2021 in Glasgow, United Kingdom.

70. We recognised the potential interlinkages between biodiversity loss, ecosystem degradation and zoonosis, and committed to using the momentum to engage relevant sectoral bodies to integrate biodiversity into responding to COVID-19 and preventing future public health emergencies and pandemics. We noted a series of initiatives and programs coordinated by the ASEAN Centre for Biodiversity (ACB), including effectively managing protected areas, improving species conservation, enhancing ecosystem restoration, and promoting natural capital integration. We affirmed our support to the UN Decade on Ecosystem Restoration and endeavoured to promote the restoration and sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems resources through the ASEAN Green Initiative with the planting of 10 million trees in the region in 10 years beginning in 2021. We looked forward to the launch of the Investing in Sustainable Natural Capital in ASEAN Status Report this year, which will be the basis for developing an ASEAN Natural Capital Roadmap.

71. We noted the enhanced regional cooperation in addressing transboundary issues such as marine litter and haze pollution control. We encouraged enhanced regional cooperation

to address marine debris, and welcomed the launch of the ASEAN Regional Action Plan for Combating Marine Debris in the ASEAN Member States (2021–2025) which provides specific policy and programme recommendations to tackle marine plastic debris.

72. We noted that transboundary haze pollution, arising from land and forest fires remains a major concern in the region. We reiterated our commitment to the full and effective implementation of the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (AATHP) and the Roadmap on ASEAN Cooperation towards Transboundary Haze Pollution Control with Means of Implementation to achieve a Haze-Free ASEAN. We commended the progress of the ASEAN Peatland Management Strategy (APMS 2006-2020) and welcomed the commencement of the formulation of the next APMS. We note the ongoing Final Review of the Roadmap on ASEAN Cooperation Towards Transboundary Haze Pollution with Means of Implementation and look forward to receiving its recommendations. We are also pleased to note the progress of the haze and peatland programmes/projects, namely: Sustainable Use of Peatland and Haze Mitigation in ASEAN (SUPA) and Measurable Action for Haze-Free Sustainable Land Management in Southeast Asia (MAHFSA). We noted the progress towards the finalisation of the Establishment Agreement and Host Country Agreement of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Transboundary Haze Pollution Control (ACCTHPC) and looked forward to its operationalisation, which will facilitate faster and effective implementation of all aspects of AATHP to address transboundary haze pollution in the ASEAN region. We stressed the importance of remaining vigilant and noted the ongoing preventive efforts to minimise any possible occurrence of transboundary smoke haze during periods of drier weather. We looked forward to the final reviews of the APMS and the Roadmap to evaluate the achievement of a haze-free ASEAN.

Disaster Management and Emergency Response

73. We welcomed the launch and the implementation of the AADMER Work Programme 2021-2025 and to advance ASEAN's priorities and capabilities in managing disasters in the region and realise ASEAN's aspiration to be a global leader in disaster management by 2025 as set in the ASEAN Vision 2025 on Disaster Management. We noted the ongoing review of the Financial Rules of the ASEAN Disaster Management and Emergency Response (ADMER) Fund to enhance ASEAN's disaster funding and resource mobilisation mechanisms by looking beyond traditional funding sources to establish a self-sufficient fund, such as the potential establishment of a suitable platform for members of the public to contribute towards ASEAN's disaster response efforts. We looked forward to the adoption and launching of the ASEAN Regional Plan of Action on Adaptation to Drought 2021-2025 to implement the ASEAN Declaration on the Strengthening of Adaptation to Drought adopted on 17 November 2020. We noted the importance of Disaster Emergency Logistics System for ASEAN (DELSA) Regional Warehouse and Satellite Warehouses in disaster management. We reaffirmed the importance of promoting a whole-of-ASEAN approach in disaster management, including through strengthening the Joint Task Force to Promote Synergy with other Relevant ASEAN Bodies on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (JTF on HADR). We reaffirmed our commitment to continuously enhance ASEAN's capacity in implementing the ASEAN Declaration on One ASEAN One Response through supporting the AHA Centre, and appreciated the work of the AHA Centre.

74. We reaffirmed our support for a more visible and enhanced role of ASEAN to support Myanmar by providing humanitarian assistance, facilitating the repatriation process, and promoting sustainable development in Rakhine State. We stressed the importance of the voluntary return of displaced persons in a safe, secure, and dignified manner, in accordance with the bilateral agreement between Myanmar and Bangladesh. We further underscored the importance of efforts to addressing the root causes of the conflict in Rakhine State. We reiterated our appreciation to the Secretary-General of ASEAN for his efforts in leading the implementation of the recommendations of the Preliminary Needs Assessment (PNA) which has been making progress. We appreciated the contribution from ASEAN Member States and some external partners in supporting ASEAN activities, including the prioritised projects in Rakhine State to facilitate the repatriation process and to promote inclusive and sustainable development, including through providing basic services and creating livelihood opportunities for the displaced persons. We also looked forward to the conduct of the Comprehensive Needs Assessment (CNA) when conditions allow and encouraged the Secretary-General of ASEAN to continue identifying possible areas for ASEAN to effectively facilitate the repatriation process.

ASEAN EXTERNAL RELATIONS

75. We underscored the importance of strengthening ASEAN Centrality and unity in our engagement with ASEAN's external partners, including through ASEAN-led mechanisms such as the ASEAN-Plus One, ASEAN Plus Three (APT), East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and ADMM-Plus, in order to build mutual trust and confidence as well as reinforce an open, transparent, inclusive, and rules-based regional architecture with ASEAN at the centre.

76. We noted with satisfaction the encouraging progress in ASEAN's relations with our Dialogue Partners, Sectoral Dialogue Partners, and Development Partners through the existing frameworks, Plans of Action, Practical Cooperation Areas, and development cooperation programmes based on mutual interest and benefit. We acknowledged with appreciation the contribution of these partnerships to our ASEAN Community-building and development cooperation efforts. We also welcomed the support of our partners for the priorities of ASEAN in 2021 under the theme of "We Care, We Prepare, We Prosper". We agreed to further strengthen partnerships and cooperation with our external partners, thus contributing to the continued efforts towards the realisation of the ASEAN Community Vision 2025 and our proactive response to challenges, including the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, and opportunities thereon.

77. We took note of the growing interest from countries and regional organisations outside of the region in developing stronger collaboration and substantial cooperation with ASEAN, including through applications for formal partnerships with ASEAN. We affirmed the importance of pursuing an outward-looking policy and agreed on the need to reach out to new potential partners based on shared interest, constructive engagement, and mutual benefit which could contribute to ASEAN's Community-building, regional integration and development cooperation efforts. We also welcomed the increased engagement between the Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN and ASEAN's partners, including through the 95 Non-ASEAN Ambassadors Accredited to ASEAN (NAAAs). We also welcomed the role of the 54 ASEAN Committees in Third Countries and International Organisations in promoting ASEAN's interest and forging partnerships in the respective host countries and international organisations.

78. We agreed to accord the United Kingdom the status of Dialogue Partner of ASEAN in view of its individual relationship with ASEAN as well as its past cooperation and engagement with ASEAN when it was a member of the European Union, in accordance with the Guidelines for ASEAN's External Relations (2014) and the List of Criteria for Dialogue Partnership (2021). We looked forward to the ASEAN Secretariat's recommendations on the modalities of engagement including arrangements on coordinatorship.

79. We agreed to commence a comprehensive review of the moratorium on new dialogue partnerships, in conjunction with the work of the ASEAN Community Vision Post-2025, with the objective to enhance the ASEAN Community and advance ASEAN's relations with external parties based on the principles of strengthening ASEAN Centrality, openness and inclusivity as enshrined in the ASEAN Charter, the TAC and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.

Dialogue Partners

80. We look forward to the convening of the 24th ASEAN-Japan Summit, 22nd ASEAN-Republic of Korea Summit, the 18th ASEAN-India Summit, the 9th ASEAN-U.S. Summit and the 1st annual ASEAN-Australia Summit to be held in October 2021. We also look forward to the convening of the 24th ASEAN-China Summit to commemorate the 30th Anniversary of ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations, and the 4th ASEAN-Russia Summit to mark 30 years of ASEAN- Russia relations and 25 years of Dialogue Partnership to be held in October 2021 back-to-back with the 38th and 39th ASEAN Summits and Related Summits, and the adoption of the Comprehensive Plan of Action to Implement ASEAN-Russia Strategic Partnership (2021-2025).

ASEAN Sectoral Dialogue Partners and ASEAN Development Partners

81. We noted the good progress made in the ASEAN-Switzerland Sectoral Dialogue Partnership, ASEAN-Norway Sectoral Dialogue Partnership, ASEAN- Turkey Sectoral Dialogue Partnership, ASEAN-Germany Development Partnership, ASEAN-Chile Development Partnership as well as the ASEAN- France Development Partnership and ASEAN-Italy Development Partnership. We welcomed the adoption of the Practical Cooperation Areas for ASEAN-Chile Development Partnership 2021-2025 and Practical Cooperation Areas for ASEAN-Norway Sectoral Dialogue Partnership 2021-2025 and appreciated the ongoing support of these partnerships for ASEAN's Community-building efforts. In this regard, we look forward to the holding of the individual Trilateral Meetings between the ASEAN Chair, the Secretary-General of ASEAN and Norway, Switzerland and Turkey respectively to explore opportunities for further cooperation and exchanges on issues of mutual interest.

Regional and International Organisations

82. We reaffirmed the importance of multilateralism and underscored the importance of ASEAN's partnerships with other external partners such as regional and international organisations, including the United Nations to address global concerns, pursue shared goals and complementary initiatives, and promote sustainable development for the benefit of our people. In this connection, we welcomed the convening of the 11th ASEAN-U.N. Summit held via videoconference in November 2020. We also welcomed the contribution of Viet Nam, as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, and took note of the convening of the High-level Open Debate on "Cooperation between UN and regional organisations in enhancing confidence-building and dialogue in conflict prevention and resolution" in April 2021.

83. We were pleased to note the positive progress made in the implementation of the Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Declaration on Comprehensive Partnership between ASEAN and the United Nations (2021-2025). We reaffirmed our commitment to intensifying cooperation in the implementation of the Complementarities Roadmap and effectively realizing the goals of the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

ASEAN Plus Three

84. We reaffirmed the importance of the APT cooperation framework in promoting peace, stability and prosperity in the East Asian region. We underscored the need to further strengthen and deepen functional cooperation under the APT framework, which plays a key role in regional community building in East Asia, with ASEAN as the driving force. We agreed to further enhance APT cooperation in wide-ranging areas through the implementation of the APT Cooperation Work Plan 2018-2022 and the EAVG II Recommendations. In this regard, we looked forward to the development of a successor Work Plan (2023- 2027), which will serve as a principal guide in enhancing the APT process and identifying new areas of cooperation over the next five years. We were committed to further strengthening APT cooperation in response to emerging challenges and ensuring the effective implementation of the APT Leaders' Statement on Strengthening APT Cooperation for Economic and Financial Resilience in the face of Emerging Challenges which was adopted at the 23rd APT Summit in November 2020. We are committed to promoting APT cooperation in post-pandemic recovery, including by strengthening mental health cooperation in a post-COVID-19 era and in this regard, welcomed the proposed issuance of the APT Leaders' Statement on Cooperation on Mental Health Amongst Adolescents and Young Children at the 24th APT Summit in October 2021.

East Asia Summit

85. We reaffirmed our commitment to further strengthening the EAS as a Leaders- led forum for dialogue on broad strategic, political, and economic issues of common interest and concern with the aim of promoting peace, stability, and economic prosperity in the region. In this regard, we were committed to ensuring the effective follow-up on the Ha Noi Declaration on the 15th Anniversary of the East Asia Summit, which was adopted at the 15th East Asia Summit in November 2020, to further strengthen the EAS process, sustain its strategic value and relevance as well as enhance its responsiveness to fast-changing developments in the regional and global context. We agreed to further enhance EAS practical cooperation under the Manila Plan of Action to Advance the Phnom Penh Declaration on the EAS Development Initiative (2018-2022). We also looked forward to the development of a successor Plan of Action for the next five years (2023-2027), building on the existing Plan of Action's areas of cooperation, and current issues and challenges. We also highlighted the need to strengthen EAS collaboration, based on the principle of ASEAN Centrality, in response to emerging issues and challenges that affect peace, stability and

prosperity in the region, as well as the adverse impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, such as mental health, and in facilitating a sustainable comprehensive recovery. In this regard, we welcomed the proposed issuance of the EAS Leaders Statements, namely the EAS Leaders' Statement on Mental Health Cooperation, EAS Leaders' Statement on Economic Growth Through Tourism Recovery and the EAS Leaders' Statement on Green Recovery: Advancing Towards a Sustainable and Resilient Future, at the 16th EAS in October 2021. We welcomed the continued discussions and efforts to strengthen the EAS, including through, among others, the regular engagement of the EAS Ambassadors' Meeting in Jakarta to discuss implementation of the Leaders' decisions as well as exchanging information on regional development cooperation initiatives and security policies and initiatives, and discussions on the evolving regional architecture.

ASEAN Regional Forum

86. We reiterated the importance of the ARF as a key platform for dialogue and consultation on regional political and security issues of common interest and concern. We noted with satisfaction the progress of cooperation in the ARF, and commended the provisional measures undertaken to ensure continuity of cooperation and operations of the ARF amidst the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. We were pleased to note that the ARF has continued to further enhance its effectiveness and maintain its relevance in the evolving regional security architecture, including its work on cyber security and promoting the youth, peace and security agenda. In this regard, we encouraged follow-up actions to streamline and enhance the efficiency of the ARF based on the agreed Guide to ARF Processes, Procedures, Practices and Protocol. We welcomed the implementation of the ARF Hanoi Plan of Action II (2020-2025) and looked forward to further discussions on developing a post-2025 vision for the ARF. We also looked forward to the adoption of the ARF Statement on Preventing and Combating Cybercrime and the ARF Joint Statement on Promoting the Youth, Peace and Security Agenda at the ARF to be adopted during the 28th ARF.

ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific

87. We reaffirmed the objectives and principles of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo- Pacific (AOIP), which provides a guide for ASEAN's engagement in the wider Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions. We noted that various ASEAN sectoral bodies, ASEAN Political-Security Community and the ASEAN Economic Community pillars, had discussed the implementation of the Outlook. We further noted the ADMM-Plus' recognition of ASEAN's leading role in the shaping of regional economic and security architecture, by promoting close cooperation through ASEAN-led mechanisms, under the guiding principles reflected in the ASEAN Charter, the TAC, the Bali Principles, and reconfirmed in the AOIP. We agreed that ASEAN-led mechanisms, including ASEAN Plus One mechanisms, the EAS, the ADMM-Plus, and the ARF could serve as useful platforms for dialogue and cooperation to implement the Outlook. In this regard, we encouraged external partners to support and undertake cooperation with ASEAN, in accordance with the principles contained in the Outlook, on the four identified key areas, namely maritime cooperation, connectivity, UN SDGs 2030, economic and other possible areas of cooperation, through practical projects to promote mutual trust, mutual respect, and mutual benefit through ASEAN-led mechanisms, thereby contributing to peace, stability and prosperity in the region.

Timor-Leste's Application for ASEAN Membership

88. We noted the progress made in preparing for the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Pillars (ASCC) Fact-Finding Missions (FFM) to Timor-Leste. We looked forward to the convening of the FFMs, when circumstances surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic allow, and to the outcomes of the FFMs, after which a comprehensive assessment of Timor- Leste's application for ASEAN membership would be developed. In this regard, we welcomed the effort of the AEC and ASCC in moving this forward by holding virtual interfaces with Timor-Leste's sectoral counterparts to prepare for their FFMs. In line with the APSC FFM, we reaffirmed our commitment to continue exploring ways to provide capacity building assistance to Timor-Leste, especially through participation in non-policy making activities in ASEAN. In this regard, we looked forward to the ACC's endorsement of the Guidelines for Timor-Leste's Participation in ASEAN Activities for Capacity Building Purposes, and the accompanying Matrices of ASEAN Non-Policy Making Activities for Timor-Leste's Participation for Capacity Building Purposes, and their implementation.

REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

South China Sea

89. We discussed the situation in the South China Sea, during which concerns were expressed by some Ministers on the land reclamations, activities, serious incidents in the area, including damage to the marine environment, which have eroded trust and confidence, increased tensions, and may undermine peace, security, and stability in the region. We reaffirmed the need to enhance mutual trust and confidence, exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability, and avoid actions that may further complicate the situation. We further reaffirmed the need to pursue peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with the universally recognised principles of international law, including the 1982 UNCLOS. We emphasised the importance of non-militarisation and self-restraint in the conduct of all activities by claimants and all other states, including those mentioned in the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) that could further complicate the situation and escalate tensions in the South China Sea.

90. We reaffirmed the importance of maintaining and promoting peace, security, stability, safety, and freedom of navigation in and overflight above the South China Sea and recognised the benefits of having the South China Sea as a sea of peace, stability, and prosperity. We underscored the importance of the full and effective implementation of the DOC in its entirety. We warmly welcomed the continuously improving cooperation between ASEAN and China, and were encouraged by the progress of the substantive negotiations towards the early conclusion of an effective and substantive Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC) consistent with international law, including the 1982 UNCLOS, within a mutually-agreed timeline. We welcomed the resumption of textual negotiations on the Single Draft COC Negotiating Text (SDNT), which has resulted in provisional agreement on the Preamble section after delays due to the COVID-19 pandemic. We recognised the importance of negotiations through virtual platforms, while reaffirming that physical meetings would remain the primary modality, and looked forward

to further progress towards the early conclusion of an effective and substantive COC that is in accordance with international law, including the 1982 UNCLOS. We emphasised the need to maintain and promote an environment conducive to the COC negotiations, and thus welcomed practical measures that could reduce tensions and the risk of accidents, misunderstandings and miscalculation. We stressed the importance of undertaking confidence building and preventive measures to enhance, among others, trust and confidence amongst parties, and we reaffirmed the importance of upholding international law, including the 1982 UNCLOS.

Developments in the Korean Peninsula

91. We stressed the importance of continued peaceful dialogue amongst all concerned parties in order to realise lasting peace and stability in a denuclearised Korean Peninsula. We urged all concerned parties to resume peaceful dialogue and continue working towards the realisation of lasting peace and stability in a denuclearised Korean Peninsula, including through the full and expeditious implementation of the Panmunjom Declaration, the Pyongyang Joint Declaration and the Joint Statement by the United States and Democratic People's Republic of Korea leaders. We reiterated our commitment to the full implementation of all relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions and noted international efforts to bring about the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. We reiterated our readiness to play a constructive role, including through utilising ASEAN-led platforms such as the ARF in promoting a conducive atmosphere to peaceful dialogue amongst the concerned parties.

Situation in the Middle East

92. We expressed concern over the recent developments in the Middle East region. In this regard, we welcomed the ceasefire that took effect on 21 May 2021 as a step toward creating conditions conducive for dialogue. We reiterated the need for a comprehensive, just, and sustainable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in order to achieve peace and stability in the Middle East region. We urged both sides to actively take positive steps to allow for negotiations to gain traction and work together towards the resumption of negotiations to achieve an enduring peace. We fully support the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people for an independent State of Palestine with the realisation of two states, Palestine and Israel living side by side in peace and security based on pre-1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital.

Developments in Myanmar

93. We discussed the recent developments in Myanmar and expressed our concern over the situation in the country, including reports of fatalities and violence. We also heard calls for the release of political detainees including foreigners. We welcomed Myanmar's commitment to the Five-Point Consensus of the ASEAN Leaders Meeting on 24 April 2021 and acceptance for the timely and complete implementation of the Five-Point Consensus namely, the immediate cessation of violence in Myanmar and all parties to exercise utmost restraint; constructive dialogue among all parties concerned to commence to seek a peaceful solution in the interests of the people; a special envoy of the ASEAN Chair to facilitate mediation of the dialogue process, with the assistance of the Secretary-General of ASEAN; ASEAN to provide humanitarian assistance through the AHA Centre; and the

special envoy and delegation to visit Myanmar to meet with all parties concerned. We welcomed the updates provided by the Secretary-General of ASEAN regarding the status of the "Five-Point Consensus". We welcomed the appointment by the ASEAN Chair for the Minister of Foreign Affairs II of Brunei Darussalam to be the Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair on Myanmar, who will start his work in Myanmar, including building trust and confidence with full access to all parties concerned and providing a clear timeline on the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus before the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting. We noted the continued support from our external partners for ASEAN's efforts in the swift and complete implementation of the "Five-Point Consensus", particularly on humanitarian assistance.

94. We reaffirmed the role of AHA Centre to provide humanitarian assistance in Myanmar as mandated in the Five-Point Consensus of the ASEAN Leaders' Meeting. We encourage the Governing Board of the AHA Centre to immediately start the work on the policy guidance to implement the Five-Point Consensus.

55th ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING

95. We looked forward to the convening of the 55th ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting, Post Ministerial Conferences, 23rd APT Foreign Ministers' Meeting, 12th EAS Foreign Ministers' Meeting, and 29th ARF to be held in the Kingdom of Cambodia in 2022.


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